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Abstract 
Attentional Control Theory (ACT) predicts that trait anxiety and situational stress 
interact to impair performance on tasks that involve the phonological loop and 
central executive, specifically the updating, inhibition and shifting functions. The 
theory suggests that anxious individuals recruit additional resources (e.g., effort, 
motivation) to prevent shortfalls in performance effectiveness (accuracy), with 
deficits becoming evident in processing efficiency (the relationship between 
accuracy and time taken to perform the task). These assumptions however, have 
not been systematically tested.  
Two series of experimental studies investigated the relationship between 
anxiety and cognitive performance and were premised on ACT. Series 1 included 
four studies (Study 1.1, Study 1.2, Study 1.3, & Study 1.4) that examined the 
relationship between trait anxiety (somatic and cognitive; operationalised using 
questionnaire scores), situational stress (somatic and cognitive; manipulated using 
threat of electric shock and ego threat instructions, respectively), mental effort 
(indexed using a self-report visual analogue scale) and performance on 
phonological (forward and backward word span), updating (reading span), 
inhibitory (Go-No-Go), and shifting (WCST) tasks. Series 2 included three studies 
(Study 2.1, Study 2.2, & Study 2.3) that investigated the associations between 
cognitive trait anxiety (measured using questionnaire scores), situational stress 
(manipulated using ego threat instructions), motivation (indexed using 
questionnaire scores) and performance on an updating (reading span), inhibitory 
(Go-No-Go), and shifting (WCST) tasks. The two attentional tasks (inhibition and 
shifting) in Series 2 contained both neutral and threat-related stimuli (Study 2.2 & 
Study 2.3). The quasi-experimental designs examined the separate and combined 
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contributions of trait anxiety and situational stress in predicting performance 
effectiveness (quality of performance) and processing efficiency (ratio of 
effectiveness to RT), and investigated the moderating effects of mental effort 
(Series 1) and motivation (Series 2). For each experiment, the data were 
interpreted using separate hierarchical moderated regression analyses that allowed 
for the examination of the unique and combined contributions of the factors after 
controlling for depression, which is known to co-vary with anxiety.  
The data suggested that somatic trait anxiety, somatic stress and effort did 
not combine to predict performance effectiveness or efficiency on phonological, 
updating, inhibitory or shifting tasks.  Somatic trait anxiety and somatic stress did 
however combine to predict phonological efficiency on the complex task 
(backward word span), such that higher somatic trait anxiety predicted greater 
backward span efficiency at low stress relative to high stress (Study 1.1.1). This 
relationship was not moderated by mental effort. The findings were consistent 
with the notion that anxiety-performance link manifests in cognitive rather than 
somatic anxiety.  
For phonological performance, the data revealed that cognitive trait 
anxiety, cognitive situational stress and effort interacted to predict phonological 
efficiency (but not effectiveness) on both the simple (forward word span) and 
complex (backward word span) task. When under evaluative stress conditions 
(ego threat) only, higher trait anxiety predicted lower efficiency at lower effort 
(Study 1.1.2).  
In terms of updating performance, cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress 
and effort did not predict updating effectiveness or efficiency (Study 1.2.1 & 
Study 2.1.1) on the reading span task. With the inclusion of motivation as a 
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predictor however, the data revealed that cognitive trait anxiety and motivation 
combined to predict updating efficiency (but not effectiveness). At higher 
motivation, higher cognitive trait anxiety was related to better updating efficiency, 
whereas at lower motivation, higher cognitive trait anxiety was associated with 
poorer efficiency (Study 2.1.2). 
With respect to inhibitory control, cognitive trait anxiety, cognitive stress 
and effort were inter-related with inhibitory effectiveness and efficiency. 
Irrespective of stress condition, higher trait anxiety was related with lower 
effectiveness at lower effort, yet higher trait anxiety was related to lower 
efficiency at higher effort (Study 1.3.2).   
For shifting performance, the data showed that cognitive trait anxiety, 
situational stress and effort were inter-related with efficiency, but not 
effectiveness. At higher effort, higher trait anxiety was associated with poorer 
shifting efficiency independent of stress condition, whereas at lower effort, this 
relationship was highly significant and most pronounced for those in the ego 
threat group (Study 1.4).  
In term of attentional biases in anxiety, the results demonstrated that 
situational stress and motivation combined to predict inhibitory efficiency (but not 
effectiveness) for threat-related relative to neutral words, such that higher 
motivation was related to poorer inhibitory efficiency for threat under high (ego 
threat), but not low (ego safe) situational stress (Study 2.2). Trait anxiety and 
situational stress combined to predict shifting effectiveness for threat words 
relative to neutral words, such that when under ego threat conditions, those lower 
in trait anxiety had better shifting effectiveness for threat versus neutral words, yet 
those higher in trait anxiety had poorer shifting effectiveness for threat. 
viii 
 
Situational stress and motivation also combined to predict shifting effectiveness 
for threat-related relative to neutral words, such that lower trait anxiety was 
associated with better shifting effectiveness for threat at higher motivation. These 
patterns, however were not present in the data for shifting efficiency in the 
presence of threat (Study 2.3). 
The overall patterns of results were interpreted with respect to ACT. 
Limitations of the current program of research are noted and directions for future 
work are suggested. 
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CHAPTER 1: ANXIETY AND COGNITIVE PERFORMANCE 
Overview and Theoretical Perspectives 
Introduction  
   Anxiety is commonly recognised as a negative mood state and definitions 
are usually couched in terms of a combination of both cognitive and physical 
symptoms. Cognitive characteristics include worry, fear and apprehension, 
whereas physical symptoms include physical tension, shortness of breath, and 
elevated heart rate (see Clark & Watson, 1991). Further, anxiety can be separated 
into two theoretical dimensions: trait anxiety as an enduring, dispositional 
proneness or susceptibility to emotional arousal, and state anxiety as a current, 
situationally-based, aroused state, such as fear of impending threat or danger 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg & 
Jacobs, 1983). Empirical studies (e.g., Spielberger et al., 1970, 1983) have found 
significant positive correlations (.70 or greater) between trait and state anxiety 
with trait anxious individuals more likely to experience heightened levels of state 
anxiety.  
There is evidence to suggest that higher anxiety is related to poorer 
performance on a range of cognitive tasks, such as reasoning (Leon & Revelle, 
1985), memory (MacLeod & Donnellan, 1993), attention (Matthews & MacLeod, 
1985), and planning and decision making (Nichols-Hoppe & Beach, 1990). More 
specifically, elevated levels of anxiety have been associated with performance 
deficits on simple tasks such as recall of word lists (Mueller, 1977), digit span 
(Firetto & Davey, 1971), and letter transformation (Eysenck, 1985). Anxiety has 
also been shown to have detrimental effects on more complex cognitive tasks, 
such as analogical reasoning (Tohill & Holyoak, 2000), reading span (Sorg & 
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Whitney, 1992), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Goodwin & Sher, 
1992). Poor task performance has been linked to both high levels of trait anxiety 
(e.g., Ansari, Derakshan, & Richards, 2008; Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998) and 
elevated state anxiety (e.g., Derakshan, Smyth, & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck, 1985) 
with several studies reporting performance deficits to be associated with the 
relationships between state and trait anxiety (e.g., Edwards, Burt, & Lipp, 2006; 
Edwards, Moore, Champion, & Edwards, 2015; Sorg & Whitney, 1992).  
Additionally, cognitive performance deficits have been linked to elevated 
cognitive anxiety or worry (e.g., Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998; MacLeod & 
Donnellan, 1993) and high levels of somatic anxiety (e.g., Hudetz, Hudetz, & 
Klayman, 2000; Meinhardt & Pekrun, 2003). 
Performance deficits in anxiety are by no means universal or fully 
understood. Understanding the link between the complex biological and 
psychological characteristics of anxiety and cognition remains a challenge for 
clinical psychologists, medical professionals and researchers. The proposed 
program of research focuses on understanding the relationship between anxiety 
and cognitive performance, whilst undertaking a robust test of one of the most 
recent theoretical approaches in this area, namely attentional control theory (ACT; 
Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011; Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos, & Calvo, 2007).  
Theoretical Perspectives  
Since the proposal of the Yerkes-Dodson „Law‟ (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), 
the relationship between anxiety and cognitive performance has become an 
increasingly important topic of inquiry in cognitive psychology. In turn, numerous 
frameworks and models have emerged describing the possible mechanisms that 
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might form the basis of the relationship between anxiety and cognitive processing 
(e.g., Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck, 1979; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; 
Humphreys & Revelle, 1984; Sarason, 1984). The following section reviews the 
theoretical developments within this domain and concludes with an in-depth 
description of ACT (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009, Eysenck et al., 2007; Eysenck 
& Derakshan, 2011), which forms the focus of the thesis.  
Yerkes-Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Yerkes and Dodson 
(1908) proposed a curvilinear relationship (also known as an inverted U) between 
arousal and performance. The principle proposed that performance peaks at a 
moderate level of arousal, with poorer performance being noted at both low and 
high levels of arousal. Later work attributed the pattern to other relationships, 
such as the effects of anxiety and/or motivation on memory and/or processing 
efficiency (see Teigen, 1994 for a review). It seemed plausible that individuals 
lacking in motivation, or even a conservative amount of arousal to maintain focus 
on the task, would most likely experience performance deficits. Conversely, an 
individual expending too much energy or strain would also possibly suffer 
performance impairments. Despite offering a seemingly logical description of the 
relationship between arousal and task performance, critics argued that the Yerkes-
Dodson principle failed to explain the internal processes that produced the 
curvilinear pattern (e.g., Eysenck, 1985; Landers, 1980). Furthermore, successors 
claimed the theory was too simplistic in that it did not allow for discrimination of 
task difficulty or other moderating factors that might influence the arousal-
performance relationship (see Teigen). Consequently, over the next century 
several theories and models have been proposed to account for the effects of 
anxiety on task performance.  
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Anxiety, Learning and Memory Theory (Eysenck, 1979). One of the 
early theories that attempted to explain the mechanisms underlying the 
relationship between anxiety and cognitive performance was proposed by 
Eysenck (1979). He suggested that anxious individuals engage in task-irrelevant 
thoughts, which in turn consume some of the available cognitive capacity, 
resulting in decreases in performance. Eysenck proposed that highly anxious 
individuals attempt to compensate for the adverse effects of their task-irrelevant 
processing by expending additional effort on the task. He proposed that anxiety 
has differential effects on task performance (i.e., the quality of performance) 
relative to the efficiency in which the task is processed (i.e., accuracy relative to 
effort), and suggested that anxiety always impairs processing, but will not impair 
performance if there is sufficient effort expended. Eysenck‟s theoretical 
contributions towards understanding the relationship between anxiety and 
cognitive performance have continued over more than three decades (e.g., 
Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007; 
Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011) and are discussed below. 
Attentional Interference Theory (Sarason, 1984). Sarason‟s work 
described the relationship between test anxiety and cognitive performance within 
an attentional processing framework. According to attentional interference theory, 
threatening situations produce a stress reaction that includes two types of 
cognitions: task-relevant thinking (e.g., thoughts about solving the problem at 
hand) and task-irrelevant thinking (e.g., worry about abilities and difficulties). 
Attentional interference theory suggested that task-irrelevant cognitions (i.e., 
worrisome thoughts) impede attention to task-oriented information, thereby 
reducing the cognitive resources available to undertake the task. The theory 
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suggested that performance deficits are likely when task-irrelevant thoughts 
outweigh thoughts related to attaining the goal of the task. Later theories, 
however, argued that Sarason may have overlooked the positive contribution of 
worry under certain conditions (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Eysenck and Calvo 
suggested that despite evidence for task-irrelevant thoughts consuming attentional 
resources (e.g., Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986), worry can 
potentially increase motivation, which may consequently have a compensatory 
effect on task performance (e.g., Eysenck, 1985).  
Personality, Motivation and Performance Theory (Humphreys & 
Revelle, 1984). Personality, motivation, and performance theory viewed 
motivation as the critical factor determining cognitive performance via the 
availability and allocation of cognitive resources. Humphreys and Revelle 
suggested that motivation determines whether resources are allocated to one facet 
of performance over another (e.g., accuracy may be favoured over speed, or vice 
versa) and that motivation is linked to the level of mental effort invested in 
performing the task (i.e., increased motivation leads to increased effort, hence 
increased cognitive resources available to perform the task). Furthermore, 
Humphreys and Revelle proposed that the effects of anxiety on task performance 
vary according to the difficulty of the task, such that high anxiety can facilitate 
performance on simple tasks and hinder performance on complex tasks. Despite 
the theoretical merit in recognising anxiety as having a variable influence on 
cognitive performance, Eysenck and Calvo (1992) suggested that the model 
overestimated the negative influence of anxiety on performance. They further 
criticised this approach for viewing the individual as a passive reactor rather than 
having the flexibility to re-allocate resources as required.  
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Processing Efficiency Theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Processing 
efficiency theory sought to address the limitations in the work of Sarason (1984) 
and Humphreys and Revelle (1984) and proposed a model to account for 
performance deficits in anxious individuals (i.e., individuals high in trait anxiety) 
under high levels of situational stress. According to the theory, anxious 
individuals engage in task-irrelevant worrisome thoughts which have a two-fold 
implication for cognitive performance. Worry can reduce the resources available 
to perform the task, yet enhance performance by initiating recruitment of extra 
effort. The theory defined performance effectiveness (i.e., the quality of 
performance; typically operationalised as accuracy) and processing efficiency 
(i.e., the relationship between accuracy and the resources used to accomplish the 
task; typically operationalised as RT) and suggested that anxiety impairs 
processing efficiency more than performance effectiveness. The theory posits that 
anxious individuals may be capable of overcoming performance deficits by 
deploying extra effort, however the worry-costs consume processing resources 
which in turn manifests as lower efficiency.  
Processing efficiency theory is premised on the tripartite model of working 
memory (see Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 1986). Baddeley‟s model (1986) 
described the central executive as responsible for attentional control, processing 
and co-ordinating  information; the phonological loop as accountable for rehearsal 
and short-term storage of verbal information; and the visuo-spatial sketchpad as a 
mechanism dedicated to the processing and transient storage of visual and spatial 
information. A fourth component, the episodic buffer, was later added to the 
model (see Baddeley, 2000; 2002), but not incorporated into later iterations of the 
theory. In adopting Baddeley‟s model, processing efficiency theory implicated the 
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central executive and the phonological loop as the components affected by 
anxiety. The theory predicted that the inner-verbal nature of worry involves the 
phonological loop to a greater extent than the visuo-spatial sketchpad (see also 
Rapee, 1993), since at the time it was thought not to have a visual or spatial 
component. Despite gaining some empirical support (see Eysenck et al., 2007) the 
theory fell short of specifying the precise relationship between anxiety and 
executive functioning, particularly in light of increasing evidence that the central 
executive was not unitary, but rather a multi-component system responsible for 
discrete cognitive operations (see Miyake et al., 2000 for a review). Processing 
efficiency theory also made no assumptions related to the presence of distracting 
or threat-related stimuli, nor for situations when anxious individuals perform 
better than their non-anxious counterparts.  
Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck et al., 2007). Drawing on the 
theoretical perspectives of its predecessors (Eysenck, 1979; Eysenck & Calvo, 
1992), ACT provides a systematic account of the mechanisms underpinning the 
relationship between anxiety and cognitive performance and specifies the 
behavioural characteristics inherent in this relationship. ACT retained several key 
assumptions from processing efficiency theory, and generated some major 
theoretical developments to address its limitations. Though some predictions were 
initially speculative, many are now empirically supported, and others remain to be 
specifically tested (see Chapter 2 for a review of the empirical support for ACT).  
ACT is premised on the idea there are two attentional systems, one 
involved in top-down, goal-driven processing and one associated with bottom-up, 
stimulus driven processing (see also Yantis, 1998). The main assumption of ACT 
is that anxiety heightens activation of the stimulus-driven system (i.e., preferential 
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resource allocation to internal and external threat-related stimuli) and reduces the 
influence of the goal-driven system (i.e., involved in the ongoing performance of 
tasks), such that this imbalance between the two systems results in impaired 
attentional control. According to ACT, asymmetry in these systems should be 
most apparent when trait anxiety and/or situational stress are elevated. The 
theoretical framework of ACT provides numerous specific predictions that will be 
discussed below to provide the context for a comprehensive examination of the 
theory using existing empirical work (see Chapter 2) and new experimental data 
collected in the process of this program of research. 
Assumptions of attentional control theory. The assumptions described 
here are a compilation of the theoretical literature thus far, inclusive of the 
authors‟ most recent reviews (e.g., Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Derakshan & 
Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011).  
Anxiety is determined interactively by trait anxiety and situational stress. 
ACT posits that trait anxiety has a multiplicative effect on the arousal of 
individuals in a stressful situation (i.e., an anxious state) and this combined degree 
of anxiety is associated with adverse performance on cognitive tasks. 
Anxiety and effort. ACT suggests that anxious individuals engage in task-
irrelevant thoughts, hence they actively respond to cognitive processing deficits 
by investing extra mental effort to prevent cognitive performance shortfalls (i.e., 
to avoid performance impairments). Specifically, anxious individuals protect 
against accuracy deficits by allocating additional resources to the task. The 
resourcing costs, however, manifest as additional time to complete the task. 
Effectiveness and efficiency. ACT differentiates performance 
effectiveness, that is, the quality of cognitive performance, from processing 
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efficiency, specifically the cognitive resources used to accomplish the task (see 
also processing efficiency theory).  
Anxiety impairs efficiency more than effectiveness. ACT proposes that in 
some circumstances high-anxious individuals are able to demonstrate comparable 
effectiveness (i.e., accuracy) to their low-anxious counterparts by recruiting 
adequate effort, however the costs are borne in poorer efficiency. For example, 
highly anxious indivduals will take longer to perform the task (e.g., longer RTs). 
Adverse effects of anxiety on performance are greater as task demands 
increase. ACT posits that when task demands increase, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to overcome anxiety-linked impairments. The theory predicts that 
impaired performance in anxiety is more apparent during complex rather than 
simple tasks since the former places greater demands on the storage and 
processing components of working memory, whereas the latter utilises short-term 
storage only.  
Anxiety impairs the functioning of the central executive. According to 
ACT anxiety has adverse effects on attentional control, one of the main functions 
of the limited capacity central executive. In an investigation into individual 
differences of executive functions, Miyake and colleagues (2000) identified three 
separate control functions of the central executive: inhibition, shifting and 
updating. The inhibition function involves the inhibition of a dominant response, 
such that attentional control is utilised to prevent interference from task-irrelevant 
stimuli (see also Friedman & Miyake, 2004). The shifting function involves 
switching between tasks or mental sets, such that it is used to apportion attention 
in an optimal way to the stimulus or task that is the most important (see also 
Monsell, 2003), and the updating function involves monitoring, coding and 
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revising information within working memory (see also Smith & Jonides, 1997). In 
accepting Miyake‟s work, ACT proposes that anxiety impairs the three main 
functions of the central executive such that the effect would be most noticeable on 
the inhibition and shifting functions, and to a lesser extent on updating.  
Anxiety impairs the functioning of the phonological loop. In light of 
limited empirical support for the prediction that anxiety impairs phonological 
performance, revisions of ACT have excluded assumptions regarding this 
component (see Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011). 
Processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), however, suggested that 
anxiety has adverse effects on phonological performance (i.e., the rehearsal and 
storage of verbal information) and other work by Rapee (1993) reported that 
worry predominantly utilises the phonological function of working memory. 
Thus, for the purpose of completeness, the present program of research has 
investigated this assumption.  
Anxiety impairs the updating function (under stressful conditions). Miyake 
and colleagues (2000) suggested that the updating function involves the 
monitoring and updating of information in working memory. Consistent with this 
definition, ACT predicts that the updating function is more aligned to working 
memory than attentional control. ACT suggests that highly anxious individuals 
(i.e., high-trait anxious) will display updating efficiency (and sometimes 
effectiveness) deficits under stressful conditions, when the demands of the central 
executive are heightened.  
Anxiety impairs the inhibition function. Friedman and Miyake (2004) 
suggested that the inhibition function involves two interrelated processes: 
response inhibition (supressing a dominant response to a target stimulus) and 
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resistance to distractor interference (resisting attention to a task-irrelevant 
stimulus). ACT posits that anxiety reduces inhibitory control, such that anxiety 
produces more incorrect dominant responses and decreases the ability to resist 
attending to task-irrelevant information. Accordingly, ACT suggests that anxiety-
linked impairments are greater in the presence of threat- relative to neutral- 
stimuli.  
Anxiety impairs the shifting function. Miyake and colleagues (2000) 
identified the shifting function as the process of switching back and forth between 
mental sets (either between tasks or between categories within a single task). In 
other work, Monsell (2003) described the shift from one mental set to another 
much like changing gears in a car, and demanding of a switch-cost (e.g., an 
increased RT on the switch trial) requiring the exertion of attentional control (e.g., 
Monsell & Driver, 2000). ACT suggests that elevated anxiety is associated with 
shift-cost efficiency, specifically poorer efficiency on trials in which switching is 
necessary.  
Anxiety impairs attentional control in the presence of threat-related 
stimuli. ACT suggests that anxiety over-activates the stimulus-driven attentional 
system which in turn disrupts the balance between it and the goal driven system, 
resulting in impaired attentional control. Performance on tasks that rely mainly on 
the stimulus driven system is likely to be impaired in the presence of anxiety.  In 
accord with others (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & 
van Ijzendoorn, 2007 for a review), ACT accepts that highly-anxious individuals 
preferentially allocate attention to the source of threat. However ACT also posits 
that these individuals are slower to disengage from threat. Taken together, ACT 
therefore inherently predicts that anxiety facilitates performance on tasks that 
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involve threat detection, and attenuates performance on tasks that involve 
attentional withdrawal from threat.   
Anxiety and motivation. In a recent update to ACT, Eysenck and 
Derakshan (2011) proposed that motivation might be used as a compensatory 
strategy by high-anxious individuals during performance on cognitive tasks. ACT 
suggests that when the task is easy and/or the goals of the task are unclear, 
anxious individuals have a tendency to feel less motivated and use fewer 
attentional control resources, resulting in poorer performance. Conversely, when 
the task is more demanding and/or has clear goals, highly anxious individuals tend 
to engage more resources, resulting in better performance than their low-anxious 
counterparts.  
Diagrammatic representation of ACT. Figure 1 shows a diagramatic 
representation of ACT. As can be seen in the figure, trait anxiety and situational 
stress comprise separate dimensions of cognitive and somatic anxiety, and 
combine interactively. Moving from left to right, the figure shows that mental 
effort and/or motivation moderate the relationship between anxiety and 
performance. The centre of the figure symbolizes the working memory model 
proposed by Baddeley (1986) and includes the systems accepted by ACT as most 
affected by anxiety. Finally, the right of the figure shows how performance 
effectiveness and processing effciency are dependent on cognitive load (or task 
complexity).  
The present program of research provides a comprehensive test of the 
predictions of ACT in terms of the theoretical components represented in Figure 
1. The program of research reported in the present thesis comprises (Series 1) a 
four-part investigation of the  relationship between  trait anxiety, situational stress,   
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Figure 1. A diagrammatic representation of Attentional Control Theory (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007) 
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effort and  performance (effectiveness and efficiency) on tasks designed to tap 
phonological, updating, inhibition and shifting performance (see Studies 1.1, 1.2, 
1.3, & 1.4), and (Series 2) a three-part investigation of the relationship between  
trait anxiety, situational stress and  motivation on indicies of updating, inhibition 
and shifting (see Studies 2.1, Study 2.2, & Study 2.3). 
Summary of Theoretical Perspectives 
From a historical perspective there have been numerous influential 
theoretical accounts of the relationship between anxiety and cognitive 
performance. In sum, it is apparent that the models have several commonalities. 
First, the models share the view that effort and motivation are in some way 
connected to the relationship between anxiety and performance. Second, the 
theories recognise that task complexity (or cognitive load) contributes to 
performance variability. Third, the later theories acknowledge that attention to 
task-relevant and/or irrelevant thoughts/stimuli contributes to cognitive 
performance, although the direction of this relationship warrants further 
clarification. Finally, the models concur that anxiety can be trait-like or 
situationally-based and both contribute to the adverse effects on performance and 
processing outcomes.  
Eysenck‟s theories (with others in 1979, 1992, & 2007) have evoloved 
over time, resulting in the most sophisticated set of assumptions in the area to date 
(see ACT; Eysenck et al., 2007). Despite both processing efficiency theory 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and ACT (Eysenck et al.) recognising that the pattern of 
cognitive performance in anxiety is unique to the specific components of the 
working model (e.g., phonological loop, central executive), ACT was the first 
theroretical perspective to specify the precise nature in which the functions of the 
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central executive (i.e., updating, inhibition, and shifting) are affected by anxiety. 
Consequently, ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) and later reviews (Derakshan & 
Eysenck, 2009; Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011) certainly merit the comprehensive 
investigation conducted here. 
Chapter Summary 
In Chapter 1, the concept that anxiety comprises trait-, situational-, 
somatic- and cognitive- characteristic was described. The idea that anxiety is 
associated with individual differences in cognitive performance was introduced, 
and the theoretical perspectives attempting to explain anxiety-linked performance 
deficits were discussed with particular emphasis on the assumptions of ACT. The 
foundations were laid for a comprehensive investigation of ACT. In Chapter 2, the 
empirical evidence for ACT is reviewed and relevant factors (trait anxiety, 
situational stress, effort, motivation, performance effectiveness and processing 
efficiency) are critically evaluated for their place in the model (the factors were 
diagrammatically represented in Figure 1).  
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CHAPTER 2: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Empirical Evidence for Attentional Control Theory 
The focus of the present research is to systematically test the predictions of 
ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007). Chapter 1 outlined the development of some of the 
more influential theoretical perspectives on the relationship between anxiety and 
cognitive performance. The present chapter provides a critical review of the 
empirical support that has guided the development of ACT (see Eysenck & 
Derakshan, 2011 for a review). The evidence is reviewed with respect to the 
phonological loop and the three functions of the central executive proposed by 
Miyake et al. (2000) and accepted by ACT (updating, inhibition, and shifting). 
Each study is presented with the aim of critically reviewing its methodology, 
detailing the contribution of the findings with respect to ACT and suggesting the 
limitations and interpretational difficulties arising from the use of different tasks, 
measures, and procedures. The chapter includes a discussion of possible 
extraneous variables in the current literature and concludes with an overview of 
the structure and approach of the present thesis. 
Anxiety and Phonological Performance 
The phonological loop is thought to be responsible for storage and 
processing of verbal and acoustic information (see Baddeley, 1986). The digit and 
word span tasks are recognised measures of phonological processing within both 
laboratory (e.g., Markham & Darke, 1991) and clinical settings (e.g., Gerton et al., 
2004). In a prototypical version of these tasks, the researcher reads aloud item 
sequences that vary in length, and the participant is required to recall a given 
sequence in the order in which the items were presented (forward span) or in the 
reverse order (backward span).  
17 
In an early study employing the span task, Walker and Spence (1964) 
investigated the relationship between situational stress and phonological 
processing using the forward digit span task. Although the results revealed 
equivalent span scores between their high and low stress groups, they did report 
that individuals in the high stress group who reported feeling „disturbed‟ after the 
test recalled fewer digit span sequences than control participants. Similar results 
were found in replication studies (e.g., Firretto & Davey, 1971; Walker, Sannito, 
& Firetto, 1970).  The major interpretational difficulty with this approach, 
however, was that the self-assignment procedure does not clarify the direction of 
the relationship between anxiety and phonological performance. That is, it was 
unclear whether anxiety affected phonological performance or whether poor 
performance caused participants to self-report feeling more disturbed. In other 
work, Darke (1988) examined the effects of test anxiety and situational stress on 
forward digit span accuracy. Results indicated that individuals in the high stress 
group recalled fewer digit sequences than their low stress counterparts, suggesting 
that higher stress is associated with lower phonological effectiveness (i.e., 
accuracy). Although this early work provided some promise for the idea that 
anxiety is associated with poorer phonological performance, reliable replications 
have not been reported (e.g., Ikeda, Iwanaga, & Seiwa, 1996; Sorg & Whitney, 
1992; Walkenhorst & Crowe, 2009).  
The inconsistent results using these paradigms might plausibly be 
explained by the use of accuracy (performance effectiveness) as the dependent 
measure. As predicted by ACT, anxiety will have little effect on accuracy under 
conditions in which participants are able to recruit extra resources; however, the 
effort cost will be evident in the additional time it takes to perform the task (i.e., 
18 
lower processing efficiency). Support for this idea was reported by Ikeda et al. 
(1996) who found that high state anxious participants took longer to perform a 
verbal memory task than did those low in anxiety, despite both groups performing 
with equivalent accuracy. Although these data offer support for this key 
assumption of ACT, there are well-documented problems using RT alone as the 
dependent measure. For example, it is important that consideration be given to the 
relationship between accuracy and time in order to discount a speed-accuracy 
confound. More importantly, RT is only an appropriate measure of efficiency 
under conditions in which all participants perform with equal accuracy. When 
accuracy varies between participants, efficiency is better operationalised as the 
ratio of accuracy over RT (see Edwards, Edwards, & Lyvers, 2015, & Edwards, 
Moore et al., 2015, for further details).  
It is also plausible that the forward span task utilises insufficient 
phonological resources to capture consistent anxiety-related performance deficits 
(i.e., it is a simple task). In accord with ACT, it is possible that anxious 
individuals are able to recruit additional effort to overcome performance shortfalls 
on this simple task, whereas the adverse effects of anxiety on performance 
increase as the task demands increase. Since the backward span task places greater 
demands on the phonological loop due to the additional processing required to 
reverse the items (i.e., a complex task; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 
1999), administration of both forward and backward versions in the one study 
would allow a for robust test of the relationship between anxiety and phonological 
performance at low- and high- cognitive load.  
The ability of ACT to explain the relationship between anxiety and the 
functioning of the phonological loop remains unclear. Although there is some 
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evidence for an association between situational stress and performance 
effectiveness deficits using a span task (e.g., Darke, 1988), and impaired 
processing efficiency using a verbal memory task (e.g., Ikeda et al., 1996), further 
work is warranted. The methodological problems discussed here are addressed in 
the present work (see Study 1.1).  
Anxiety and Updating Performance 
Early work in understanding the executive functions suggested that the 
updating of information in working memory is part of the coordinating role of the 
central executive (Morris & Jones, 1990). This definition was later expanded to 
include the updating (i.e., overwriting old and no longer relevant) and monitoring 
(i.e., checking for new and more relevant) of information (see Miyake et al., 2000 
for a review).  It is now accepted that the function of updating actively monitors 
and manipulates information in working memory (Miyake et al.). Several 
paradigms have been used to investigate the relationship between anxiety and 
updating. Empirical work has typically deployed tasks that involve both updating 
and recall of information, such as the n-back task (e.g., Vytal, Cornwell, Arkin, & 
Grillon, 2012; Wong, Mahar, Titchener, & Freeman, 2013), the reading span task 
(e.g., Calvo, 1996; Sorg & Whitney, 1992) and other tasks (e.g., Calvo, Ramos, & 
Esteves, 1992).  
The n-back task requires participants to monitor a series of numbers or 
letters presented in blocks of increasing difficulty (either 1-back, 2-back, 3-back 
or 4-back requirements), such that they are required to push a button or make a 
keystroke when presented with an item on the previous trial (1-back), after one 
intervening trial (2-back), after two intervening trials (3-back), or after three 
intervening trials (4-back). Studies using n-back performance to examine the 
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relationship between anxiety and the updating function have shown mixed results. 
For example, Wong and colleagues (2013) found no relationship between trait 
anxiety and n-back effectiveness, but highly anxious individuals took longer to 
identify previously presented items (i.e., longer RTs), which was interpreted as 
having poorer efficiency relative to their low-anxious counterparts. In other work, 
Vytal et al. (2012) found anxiety related n-back effectiveness deficits, however no 
difference in RTs was evident between individuals in the high- and low- anxiety 
groups. Other studies, however, have found no relationship between anxiety and 
n-back effectiveness or efficiency (Fales et al., 2008; Walkenhorst & Crowe, 
2009).  
One explanation for the differences in n-back results rests with the 
different indices of anxiety used across studies. Wong et al. (2013) and 
Walkenhorst and Crowe (2009) examined self-reported trait anxiety, whereas 
Vyal et al. (2012) and Fales et al. (2008) manipulated situational stress using 
threat of electric shock and watching threat-related movies, respectively. For the 
differences in indices of anxiety to be responsible for variances in updating 
performance, however, studies that examined the same index of anxiety should 
have revealed conceptually the same pattern of results, which was not the case 
(i.e., Wong et al. vs. Walkenhorst & Crowe). In line with ACT, it is reasonable 
that both trait anxiety and situational stress play an interactive role in the 
relationship between anxiety and updating performance, and that empirical work 
to date using the n-back task has not examined both of these dimensions of 
anxiety in the one study.  
Results of studies using the reading span task to examine the relationship 
between anxiety and updating performance have also reported equivocal results. 
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The reading span task requires participants to read aloud a series of sentences one 
at a time in close succession, and then recall the last word from each sentence (see 
Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). Following last-word recall participants (in some 
studies) perform a sentence processing check, such as a true/false question (e.g., 
Harris & Cumming, 2003) or a comprehension cloze test (e.g., Calvo et al., 1992; 
Calvo, 1996), as a control for a last-word recall versus sentence processing trade-
off (see Masson & Miller, 1983). Typically data from participants who perform at 
a minimum level of comprehension on the processing check are included in the 
analyses (i.e., > 85% comprehension is recommended; see Conway et al., 2005).  
Darke (1988) examined the interactive effects of test anxiety and 
situational stress (experimentally manipulated using an evaluative stressor) and 
found that high test-anxious individuals in the stressful condition had poorer 
reading span performance compared to those low in test anxiety. These data are 
consistent with the prediction that highly anxious individuals demonstrate poorer 
updating effectiveness under high-stress, however the findings should be 
interpreted with caution as reading span measures were not taken under low-stress 
conditions. ACT suggests that trait anxiety and situational stress combine to 
produce updating performance deficits such that a relationship is evident only 
under stressful conditions. In the absence of reading span performance data for a 
low-stress group, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the multiplicative 
relationship between anxiety and situational stress. In similar work, Calvo et al. 
(1992) found that individuals high in test anxiety recalled fewer last-words on the 
reading span task (i.e., poorer updating effectiveness) when under evaluative 
stress, and their design was able to clarify that in the absence of stress, 
performance did vary as a function of test anxiety. Sorg and Whitney (1992) 
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employed the reading span task to examine the interactive effects of trait anxiety 
and situational stress (manipulated using a competitive situation). In accord with 
ACT, they found that high trait-anxious individuals under high situational stress 
recalled fewer last-words than those safe from stress, whereas low-anxious 
individuals‟ performance did not differ between stress groups. Despite Sorg and 
Whitney‟s findings affording empirical support for ACT, their study did not 
include a sentence processing check to rule out the possibility that participants 
were storing last-words at the expense of processing the sentences. Assessing 
both the storage and processing of information in working memory constitutes a 
more fine grained measure of updating performance. Studies that have included a 
processing check, however, have returned mixed results. For example, Harris and 
Cumming (2003) found no differences in last-word recall between high- and low-
trait- or state- anxious individuals based on self-reported measures of anxiety, 
whereas Calvo and others (Study 2; 1992) found high test-anxious individuals 
recalled fewer last-words than those low in test-anxiety under evaluative stress 
conditions, but not in the absence of stress. Given the mixed findings to date, 
further work is warranted to clarify the relationship between anxiety and updating 
effectiveness using the reading span task. Moreover, in order to shed light on 
reading span efficiency, methodological procedures would need to include a 
measure of RT, which has not been done previously.  
Together, the findings from the studies utilising the n-back and reading 
span tasks offer some insight into the association between anxiety and updating 
performance. For example, it seems plausible that situational stress plays some 
role in predicting updating performance, however it is possible that other factors 
such as mental effort or motivation may buffer the anxiety-stress relationship and 
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that these factors have been overlooked in the literature to date. These issues are 
addressed in the current work (see Study 1.2 & 2.1, respectively). 
Anxiety and Inhibitory Performance 
Inhibition involves interrupting, delaying and/or suppressing a dominant 
response to task-irrelevant information (see e.g., Harnishfeger, 1995). Inhibitory 
control has been investigated in multiple event-related potential (e.g., Ansari & 
Derakshan, 2011; Bishop, 2009; Kamarajan et al., 2004) and behavioural studies 
(e.g., Hopko, Ashcraft, Gute, Ruggiero, & Lewis, 1998; Pacheco-Unguetti, 
Acosta, Callejas, & Lupiáñez, 2010), with experimental paradigms such as the 
emotional Stroop (e.g., Reinholdt-Dunne, Mogg, & Bradley, 2009; see Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007 for a review), variations of the Go-No-Go task (e.g., Gomez, Ratcliff, 
& Perea, 2007; Johnstone, Pleffer, Barry, Clarke, & Smith, 2005), and the 
antisaccade task (e.g., Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker, & Eysenck, 2009; 
Garner, Ainsworth, Gould, Gardener, & Baldwin, 2009). When emotional stimuli 
have been employed, a common finding has been that anxiety is associated with a 
bias to preferentially process threat material (see e.g., Cisler & Koster, 2010, for a 
review). Although these data offer support for ACT, they do not permit an 
analysis of the separate contributions of internal (i.e., worrisome thoughts) and 
external (i.e., item content) threats on inhibitory processes, as both are present 
during task performance. An assessment of the contribution of internal distraction 
can be obtained by using tasks that employ only neutral stimuli, and accordingly 
only studies reporting the inclusion of neutral stimuli are reviewed here.  A review 
of the inhibition literature that included threat-related stimuli is included in 
Chapter 5. 
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Garner and colleagues (2009) used an antisaccade task (with neutral 
stimuli) to examined the relationship between anxiety and inhibitory control. In 
the antisaccade task, participants are asked to inhibit the natural tendency to look 
towards an object in their periphery, compared to prosaccade performance when 
the individual is instructed to look towards the peripheral object. Garner et al.‟s 
data revealed that high anxious participants made more eye movement errors on 
antisaccade trials than their low anxious counterparts. In similar work using the 
antisaccade task, Derakshan, Ansari et al. (2009; Experiment 1) found that high 
anxious participants took longer to respond on correct antisaccade trials than low 
anxious participants, albeit there was no difference between groups in terms of 
error rate. Conceptually, Derakshan, Ansari et al.‟s findings were replicated by 
Ansari and Derakshan (2010). Taken together, the data from investigations using 
the antiscaccade task suggest that anxiety is associated with poorer inhibitory 
efficiency and effectiveness, although the latter effect seems to be less robust.   
Righi, Mecacci, and Viggiano (2009) investigated the relationship between 
anxiety and inhibition using a Go-No-Go task which requires participants to 
respond to a non-target stimulus (Go trials) and to suppress a response to a target 
stimulus (NoGo trials). Their target stimulus was the digit 3, with Go trials 
requiring participants to push the space bar on the keyboard in response to any 
number other than 3. Contrary to ACT, they found no relationship between state 
or trait anxiety and inhibitory control (indexed as the number of correct Go trials 
or the number of NoGo errors), and no association between anxiety and inhibitory 
efficiency (operationalised as RTs on Go trials). Several explanations are feasible. 
ACT suggests that anxious individuals can recruit additional resources (e.g., 
effort) in order to overcome performance shortfalls, particularly on less 
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demanding tasks. Therefore, it is possible that the task (i.e., inhibiting a simple 
response to a digit) did not place sufficient demands on inhibitory processes to 
reveal performance deficits. Alternatively, the measures of effectiveness and 
efficiency employed may not have been sufficiently sensitive to detect the effect 
of anxiety. Signal detection theory (Pastore & Scheirer, 1974) proposed that a 
measure of performance should take into account the ability to discriminate 
between non-target and target stimuli, namely stimulus sensitivity (d’; see 
Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999 for a review). Thus, d’ is calculated by subtracting the 
z score for NoGo trials from the z score for the Go trials. This parameter has been 
used in other studies as a valid and sensitive index of inhibitory efficiency (e.g., 
Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010; Wong et al., 2013).  
Wong and colleagues (2013) employed the Go-No-Go task and tested the 
relationship between anxiety and effectiveness (indexed as stimuli sensitivity) and 
efficiency (RT). They reported no association between anxiety and inhibitory 
effectiveness (d’), however highly anxious individuals demonstrated poorer 
efficiency relative to low anxious participants. Their predictive model, however, 
was constrained by the absence of a measure of state anxiety. Congruent results 
were reported in similar work by Pacheco-Unguetti and colleagues (2010) who 
found that anxiety was unrelated to effectiveness (d’) on the Go-No-Go task, but 
anxious individuals performed with longer RTs (i.e., lower efficiency).  
In combination, the data reported by Wong et al. (2013) and Pacheco-
Unguetti et al. (2010) offer support for ACT, such that anxiety impairs efficiency 
more than effectiveness. A limitation of both approaches however was that the use 
of RT on correct Go trials as the index of efficiency does not control for the 
possibility that speed of response and accuracy were confounded. For example, an 
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individual who responds with great speed on 100% of trials (i.e., Go trials and 
NoGo trials) would be highly efficient despite making 100% errors on NoGo 
trials. An appropriate measure of inhibitory efficiency should therefore consider 
the relationship between the participant‟s ability to discriminate between target-
absent (correct responses on Go trials) and target-present stimuli (errors on NoGo 
trials), and the speed of response on correct trials (see e.g., Edwards, Edwards et 
al., 2015; Edwards, Moore et al., 2015).  
Notwithstanding these limitations, the data from antisaccade and Go-No-
Go paradigms using neutral stimuli suggest that anxiety is associated with 
impaired inhibitory efficiency, and to some extent poorer effectiveness. A 
systematic study addressing the measurement issues related to inhibitory 
effectiveness and efficiency would clarify the relationship between anxiety and 
inhibitory control in the presence of neutral stimuli (i.e., investigate the extent to 
which internally-generated threat acts as anxiety-inducing stimuli) and in the 
presence of threat-related stimuli (i.e., examine the extent to which externally-
generated threat acts as anxiety-inducing stimuli). This work is conducted in 
Study 1.3 and Study 2.2 respectively.   
Anxiety and Shifting Performance 
Shifting performance is the process of switching back and forth between 
tasks or accommodating mental set changes in task requirements (Miyake et al., 
2000). There is accumulating evidence to suggest that anxiety is associated with 
impaired shifting as assessed by the mixed pro- and anti-saccade task (e.g., Ansari 
et al., 2008), the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (e.g., Caselli, Reiman, Hentz, 
Osbourne, & Alexander, 2004; Goodwin & Sher, 1992), and other task-switching 
paradigms (e.g., Derakshan, Smyth et al., 2009; Edwards, Moore, et al., 2015). 
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Ansari and colleagues (2008) explored the relationship between anxiety 
and task switching using a mixed anti- and pro-saccade paradigm. The task 
required participants to identify the direction of an arrow that was presented 
following random presentations of antisaccade trials (experimenter instructions to 
look away from a cue signal) and prosaccade trials (experimenter instructions to 
look towards a cue signal). It was suggested that shifting between antisaccade and 
prosaccade trials consumes attentional resources, thus they anticipated slower RTs 
on these trials relative to non-shift trials (i.e., prosaccade to prosaccade or 
antisaccade to antisaccade). In general, their results were consistent with ACT, 
such that high-anxious individuals made more errors and had slower RTs than 
low-anxious individuals on shift- compared to non-shift trials. The authors 
however noted that a limitation of their approach was that they did not separate 
the effects of trait anxiety and situational stress, as is necessary to demonstrate full 
support for ACT. Similar anxiety-related shifting deficits have been observed in 
other work (e.g., Derakshan, Smyth et al., 2009). 
The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Heaton, Chelune, Talley, Kay, 
& Curtiss, 1993) is a widely used executive function task that has been used to 
index shifting performance (see Miyake et al., 2000). The task requires 
participants to select one of four target cards that match a stimulus card in form, 
colour or number. Performance feedback is given following each trial, and after 
10 consecutive correct matches the sort criterion is changed. Shifting 
effectiveness is typically operationalised as the number of perseverative errors 
(i.e., continued use of the same sorting criterion despite negative feedback). 
Caselli and colleagues (2004) employed the WCST to investigate the relationship 
between anxiety and shifting performance. In support of ACT, their results 
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confirmed that self-reported trait anxiety was positively associated with the 
number of perseverative errors on the task, suggesting that anxiety impairs 
shifting effectiveness. Their procedure, however, was constrained by fact that RT 
data were not collected. In the absence of confirmation that the pattern of errors 
did not match the pattern of RT data, it is not possible to discount that those 
higher in anxiety made more perseverative errors simply because they were faster 
to respond (i.e., a speed vs. accuracy trade-off).  
Similar work was undertaken by Goodwin and Sher (1992) using a 
computerised version of the WCST to examine shifting performance 
(effectiveness and efficiency). In accord with the predictions of ACT, they found 
that higher self-reported state anxiety was associated with more perseverative 
errors (index of shifting effectiveness) and longer total times to complete the task 
(index of shifting efficiency). Although conceptually these data demonstrate the 
relationship between anxiety and shifting effectiveness and efficiency, they too 
are somewhat constrained by procedural difficulties. First, the effect of trait 
anxiety was not investigated, and second, if these data were to be accepted as 
direct support for ACT then using the total time to complete all trials (inclusive of 
shift and no-shift trails) would seem imprecise. Failing to separate the RTs of shift 
trials from no-shift trials results in being unable to identify whether it is slower 
RTs on shifting trials or faster RTs on no-shift trials that influenced shifting 
efficiency.  
Notwithstanding some procedural problems, there is growing evidence to 
suggest that individuals higher in anxiety are less effective and efficient at flexibly 
shifting mental sets than those lower in anxiety. Two methodological issues 
require attention to systematically test the assumptions of ACT on shifting tasks. 
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First, there is a concern with the use of RT as an index of processing efficiency 
(e.g., Caselli et al., 2004; Goodwin & Sher, 1992). As mentioned previously, to 
accommodate individual differences in performance effectiveness (accuracy), it is 
more appropriate to express processing efficiency as a ratio of accuracy to RT on 
respective trials (cf. Edwards, Edwards, et al., 2015; Edwards, Moore, et al., 
2015). Second, some studies have examined trait anxiety (e.g., Ansari et al., 2008; 
Caselli et al., 2004) and others state anxiety (e.g., Derakshan Smyth et al., 2009; 
Goodwin & Sher, 1992). A full investigation of the effect of anxiety on shifting 
would require both trait anxiety and situational stress to be examined in a single 
study (e.g., Edwards, Moore, et al., 2015). These procedural challenges are 
addressed in this program of research (see Study 1.4 & 2.3). 
Methodological Challenges 
Despite accumulating evidence suggesting that anxiety is associated with 
performance deficits on tasks involving the phonological loop (e.g., Darke, 1988; 
Ikeda et al., 1996), and on the updating (e.g., Sorg & Whitney, 1992; Wong et al., 
2013), inhibition (e.g., Derakshan, Ansari et al., 2009; Wong et al., 2013) and 
shifting (e.g., Ansari et al., 2008; Caselli et al., 2004; Goodwin & Sher, 1992) 
functions of the central executive, a number of studies have emerged that have 
failed to replicate these findings. For example, some studies have not observed a 
relationship between anxiety and phonological (e.g., Walkenhorst & Crowe, 
2009), updating (e.g., Harris & Cumming, 2003), inhibitory (e.g., Righi et al., 
2009), and shifting (e.g.,  Kofman, Meiran, Greenberg, Balas & Cohen, 2006) 
performance. In sum, empirical support for ACT rests on a plethora of studies 
utilizing a range of cognitive tasks and differing experimental designs and 
procedures.  
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Although the particular reasons for the discordant findings are uncertain, 
consideration of the following methodological issues may hold some clues as to 
possible explanations: (1) differences in dimensions of anxiety included across 
studies, that is, some studies have included trait anxiety or situational stress alone, 
whereas only a few studies have examined both the separate and combined 
contributions of trait anxiety and situational stress; (2) failure to delineate the 
separate effects of cognitive and somatic anxiety on performance, such that most 
studies have utilised a measure of anxiety that included a mix of both; (3) 
differences in induction procedures of situational stress, for example threat of 
electric shock, ego threat instructions, and watching threat-related videos; and (4) 
potential difficulties due to the measures of performance effectiveness and 
processing efficiency used across studies. These challenges will be discussed in 
detail below. 
Dimensions of Anxiety 
One challenge for researchers in the field of cognition and emotion 
concerns the various dimensions of anxiety employed across studies. Some 
studies included measures of trait anxiety (e.g., Ansari et al., 2008; Wong et al., 
2013), others incorporated measured- or manipulated- situational stress (e.g., 
Eysenck, 1985; Ikeda et al., 1996), and some studies included both trait anxiety 
and situational stress in their predictive models (e.g., Sorg & Whitney, 1992; 
Vytal et al., 2012). One argument for the inclusion of both trait anxiety and 
situational stress as separate and combined predictors of performance relates to 
the original theoretical definitions reported by Spielberger and colleagues (1970; 
1983). Spielberger et al. reported that individuals high in trait anxiety were more 
susceptible to elevated situational stress (state anxiety) by nature of their 
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proneness to emotional arousal. Notwithstanding the value of Spielberger‟s 
argument, the strongest justification for inclusion of both trait anxiety and 
situational stress in the present context is to test the predictions of ACT. To recap 
briefly, ACT makes clear predictions with respect to the separate and combined 
contributions of trait anxiety and situational stress on cognitive performance. As 
such, a systematic examination of the predictions of ACT requires inclusion of 
both the separate and multiplicative relationships of the two anxiety dimensions 
(i.e., trait anxiety and situational stress). The work conducted for the present thesis 
addresses this concern. 
Somatic Versus Cognitive Anxiety 
The well-accepted distinction between trait and situationally based anxiety 
further reflects a combination of both somatic symptoms (e.g., physical tension, 
shortness of breath, and elevated heart rate) and cognitive characteristics (e.g., 
worry, fear, and apprehension; see Clark & Watson, 1991), each of which may 
interact in unique ways to affect cognitive performance. Ree, MacLeod, French, 
and Locke (2000; see also Ree, French, MacLeod, & Locke, 2008) reported that 
cognitive and somatic components of anxiety can be recognised at both trait- and 
state- anxiety level, and developed the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for 
Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety (STICSA) as an index of these four dimensions 
(i.e., Somatic-State, Somatic-Trait, Cognitive-State and Cognitive-Trait). Many 
studies (and most reported in this chapter), however, employed the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983) to capture just two facets, trait 
and state anxiety, thereby neglecting consideration of the cognitive-somatic 
dimension. Studies examining the effect of worry on cognitive performance have 
provided support for the link between cognitive anxiety and cognitive 
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performance (e.g., Eysenck, 1992; Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008; 
Walkenhorst, & Crowe, 2009), and other work has evidenced the adverse effects 
of somatic anxiety on cognitive performance (e.g., Hudetz et al., 2000; Meinhardt 
& Pekrun, 2003). Furthermore, a study by Edwards et al. (2006) demonstrated that 
somatic stress (threat of electric shock) and trait anxiety combined to predict 
biases in attentional control (using the Stroop task) not seen in low anxious 
participants.  
Given the multidimensional nature of anxiety, further work is needed to 
specify how cognitive and somatic trait anxiety, in combination with cognitive 
and somatic stress, is associated with cognitive control. In order to predict 
precisely how anxious individuals perform under stress it is necessary to 
investigate separately the performance of highly cognitive-trait anxious 
individuals under cognitive situational stress, and likewise to examine 
performance of those high in somatic-trait anxiety under somatic situational 
stress. The dimensions of cognitive and somatic trait anxiety were operationalized 
using questionnaire scores (Ree et al., 2008). The distinction of somatic and 
cognitive anxiety on cognitive performance is investigated in the first series of 
studies in this thesis (see Series 1). 
Induction of Situational Stress 
A review of the literature revealed that despite several studies using self-
reported pre-existing measures of state anxiety (e.g., Derakshan, Smyth et al., 
2009; Harris & Cumming, 2003), the use of a stress induction procedure can 
maximise the focal relationship between the situational stress variable and the 
criterion. There are numerous methods of manipulating situational stress in the 
literature. For example, some studies have required participants to watch threat-
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related videos (e.g., Fales et al., 2008), play competitive video games (e.g., Sorg 
& Whitney, 1992), or perform a modified cold pressor task (e.g., place their hand 
in ice water while told they are being videotaped for analyses of their facial 
expression; Banks, Tartar, & Welhaf, 2014). Although manipulation checks have 
demonstrated the efficacy of these methods in elevating situational stress, it is 
possible that these procedures would elevate both physical and psychosocial 
stress. Other studies, however, have used induction methods that more clearly 
align with either somatic or cognitive anxiety. For example, some studies have 
used CO2 inhalation (e.g., Garner, Attwood, Balwin, James, & Munafo, 2011) and 
threat of electric shock (e.g., Edwards et al., 2006, Vytal et al., 2012) to induce 
somatic situational stress, whereas others have used ego-threat instructions (e.g., 
Calvo et al., 1992; Calvo, Eysenck, Ramos, & Jiménez, 1994; Darke, 1988; 
Derakshan & Eysenck, 1998) and pressured speeded subtraction (e.g.,Tohill & 
Holyoak, 2000) as manipulations of cognitive anxiety. Threat of shock is a well-
established paradigm to induce situational stress (see Grillon, Baas, Lissek, Smith, 
& Milstein, 2004) that involves participants wearing an electrode (on their non-
dominant forearm) capable of emitting unpleasant shocks whilst they engage in 
cognitive tasks. Studies have demonstrated the threat of shock to be a short-term 
immediate stressor (e.g., Miller & Patrick, 2000) capable of elevating situational 
somatic anxiety.   
Ego threat instructions involve informing participants that their 
performance on a task is predictive of their level of intelligence, that their 
performance is being compared to others who have completed the tasks, and their 
performance is somewhat slower and less accurate than others. This type of 
evaluative procedure has been shown to elicit elevated levels of cognitive 
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situational stress (e.g., threat to self-esteem and increased worrisome thoughts; see 
Hodges, 1968 for a review). The present study examined both somatic and 
cognitive anxiety and to this end, the threat of electric shock was selected as the 
somatic stressor, and ego-threat instruction was selected as the cognitive stressor. 
Measures of Performance 
ACT posits that cognitive performance can be measured in two ways, 
performance effectiveness and processing efficiency. At present, however, 
empirical investigations have been inconsistent in the measurement of indices of 
effectiveness and efficiency. 
Performance effectiveness. Performance effectiveness (or the quality of 
performance) has typically been operationalised as accuracy on a task. It seems 
reasonable therefore that the number of correctly recalled items or correct trials 
has been used almost exclusively as an index of span performance or phonological 
effectiveness (e.g., Darke, 1988; Walker & Spence, 1964). Effectiveness measures 
on updating tasks across studies are less cohesive. Both the n-back and reading 
span tasks require participants to respond to increasingly difficult trials to test 
their ability to monitor and update larger sections of information in working 
memory, therefore determining an appropriate measure of the quality of updating 
performance presents a greater challenge to researchers.  
Only scoring on the reading span task is reviewed here, as this was the 
task employed in the current work (see Study 1.4 & 2.1). Various scoring 
techniques are possible for the reading span task (see Conway et al., 2005 for a 
review). Some studies have used the traditional, quasi-absolute or span scoring 
technique (see Daneman & Carpenter, 1980) such that a span score was assigned 
based on the threshold of accuracy or the last item size recalled correctly after the 
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individual‟s performance reached the termination criterion. Conway et al. (2005), 
however, suggest that absolute span scoring is less than ideal for studies of 
individual differences, citing that the use of item size at threshold alone (i.e., the 
point of task termination) and discarding performance indicators on all subsequent 
trials limits the sensitivity of the measure (see also Oberauer & Süß, 2000). Other 
work used a unit scoring technique which comprised the total number of correctly 
recalled last words or trials (e.g., Sorg & Whitney, 1992), and some studies have 
deployed a weighted (or load) scoring technique which awards a higher weight to 
items with a higher load, that is, trials of a greater sentence set length earn higher 
scores (e.g., Darke, 1988; Kensinger & Corkin, 2003). A review of Conway et 
al.‟s (2005) extensive work on scoring the reading span task suggests that there 
are marginal internal consistency differences between unit- and weighted- scoring 
and recommends that scoring choices should be justified by theory. On the basis 
of this argument the weighted scoring procedure provides the most suitable, 
sensitive index of updating effectiveness, and aligns more closely with the 
definition from ACT, that is, the quality of the updating performance.  
Measures of inhibitory effectiveness have been guided by task parameters 
and operationalised in several ways. For example, on the antisaccade task, 
effectiveness has been indexed by the number of antisaccade errors (e.g., Garner 
et al., 2009), and on the Go-No-Go task, inhibitory effectiveness has been 
operationalised as either the number of NoGo errors (e.g., Righi et al., 2009), or 
by using the stimulus sensitivity index (d’; e.g., Pacheoco-Unguetti et al., 2010; 
Wong et al., 2013). The latter approach is favoured as it affords the opportunity to 
capture individual differences in discriminative ability between non-target and 
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target stimuli. Further, d’ indexes the quality of inhibitory performance required 
for a robust test of ACT.  
Studies examining the relationship between anxiety and shifting have 
operationalised shifting effectiveness as the number (or percentage) of 
perseverative errors on the WCST (e.g., Caselli et al., 2004; Goodwin & Sher, 
1992). However, a perseverative error is demonstrative of an inability to shift. 
Consequently, shifting effectiveness is better operationalised as the percentage of 
responses that were not perseverative errors. Thus the effectiveness measure used 
here was calculated by deducting the percentage of perseverative errors from 
100% (see Study 1.4 for further details). 
Processing efficiency. ACT describes processing efficiency as the 
relationship between accuracy and the resources used to accomplish the task. In 
previous research, efficiency has typically been operationalised as the time taken 
to perform the task (e.g., RTs). Recent studies, however, have suggested that due 
to individual differences in accuracy, it is imperative to include a measure of 
accuracy in the equation for efficiency to avoid confounding problems with the 
potential for a speed versus accuracy trade-off (e.g., Edwards, Edwards, et al., 
2015; Edwards, Moore, et al., 2015). More specifically, if RT alone was the index 
of processing efficiency then those participants who perform with great speed at 
the expense of numerous errors would be scored highly efficiently despite their 
high error rates. As defined by ACT, individuals who operate with great accuracy 
and speed should be those attributed with greater processing efficiency. 
Efficiency, therefore, is more appropriately operationalised as accuracy divided by 
RT (cf. Edwards, Edwards, et al., 2015; Edwards, Moore, et al., 2015).  
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Possible Extraneous Variables 
Notwithstanding the accumulation of a considerable body of evidence 
from studies that have reported data indicating that anxiety is implicated as a 
predictor of impaired processing efficiency and sometimes performance 
effectiveness, many studies have not taken into consideration other person 
variables that may vary with anxiety and task performance. For example, 
individual differences in invested mental effort and depression have both been 
shown to co-vary with anxiety and with cognitive performance. Each is discussed 
in turn below.  
Mental Effort 
According to ACT, highly anxious individuals recruit additional resources 
in the form of invested mental effort to prevent performance shortfalls on 
cognitive tasks (Eysenck et al., 2007). Although the origins of this assumption 
were somewhat speculative (see Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), there is now growing 
empirical support for this prediction in studies that have found that higher mental 
effort buffers the anxiety-performance relationship on motor (e.g., Smith, 
Bellamy, Collins, & Newell, 2001) and cognitive (e.g., Edwards, Edwards et al., 
2015; Hadwin, Brogan, & Stevenson, 2005) tasks. While the data from these 
recent studies afford support for the prediction that individual differences in effort 
might moderate performance outcomes, further investigations are required to 
determine the role of this factor in phonological, updating, inhibitory and shifting 
performance. One of the aims of the present thesis was to examine the role of 
effort in a predictive model premised on ACT. Mental effort was measured using 
a visual analogue scale ( Zijlstra, 1993). 
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Depression 
Comorbid depression is a complicating factor for studies investigating the 
relationship between anxiety and cognitive performance, given that positive 
correlations between these variables range between .40 and .70 (e.g., Bradley, 
Mogg, Millar, & White, 1995: Clark & Watson, 1991). The majority of studies, 
however, fall short of implementing an appropriate control for the relationship 
between depression and cognition. Depression has been found to affect 
performance on tasks which involve the working memory system (e.g., Baker & 
Channon, 1995; Channon, Baker, & Robertson, 1993). Specifically, there is 
evidence to suggest that depression is associated with impairments in executive 
function, specifically updating performance (e.g., Harvey et al., 2004), inhibitory 
performance (see Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011) and 
shifting performance (e.g., Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 2012). There is however 
limited evidence to suggest that depression is associated with phonological 
performance (e.g., Gass & Russell,1986). 
In light of the high levels of comorbidity between anxiety and depression, 
it is important to address the possibility that any anxiety-linked performance 
impairments could be reflective of the effects of depression. Furthermore, given 
the possibility of depression confounding individual performance it would seem 
important to conduct two protective procedures: First, to screen participants on a 
measure of depression and exclude those who fall above criterion levels (this was 
also a requirement of the university ethics committee); and second, to measure 
depression and control for it in the predictive modelling, that is, treat the 
depression scores of participating individuals as a covariate in statistical analyses. 
In the present work, depression was controlled in such a way that the effect of 
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anxiety and situational stress on cognitive performance could be examined after 
controlling for variance in the criterion predicted by depression.  
Structure of the Thesis 
This chapter reviewed a number of key studies in the existing anxiety-
cognition literature. By contrasting this work in terms of the assumptions of ACT, 
it is clear that support for ACT is based on numerous studies that have used 
different meaures and/or manipulations of anxiety and/or stress, and employed a 
range of tasks to assess the functions of working memory. Very few studies have 
examined the specific predictions of ACT, with many studies selecting individual 
components or factors in a piecemeal approach, and as such many of the 
predictions of ACT remain untested. 
In review, the methodological challenges for future studies attempting to 
understand cognitive performance in anxious individuals are (1) include the 
separate and combined associations of trait anxiety and situational stress, (2) 
allow for the delineation of the separate relationships of cognitive and somatic 
anxiety, (3) include satisfactory manipulations of situational stress (somatic and 
cognitive), (4) include tasks and indices of effectiveness and efficiency that align 
with the definitions of ACT, (5) include a control for depression, and (6) examine 
possible factors that might moderate the anxiety-performance relationship (e.g., 
mental effort, motivation). A study addressing these issues would provide a robust 
and systematic test of ACT, and this is the approach taken in the current thesis. 
Data Analytic Approach 
The data were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS Version 20). Interactions in regression were followed up using the 
Interactions in Multiple Linear Regression with SPSS and Excel software (IRSE; 
40 
Meier, 2008). The multiplicative interaction terms used in the regression analyses 
were formed using mean-centred scores. To control for inflation of family-wise 
errors, follow up tests for mean differences in ANOVA were carried out using 
Bonferroni correction. All tests were considered reliable at α = .05. 
 
Chapter Summary 
In Chapter 2, the evidence for cognitive performance deficits in anxiety 
was examined and critically appraised. Specifically, the literature was evaluated in 
terms of the assumptions of ACT and led to the identification of a number of 
procedural matters requiring attention that led to difficulties with interpretation of 
the existing empirical data. The chapter concluded with a description of the 
structure of the present thesis and a statement of the objective of the current series 
of experimental studies. In Chapter 3, the general methodology for the first 4-part 
experimental series of studies is described.  
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CHAPTER 3 – EXPERIMENTAL SERIES 1: GENERAL METHOD 
Participants 
 
 Undergraduate psychology students were recruited from the Bond 
University Psychology Participation Pool using online and notice-board 
announcements. Only those who reported English as their native language, who 
had normal or corrected to normal vision, and who had normal colour vision, were 
invited to undertake preliminary screening. On the basis of meeting these criteria, 
158 undergraduate psychology students (aged between 18 and 55 years, M = 
23.91, SD = 7.96) participated in the studies reported in this series; of these 35 
were male and 123 were female. Testing for each participant was conducted 
individually, in a single session which took approximately 2 hours each. In return 
for participation, students received research credit towards an introductory 
psychology course. All were provided a handout describing features of anxiety 
and depression and contact details of the university‟s counselling service. 
Upon arrival at the laboratory, participants provided written informed 
consent (see Appendix A) and then completed the psychometric measures 
(discussed later in this chapter). At the request of the University human research 
ethics committee, individuals who scored in the extremely severe range (above 
28) on the DASS- Depression scale were excluded. On this basis, 5 participants 
were thanked, released and replaced. Those who met the criteria for retention then 
completed the experimental tasks.  
Based on their order of arrival at the laboratory, participants were 
systematically assigned to either low- situational stress (ego safe/shock safe) or 
one of two high-situational stress conditions (ego threat and shock threat), such 
that every third participant was allocated to the low-stress condition (allocations 
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followed the pattern safe, ego threat, shock threat conditions and so on). 
Individuals in the low situational stress group acted as control participants for the 
ego and shock threat groups (approximately N = 90 per study). Bond University 
Human Research Ethics Committee (BUHREC) approval was obtained prior to 
commencement of data collection. 
The data from a number of participants were excluded from the final 
analyses. The details of these exclusions are provided in the corresponding 
empirical sections that follow, and the details of each final, full sample are 
reported separately for each study. 
Situational Stress Induction 
Somatic Stress Induction 
In the shock threat condition, an electrode was attached to the participant‟s 
non-dominant forearm, and the shock intensity level was individually determined 
using a shock workup procedure. Starting from a baseline of 0-volts the intensity 
of the 500 ms electric stimulus was increased in 10 volt increments until the 
participant reported the intensity to be uncomfortable but not painful.  In the 
current sample, participants set the stimulus intensity from 20 to 90 V (M = 52 V, 
SD = 16.18) and they were informed that the intensity of any further shocks would 
be the same as the maximum voltage reached in this workup phase.  
Cognitive Stress Induction 
The ego threat condition comprised instructions emphasising evaluative 
stress, such that participants were told their performance was related to their 
intelligence, that it was being evaluated against others who had volunteered for 
the study and following the practice trials they were told their performance was 
somewhat slower and less accurate than others. The false performance feedback 
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was restated during breaks throughout the tasks. By comparison, those in the low 
stress condition were told their participation was greatly appreciated and that most 
people find the task quite interesting and they were only provided with 
instructions that related to their understanding of the task. 
Facilities and Equipment 
 All data were collected in a sound-attenuated laboratory in the Cognitive 
Psychology Laboratories of the School of Psychology at Bond University. 
Experimental Hardware 
All stimuli were presented on an ASUS PR031Pseries DUO Core laptop 
computer running at 7200 MHz connected to a 17-inch monitor. Participants wore 
a Logitech ClearChat Comfort USB Headset microphone which was connected to 
the laptop and captured their vocal responses. 
Experimental Software 
Visual Basic 6.0 software controlled the presentation of stimuli for tasks. 
The software also recorded RT latencies (ms) and errors.  
Electric Stimulus 
Participants who performed under the threat of electric shock (i.e., in the 
somatic situational stress condition) wore an electrode on their forearm which was 
attached to a Grass SD9 stimulator (0-90V) that delivered the electric stimulus 
(200 ms) through a 35mm diameter concentric stainless steel electrode. Electrode-
skin contact was made through a sponge soaked in saline.  
Cognitive Tasks 
Four tasks were employed in the present series of experimental studies: 
word span task (forward and backward), reading span task, Go-No-Go task, and 
the WCST. Each task was employed to capture the functions of the working 
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memory system as specified by ACT. The word span task was used as an index of 
phonological functioning, the reading span task as an index of updating, the Go-
No-Go task as an index of inhibition, and the WCST as an index of shifting. A 
Latin square design was used to present tasks in a counter-balanced order. Four 
task sequences were administered, based on the participant‟s order of arrival at the 
laboratory. Each sequence contained a different first, second, third and fourth task. 
Sequence A consisted of word span, then reading span, then WCST, and finally 
Go-No-Go; Sequence B consisted of reading span, then WCST, then Go-No-Go, 
and finally word span; Sequence C consisted of WCST, then Go-No-Go, then 
word span, and finally reading span; Sequence D consisted of Go-No-Go, then 
word span, then reading span, and finally WCST. 
Word Span Task (Forward and Backward) 
The word span task is a recognised measure of phonological processing 
(e.g., Darke, 1988, Sorg & Whitney, 1992). Using forward and backward word 
span paradigms, participants were presented with words in lowercase, 40 point 
Arial font. Nine single-syllable words served as the stimuli (doors, hook, step, 
desk, chair, wall, bath, keys, rack). The words were matched with the digits 1 – 9 
and substituted for the digits forward- and digits backward- task from the 
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 3rd ed. (Wechsler, 1997) to provide the 
sequences for the forward and backward word span trials, respectively (see 
Appendix B). A ready cue was presented for 1 sec to signal the start of each trial, 
after which the screen was blanked for 2 sec. The stimulus words were then 
presented individually for 1 sec each, at 1 sec intervals, until a recall cue signalled 
the end of the trial at which time participants were instructed to recall the words 
as quickly and accurately as possible, in the order they were presented (forward- 
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word span), or in the reverse order (backward- word span). Following two 
practice trials (each of two and three words, respectively), the first scored trial 
consisted of a sequence of two words. Trials continued with sequences increasing 
in length by one word each time, and participants were given two attempts at each 
sequence length. Testing was terminated if both trials of the same length were 
recalled incorrectly. Accuracy and RT data were collected by the computer using 
a headset microphone. RTs on each trial were recorded upon the participant‟s last 
vocal response, such that if a response required a three-word answer the RT was 
measured from the onset of the recall cue to the final vocal response of the third 
word. The forward and backward word span tasks were administered separately 
with total scores for each task based on the number of sequences recalled correctly 
(i.e., number of correct trials). The maximum possible scores for the forward and 
backward word span tasks were 16 and 14, respectively.  
Reading Span Task 
Twenty-five unrelated sentences were adopted from Daneman and 
Carpenter‟s (1980) reading span task, and a further five sentences from Masson 
and Miller‟s (1983) study were used as practice trials. Appendix C contains a list 
of the sentences used here. Each sentence contained 11 to 17 words (M = 13.8; 
Mdn = 14), each ended in a different word, and they were arranged in 2, 3, 4, 5 
and 6 sentence set lengths. The sentences were presented one at a time, on the 
computer screen, typeset in 20 point Arial font. Participants were required to read 
the sentence aloud as soon as it appeared on the screen. At completion of each 
sentence, the next sentence appeared and so on.  A recall cue signalled the end of 
the trial at which time they were instructed to recall the last-word of each sentence 
in the set, as quickly and accurately as possible (in the order they were presented). 
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Immediately following the last-word recall task, an associated true/false question 
was presented as an assessment of sentence comprehension (or processing for 
understanding). The true/false question related to one sentence from the set and 
was presented in a fixed order to all participants. Participants were asked to put 
equal emphasis on accurately recalling the last-words and answering true/false 
questions correctly. The sentences and questions were presented using Visual 
Basic software; however, to allow for individual differences in reading time, 
presentation of the sentences was operated manually by the experimenter. 
Following two practice trials (each of two and three sentences, respectively), the 
first experimental trial consisted of a sequence of two sentences. Trials continued 
with sets increasing in length by one sentence each time, and participants were 
given five attempts at each sentence set-length, except on the six-sentence set-
length which was limited to three attempts. Testing was terminated if three out of 
five trials of the same sentence set-length were recalled incorrectly. Accuracy and 
RT data were collected by the computer using a headset microphone. RTs of each 
last-word sequence were recorded upon the participant‟s last vocal response; e.g., 
if a response required a four-word answer the RT was measured from the onset of 
the recall cue to the final vocal response to the fourth word. Before beginning the 
task, participants were reminded to answer as quickly and accurately as possible. 
Scoring was conducted using a weighted scoring technique, such that correctly 
recalled sequences of last-words on greater sentence set-lengths were awarded 
higher scores (see Conway et al., 2005 for a review). Specifically, correct last-
word sequence scores were as follows: two-sentences set = 4, three-sentence set = 
9, four-sentence set = 16, five-sentence set = 25, and six-sentence set = 36. Scores 
were summed and total weighted reading span scores ranged from 4 to 378.    
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Go-No-Go Task 
The Go-No-Go task is well-established as a measure of inhibitory control 
(see Miyake et al., 2000). Participants were shown a series of words on a 
computer screen for 300ms each, with a 900ms inter-stimulus interval. They were 
instructed to respond to any word that did not contain the letter „a‟ (i.e., initiate a 
response to target-absent trials), and these were classified as Go trials. If the word 
did contain the letter „a‟, participants were told to withhold their response (i.e., 
inhibit a response to target-present trials), and these were classified as NoGo 
trials.  A response involved pushing the space bar of the keyboard with their 
dominant hand. Each block contained an equal number of target-absent and target-
present stimuli, and the number of correct and incorrect Go and NoGo responses 
and respective RTs were collected by the computer. Following two practice 
blocks, there were 16 test blocks. Each block contained 16 neutral words (suite, 
blanket, wall, doors, desk, fence, taps, beds, hook, bath, iron, cups, eaves, sugar, 
stair, chair). Words were presented in lowercase, 40 point Arial font, and were 
presented in a fixed randomised order (see Appendix D). Blocks were separated 
by a 20s rest break. Blocks commenced with a fixation cue, such that the word 
ready was presented for the final 4s of the rest break to warn the participant that 
the next block was about to commence. Participants were asked to place their 
hand on the space bar when they saw the ready signal. Prior to commencing the 
task, they were reminded to place equal emphasis on being accurate and 
responding as fast as possible. Possible scores for correct Go and incorrect NoGo 
responses ranged from 0 to 128, for each. 
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Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST) 
The WCST is a widely used neuropsychological test that has shown to 
assess the shifting function of the central executive (see Miyake et al., 2000). On 
each trial, a single stimulus card was presented on the monitor and participants 
were instructed to match the card to one of four fixed target cards (labelled A, B, 
C, & D) by verbalising the letter corresponding to the target. Card matches could 
be made using three categories: form, colour or number. Participants were 
required to demonstrate cognitive flexibility by shifting to the new category. To 
allow for item valence to be investigated in Experimental Series 2, and for ease of 
comparison with the current study, the original test (see Heaton et al., 1993) was 
modified to incorporate words rather than shapes as stimuli (further details are 
provided in Chapter 5). As such, for all cards the triangle was replaced with the 
word carpet, the star with the word garage, the cross with the word sheets, and 
the circle with the word coffee. Form, colour, number distributions followed the 
original test, and category changes occurred after 10 consecutive correct matches 
in a predetermined fixed order.  
The target and stimulus cards were displayed in 65 mm x 65 mm 
dimensions, and the words were presented in dimensions approximately 1 cm high 
(exemplar cards are provided in Appendix E). Given that some stimulus cards 
matched the targets on more than one category it was not possible for participants 
to predict category changes on every 10th trial. Participants were instructed to 
respond as quickly and accurately as possible. Responses were recorded using a 
headset microphone and RTs on each trial were recorded by the computer upon 
the participant‟s first vocal response. The experimenter manually recorded the 
match responses and provided verbal feedback (i.e., right or wrong) following 
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each trial. The task was completed after all 128 stimulus cards were presented. 
The WCST score of interest was the relationship between the percentage of 
perseverative errors (i.e., errors made when the participant continued to 
unsuccessfully use a matching category after being told their selections were 
incorrect) and the mean RTs on these trials. Further scoring details are provided in 
the method section of Study 1.4.  
Psychometric Measures 
 This section describes the measures, their psychometric properties and 
scoring procedures.  For each measure, a section is dedicated to describing 
reliability and validity indices and selected examples are provided.  
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
The DASS is a 21 item self-report measure designed to assess depression, 
anxiety and stress using a 7-item subscale for each. Only scores from the 
Depression subscale were included in the analyses. The Anxiety and Stress 
subscales of the DASS were not appropriate indices of trait anxiety or situational 
stress because respondents report on these symptoms over the past week.  
Scoring. Participants indicate the degree to which statements such as I felt 
downhearted and blue, and I felt I wasn’t worth much as a person, applied to 
them in the previous week. Responses are made using a 4-point Likert scale where 
0 = Did not apply to me at all, 1 = Applied to me to some degree, or some of the 
time, 2 = Applied to me to a considerable degree, or a good part of the time and 3 
= Applied to me very much, or most of the time. There are no reverse scored items. 
Scores are summed and multiplied by two, creating a score range of 0-42 with 
higher scores reflecting higher symptoms of depression. Only participants who 
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scored in the minimal to mild depression ranges (i.e., 0-27) were invited to 
participate in the study. The DASS is included as Appendix F. 
Reliability and validity. Prior to employing the DASS-21 Depression 
scale as an index of depression, its reliability and validity was established. A 
review of the literature confirmed the instrument has good internal reliability. 
Reliability analyses conducted by the authors and others (e.g., Brown, Chorpita, 
Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997; Crawford & Henry, 2003; Henry & Crawford, 2005) 
have been favourable, α = .81, α = .96, α = .93, and α = .82, respectively. In a 
student sample, the authors reported that scores on the Depression subscale were 
significantly and positively correlated with scores on the Beck Depression 
Inventory (r = .74; Beck, Ward, & Mendelsohn, 1961), and in a non-clinical 
sample Henry and Crawford (2005) reported that scores on the Depression scale 
were significantly positively correlated with the Negative-Affect dimension (r = 
.59), and negatively correlated with the Positive-Affect dimension (r = -.48) of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). These data suggest the DASS-Depression scale was appropriate for 
assessing depression in student samples. 
State and Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety (STICSA; Ree 
et al., 2000) 
The STICSA is a self-report measure of somatic (11 items) and cognitive 
(10 items) anxiety, designed to capture the state and trait dimensions of each. 
Items 1-21 provide an index of how participants feel right now, at this very 
moment (State scale), whereas items 22-43 index how participants feel in general 
(Trait scale). Scores from the Cognitive and Somatic subscales of State and Trait 
anxiety were calculated and analysed separately giving a measure of the four 
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anxiety dimensions: State-Somatic, State-Cognitive, Trait-Somatic, and Trait-
Cognitive. 
Scoring. Individuals were required to respond to statements such as My 
heart beats fast and My muscles are tense (Somatic subscale) and I think that 
others won’t approve of me and I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts 
(Cognitive subscale). For each item, subjects were asked to provide responses to 
statements ranging from 1 = Not at all to 4 = Very much so (State scale) and 1 = 
Almost never to 4 = Almost always (Trait scale).  No items are reversed scored. 
Scores on each dimension are summed with higher scores reflecting higher levels 
of anxiety. Possible total scores ranged from 11-44 (State-Somatic), 10- 40 (State-
Cognitive), 11-44 (Trait-Somatic), and 10-40 (Trait-Cognitive). The STICSA is 
included as Appendix G. 
Reliability and validity. The cognitive scales have demonstrated good 
internal consistency estimates, STICSA Trait-Cognitive (α = .87) and STICSA 
State-Cognitive (α = .88) (Gros, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 2007). Analyses of 
convergent and discriminant validity suggest the STICSA provides a more 
specific assessment of anxiety than the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; 
Spielberger et al., 1983); see Gros et al. (2007) for a review.  These data suggest 
the STICSA was appropriate for assessing the Somatic and Cognitive dimensions 
of State and Trait anxiety, as required here. 
Rating Scale of Mental Effort (RSME; Zijlstra, 1993) 
The RSME is a uni-dimensional, visual analogue scale, regarded as a self-
reported estimation of mental costs associated with task execution, that is, the 
amount of mental effort required to execute a task.  
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Scoring. Participants were asked to mark a point on a 150 mm vertical 
axis scale that reflected the amount of mental effort in task performance. Nine 
anchor points are marked along the scale from 2 mm to 112 mm to indicate 
ratings from not at all effortful to tremendously effortful, with effort 
operationalised as the distance in mm to this mark. The RSME is included as 
Appendix H. 
Reliability and validity. Scores on the RSME have been shown to be 
sensitive to changes in task load, psychophysiological state of the person and 
time-on-task (e.g., Veltman & Gaillard, 1996; Zijlstra, 1993). The RSME has 
demonstrated adequate psychometric properties. For example, reliability is good 
in workplace (r = .78) and laboratory (r = .88) settings (see Zijlstra), and the 
RSME undergone extensive validation in a range of settings (see also Wilson, 
2008 for a review). Taken together, this work suggests that RSME was an 
expedient and appropriate index of mental effort for the current program of 
research. 
Stress Rating Questionnaire (SRQ) 
The SRQ is a brief, five-item, self-report measure developed to evaluate 
changes in situational stress. This questionnaire was used as the experimental 
approach demanded multiple assessments of situational stress throughout each 
testing session and the SRQ was quick to administer and complete. 
Scoring. Participants rated their current stress levels on five bipolar 
dimensions: Calm to Nervous, Fearless to Fearful, Relaxed to Anxious, 
Unconcerned to Worried, and Comfortable to Tense on a seven-point scale. For 
example, 1 = Very calm, 2 = Quite calm, 3 = Slightly calm, 4 = Neither Calm/nor 
nervous, 5 = Slightly nervous, 6 = Quite nervous, 7 = Very nervous. Composite 
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scores are calculated by summing responses on each dimension to produce scores 
ranging between 5 and 35. Higher scores are representative of higher reported 
situational stress. The SRQ is included as Appendix I. 
Reliability and validity. Given that the measure was developed for the 
purpose of this program of research, there were no data available on the reliability 
and validity of the SRQ. The SRQ, however, is an expanded version of the three-
item Arousal Rating Questionnaire (ARQ; Nervousness, Fearfulness, and 
Anxiousness) used by Edwards et al. (2006). The ARQ has been shown to 
positively correlate with the State-Anxiety scale of the STAI (Spielberger et al., 
1983) such that Nervousness r = .47, Fearfulness r = .49, and Anxiousness, r = 
.40, and to be sensitive to changes in state anxiety produced by situational 
stressors (see Edwards et al., 2006 for details).  
Experimental Series 1 
The series of experiments reported in the following chapter extend 
theoretical and empirical work on the inter-relationships between anxiety, 
situational stress, and effort on cognitive performance (i.e., phonological, 
updating, inhibitory and shifting functions). In each study, trait anxiety was 
operationalised using the somatic and cognitive trait anxiety scales from the 
STICSA (Ree et al., 2000) and situational stress was manipulated using a somatic 
stressor (threat of electric shock) and a cognitive stressor (ego threat instructions). 
For each task, the somatic and cognitive anxiety data were analysed and reported 
as separate experiments. Mental effort was measured using a visual analogue scale 
(RSME). The current work employed the forward and backward word span tasks 
as indices of simple and complex phonological performance (respectively; see 
Study 1.1), the reading span task as the measure of updating (see Study 1.2), the 
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Go-No-Go task as the measure of inhibition (see Study 1.3), and the WCST as the 
index of shifting performance (see Study 1.4). Performance effectiveness was 
operationalised as the quality of performance and processing efficiency was 
indexed by the ratio of accuracy to RT. Scores on the DASS-Depression subscale 
(Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) were used as a control variable.  
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually on all tasks and measures in a sound-
attenuated laboratory, and the procedure took approximately 120 minutes for 
each. After providing informed consent, they completed the STICSA, DASS, and 
the SRQ (i.e., SRQ at baseline). In accordance with a request from the 
university‟s ethics committee, individuals who scored above 28 (extremely 
severe) on the DASS Depression Scale were excluded from participation; 5 
participants were released on the basis of this criterion. Participants were 
systematically assigned to either the low situational stress (shock safe/ego safe) or 
one of two high situational stress conditions (shock threat and ego threat) based 
on their order of arrival at the laboratory, such that every third participant was 
allocated to the safe condition. Following the stress manipulation, participants 
completed the SRQ a second time (i.e., SRQ at post-manipulation), and they were 
reminded to work as quickly and accurately as possible on the tasks. Based on 
their order of arrival at the laboratory, participants completed the four tasks in a 
counter-balanced order. After each task, participants were asked to complete the 
RSME, after which the stress induction procedure was readministered, followed 
by the SRQ (i.e., SRQ at post-manipulation). This procedure continued with each 
task until all tasks were completed. Upon completion of all of the four tasks 
participants completed the RSME, were thanked, debriefed and released.  
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CHAPTER 4 – EXPERIMENTAL SERIES 1 
Study 1.1: Anxiety and Phonological Performance 
Study 1.1 examined the relationship between trait anxiety, situational 
stress, effort and phonological performance using forward (i.e., simple task) and 
backward (i.e., complex task) word span. Study 1.1.1 tested whether somatic trait 
anxiety and a somatic stressor (i.e., shock threat) combined to predict 
phonological effectiveness and efficiency, and Study 1.1.2 investigated whether 
the relationship between cognitive trait anxiety and a cognitive stressor (i.e., ego 
threat) were related to phonological effectiveness and efficiency. The modelling 
also tested whether effort further moderated these relationships.  
Hypotheses 
After controlling for depression, the predictions were derived from ACT 
(Eysenck et al., 2007) and the existing literature with respect to performance 
effectiveness and processing efficiency. ACT suggests that anxious individuals 
allocate additional resources, such as effort, to improve their accuracy. As such it 
was predicted that there would be no relationship between trait anxiety and stress 
on performance effectiveness on either the simple (forward word span) or 
complex (backward word span) tasks. ACT suggests, however, that the additional 
effort required to preserve accuracy comes at the cost of lower efficiency. It was 
therefore expected that the processing efficiency data would reveal three-way 
(trait anxiety x situational stress x mental effort) interactions on both the simple 
and complex tasks such that higher trait anxiety would be associated with lower 
efficiency but that this relationship would buffered by mental effort. It was 
predicted that these relationships would emerge as a function of both somatic and 
cognitive anxiety.   
56 
Measurement of Phonological Performance 
Phonological effectiveness. Performance effectiveness was 
operationalized as the number of correct trials for both the forward- and 
backward- word span tasks.  
Phonological efficiency. Processing efficiency was operationalised in 
accordance with ACT (i.e., the relationship between accuracy and RT) as the 
relationship between the number of correct trials and the total RT for those trials 
(see also Edwards, Edwards, et al., 2015; Edwards, Moore, et al., 2015). 
Phonological efficiency was calculated using the following equation: 
Phonological Efficiency = 
 Number of Correct Trials  
 
Total RT on Correct Trials 
 
 
Study 1.1.1 Somatic Anxiety and Phonological Performance 
Participants 
Ninety undergraduate psychology students participated.  They were aged 
between 18 and 55 years (M = 24.68 years, SD = 8.51) and 64 were female. There 
was no significant difference in sex and age between the shock safe and shock 
threat groups, t(88) < 1. 
Validity of SRQ as an Index of Situational Stress 
To confirm the efficacy of the SRQ as a measure of situational stress in 
somatic anxiety in the sample, a bivariate correlation was conducted between 
composite SRQ scores at baseline and scores on the STICSA State Somatic scale. 
There was a significant positive relationship between the measures, r(90) = .37, p 
< .001, confirming the SRQ as an appropriate index of situational stress.  
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Manipulation Check 
To confirm the threat of electric shock induced somatic situational stress in 
the sample, a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with Time (baseline vs. post-
manipulation) and Group (shock threat vs. shock safe) as the factors was 
conducted using composite SRQ scores. There was no significant main effect of 
Group, F(1, 88) = 1.02, MSE = 45.59, p = .315, however the main effect of Time, 
F(1, 88) = 89.31, MSE = 13.51, p < .001, 2 = .50, and the Time x Group 
interaction, F(1, 88) = 7.83, p = .006, 2 = .08, reached significance. Follow up t-
tests revealed that at baseline, there was no difference in composite SRQ scores 
reported by individuals in the shock threat (M = 11.89, SD = 5.06) and shock safe 
(M = 12.22, SD = 3.98) conditions, t (1, 88) < 1, however following the stress 
manipulation those in the shock threat group (M = 18.60, SD = 6.43) showed 
significantly higher SRQ scores than their shock safe counterparts (M = 15.86, SD 
= 5.67), t(1, 88) = 2.14, p =.035. These results suggest that the threat of electric 
shock was an effective means of manipulating situational stress.  
Results 
Data Diagnostics and Assumption Checking 
Prior to the main analyses, the predictor and criterion variables were 
screened for outliers and normality. RTs < 200 ms were considered anticipatory 
and removed, and RTs ± 3SD from each participant‟s mean score were removed 
(< 1% of trials). Univariate outliers were considered significant with z-scores > 
3.50. Using this criterion, 1 outlier was detected for processing efficiency on the 
backward span task (z-score = 4.50) and after computation of Mahalanobis 
Distance and Cook‟s D the same case was identified as an extreme multivariate 
outlier with p < .001; consequently the case was removed. Assumptions of 
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normality, linearity and homoscedasticity were satisfactory, and tests for 
skewness and kurtosis were acceptable with consideration to the sample (non-
clinical, undergraduate students) and the nature of the task employed. The final 
data set reported for forward and backward word span contained N = 90 and N = 
89 participants, respectively.  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the relevant means and standard deviations, inter-
correlations among the predictors, and zero-order correlations between the 
predictors and criterion variables for the forward and backward word span tasks. 
As shown, there was a significant positive relationship between somatic trait 
anxiety and depression, such that higher somatic trait anxiety was associated with 
higher depression. There was a significant positive correlation between somatic 
trait anxiety and mental effort on both the forward and backward tasks, which in 
accord with ACT indicated that those who reported higher somatic trait anxiety 
also reported investing greater effort on the word span tasks. Furthermore, there 
were significant positive correlations between mental effort and performance 
effectiveness (but not processing efficiency) on both the forward and backward 
tasks, such that greater invested mental effort was related to greater effectiveness.  
Main Analyses 
To determine whether somatic trait anxiety, situational stress, mental effort 
and their interactions predicted performance effectiveness and processing 
efficiency on the forward and backward word span tasks, separate moderated 
multiple regression analyses were conducted for each task. Predictor variables 
were mean centred prior to calculating the interaction terms. The covariate 
(depression) was entered at Step 1, the component main effects (somatic trait 
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anxiety, situational stress and mental effort) were entered at Step 2, the two-way 
interaction terms (somatic trait anxiety x situational stress, somatic trait anxiety x 
mental effort, and situational stress x mental effort) were entered at Step 3, and 
the three-way interaction term for all three predictors (somatic trait anxiety x 
situational stress x mental effort) was entered at Step 4. 
Table 1. 
Means, Standard Deviations, Zero-order and Inter-correlations of Depression, 
Somatic Trait Anxiety, Mental Effort, Phonological Effectiveness and 
Phonological Efficiency for Forward Word Span (FWS) and Backward Word 
Span (BWS) Tasks. 
 M SD Depression Somatic 
Trait  
Anxiety 
Mental 
Effort 
Depression 6.14 6.13    
Somatic Trait Anxiety 15.18 3.81 .30**   
Mental Effort on FWS 80.32 28.85 .31 .19*  
FWS Effectiveness  6.11 1.43 -.01 .13 .18* 
FWS Efficiency  .65 .22 -.05 -.06 -.06 
Mental Effort on BWS 85.67 26.84 -.04 .19*  
BWS Effectiveness  4.11 1.50 -.00 .03 .20* 
BWS Efficiency .73 .40 .07 .20* -.10 
NOTE: p < .01**; p < .05* 
 
Phonological Effectiveness in Somatic Anxiety 
Forward word span effectiveness. Table 2 shows the unstandardised 
coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence intervals for all variables at each 
step of the model. At Step 1, depression accounted for < 1% of the variance in 
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phonological effectiveness, R = .01, F < 1. At Step 2, with the inclusion of the 
main effects, the model accounted for 8% of the variance in effectiveness, 
however the increase in R
2 
was not significant,
 
R = .28, ΔR2 = .08, ΔF (3, 85) = 
2.39, p = .075, and the model was not significant, F (4, 89) = 1.79, p = .138. At 
Step 3, with the addition of the two-way interaction terms, the model accounted 
for 8% of the variance in the criterion, R = .29, however ΔR2 = .00 was not 
significant, ΔF < 1, and the model was not significant, F (7, 89) = 1.05, p = .404. 
With the inclusion of the three-way interaction term at Step 4, the full model 
accounted for 10% of the variance in forward span effectiveness, yet there was no 
significant increase in  R
2
, R = .31, ΔR2 = .02, ΔF (1, 81) = 1.44, p = .234, and the 
full model was not significant, F (8, 89) = 1.10, p = .371. These results indicate 
that forward span effectiveness was independent of somatic trait anxiety, 
situational stress and mental effort.  
Backward word span effectiveness. The unstandardised coefficients, beta 
weights and 95% confidence intervals for all variables at each step are shown in 
Table 3. Depression accounted for < 1% of the variance in effectiveness at Step 1, 
R < .01, F < 1. At Step 2, the model accounted for 3% of the variance, however 
the addition of the main effects failed to increase R
2
,
 
R = .18, ΔR2 = .03, ΔF < 1, 
and the model was not significant, F < 1. At Step 3, with the inclusion of the two-
way interaction terms the model accounted for 12% of the variance in 
effectiveness, and the increase in R
2
 tended towards significance, R = .34, 
ΔR2= .09, ΔF = 2.59, p = .058, however the model failed to reach significance, F 
(7, 88) = 1.55, p = .162. With the three-way interaction term included at Step 4, 
the full model accounted for 12% of variance in backward span effectiveness, 
however the increment in explainable variance, R = .34, ΔR2 = .00, ΔF <1, and the  
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Table 2.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Phonological Effectiveness in 
Forward Word Span 
p < .05* 
 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 6.13 .22    5.70 6.56 
 Depression -.00 .03  -.01  -.05 .05 
Step 2 (Constant) 6.12 .22    5.69 6.56 
 Depression -.00 .03  -.01  -.05 .05 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .05 .04  .13  -.04 .13 
 Situational Stress -.27 .16  -.19  -.57 .04 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .18  -.00 .02 
Step 3 (Constant) 6.10 .23    5.64 6.56 
 Depression -.00 .03  -.00  -.06 .05 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .04 .05  .11  -.05 .13 
 Situational Stress -.27 .16  -.19  -.58 .05 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .18  -.00 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .02 .04  .05  -.07 .11 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .00 .00  .03  -.00 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.00 .01  -.03  -.02 .01 
Step 4 (Constant) 6.11 .23    5.66 6.57 
 Depression -.01 .03  -.02  -.06 .05 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .06 .05  .15  -.04 .15 
 Situational Stress -.23 .16  -.16  -.55 .08 
 Mental Effort .02 .01  .26  .00 .03 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .02 .04  .06  -.06 .11 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .00 .00  .14  -.00 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.01 .01  -.09  -.02 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress 
X Mental Effort 
-.00 .00  -.19  -.01 .00 
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Table 3.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Phonological Effectiveness in 
Backward Word Span  
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 4.11 .23    3.67 4.56 
 Depression .00 .03  -.00  -.05 .05 
Step 2 (Constant) 4.10 .23    3.64 4.57 
 Depression .00 .03  .01  -.06 .05 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.00 .05  -.01  -.09 .09 
 Situational Stress .02 .17  .01  -.31 .35 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .20  -.00 .02 
Step 3 (Constant) 3.94 .24    3.47 4.41 
 Depression .02 .03  .07  -.04 .07 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.04 .05  -.10  -.13 .07 
 Situational Stress -.01 .16  -.01  -.33 .31 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .17  -.00 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .04 .04  .10  -.05 .12 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .01 .01  .09  -.01 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .22  .00 .01 
Step 4 (Constant) 3.94 .24    3.47 4.41 
 Depression .02 .03  .07  -.04 .07 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.04 .05  -.10  -.13 .05 
 Situational Stress -.02 .17  -.01  -.35 .32 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .16  -.01 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .04 .04  .09  -.05 .13 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .00 .00  .21  -.00 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .21  -.00 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress 
X Mental Effort 
.00 .00  .02  -.00 .00 
p < .05* 
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full model, F (8, 88) = 1.34, p = .235, were not significant. These results suggest 
that backward span effectiveness did not vary as a function of somatic trait 
anxiety, situational stress and mental effort. 
Phonological Efficiency in Somatic Anxiety 
Forward word span efficiency. Table 4 shows the unstandardised 
coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence intervals for all variables at each 
step of the model. At Step 1, depression accounted for < 1% of the variance in 
processing efficiency, R = .05, F < 1. With the addition of the component main 
effects at Step 2, the model accounted for 1% of variance in efficiency, however 
the increase in R
2 
was not significant, R = .11, ΔR2 = .01, ΔF < 1, and the model, 
F < 1, was not significant. At Step 3, with the inclusion of the two-way interaction 
terms, the model accounted for < 4% of the variance in the criterion, however, R 
= .19, and ΔR2 = .02 were not significant, ΔF < 1, and the model was not 
significant, F < 1. At Step 4, the addition of the three-way interaction term 
resulted in the model accounting for 4% of the variance in forward span 
efficiency, however, R = .20, ΔR2 < .01 was not significant, ΔF < 1, and the 
model, F < 1, was not significant. These data suggest that processing efficiency on 
forward word span did not vary as a function of somatic trait anxiety, situational 
stress and mental effort.  
Backward word span efficiency. Table 5 shows the unstandardised 
coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence intervals for all variables in the 
model. At Step 1, depression accounted for < 1% of the variance in the criterion, 
R = .02, F < 1. At Step 2, with inclusion of the main effects, the model accounted 
for 14% of variance in efficiency, and the increase in R
2 
was significant, R = .37, 
ΔR2 = .14, ΔF (3, 84) = 4.47, p = .006, and the model reached significance, F (4,
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Table 4.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Phonological Efficiency in Forward 
Word Span 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) .66 .03    .59 .73 
 Depression -.00 .00  -.05  -.01 .01 
Step 2 (Constant) .65 .04    .58 .72 
 Depression .00 .00  -.01  -.01 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.00 .03  -.08  -.07 .03 
 Situational Stress -.02 .03  -.08  -.07 .03 
 Mental Effort .00 .00  -.04  -.00 .00 
Step 3 (Constant) .65 .04    .58 .72 
 Depression .00 .00  .01  -.01 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.00 .01  -.06  -.02 .01 
 Situational Stress -.02 .03  -.09  -.07 .03 
 Mental Effort .00 .00  -.02  -.00 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.01 .00  -.12  -.02 .01 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.00 .00  -.10  -.00 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .14  .00 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) .65 .04    .58 .72 
 Depression .00 .00  -.00  -.01 .10 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.00 .01  -.04  -.02 .01 
 Situational Stress -.02 .03  -.08  -.07 .03 
 Mental Effort .00 .00  .02  -.00 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.01 .01  -.11  -.02 .01 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.00 .00  -.12  -.00 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .19  .00 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
.00 .00  -.10  -.00 .00 
p < .05* 
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Table 5.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Phonological Efficiency in Backward 
Word Span 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 70 .06    .58 .82 
 Depression .01 .01  .07  -.01 .02 
Step 2 (Constant) .71 .06    .59 .84 
 Depression .00 .01  .04  -.01 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .03 .01  .25*  .00 .05 
 Situational Stress -.07 .04  -.17  -.16 .02 
 Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.16  -.01 .00 
Step 3 (Constant) .75 .06    .63 .87 
 Depression -.00 .01  -.03  -.02 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .03 .01  .32  .01 .06 
 Situational Stress -.06 .04  -.16  -.15 .02 
 Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.09  -.00 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.02 .01  -.21*  -.04 .00 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.00 .00  -.23  -.01 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  -.06  -.00 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) .75 .06    .63 .87 
 Depression -.00 .01  -.03  -.02 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .03 .01  .32  .01 .06 
 Situational Stress -.07 .04  -.16  -.15 .02 
 Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.10  -.01 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.02 .01  -.21  -.05 .00 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.00 .00  -.22  -.01 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  -.08  -.00 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress 
X Mental Effort 
.00 .00  .24  -.00 -.05 
p < .05* 
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88) = 3.36, p = .013. The results revealed a significant main effect  of somatic trait 
anxiety, however this effect was further qualified by a two-way situational stress x 
somatic trait anxiety interaction at Step 3. The inclusion of the two-way 
interaction terms brought about a significant change in R
2
and the model accounted 
for 28% of the variance in backward span efficiency, R = .53, ΔR2 = .15, 
furthermore the increment was significant, ΔF (3, 81) = 5.52, p = .002, and the 
model also reached significance, F (7, 88) = 4.60, p < .001. The only two-way 
interaction to reach significance was somatic trait anxiety x situational stress 
(unique variance 9%), t = 3.26, p = .002. The pattern of this interaction is 
described below. At Step 4, the inclusion of the three-way interaction term did not 
increase explainable variance,
 
R = .53, ΔR2 = .00, ΔF < 1. The full model 
accounted for 29% of the variance in backward efficiency, which was significant, 
F (8, 88) = 3.99, p = .001.  
Interactions in Multiple Linear Regression with SPSS and Excel (IRSE; 
Meier, 2008) software was used to decompose the pattern of the two-way 
interaction between somatic trait anxiety and situational stress. Specifically, a test 
of simple slopes was conducted at high and low values of somatic trait anxiety 
(calculated at ± 1 SD from the mean) at each level of situational stress (shock 
threat vs. shock safe). The pattern of the interaction is shown in Figure 2. As can 
be seen in the figure, higher somatic trait anxiety was not related to backward 
efficiency when under the threat of shock , β = .00, t < 1, however in the shock 
safe condition, higher somatic trait anxiety was a positive predictor of backward 
efficiency, β = .10, t = 3.4, p = .001, such that those who reported higher somatic 
trait anxiety demonstrated higher backward span efficiency.  
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Figure 2. Relationship between somatic trait anxiety, somatic situational stress, 
and phonological efficiency using backward word span as a complex task.   
 
Study 1.1.2 Cognitive Anxiety and Phonological Performance 
Participants 
Participants comprised 90 undergraduate university students (18 male, 72 
female; mean age = 24.06 years, SD = 8.31). Participants were randomly assigned 
to either the ego safe or ego threat condition based on their arrival at the 
laboratory. Sex was proportionately represented within the ego safe and ego threat 
groups and the groups did not differ with respect to age, t(88) = 1.30, p = .122. 
Validity of SRQ as an Index of Situational Stress 
A bivariate correlation analysis was conducted between composite SRQ 
scores at baseline and scores on the STICSA State Cognitive scale to qualify the 
SRQ as an appropriate measure of cognitive situational stress. Results revealed a 
significant positive relationship, r(90) = .35, p < .001, thus the SRQ was deemed a 
satisfactory measure of situational stress in the sample.  
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Manipulation check 
To confirm the effectiveness of the ego threat instructions as means of 
elevating situational stress, a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA using SRQ 
composite scores was conducted with Time (baseline vs. post-manipulation) and 
Group (ego safe vs. ego threat) as the factors. There was no main effect of Group, 
F(1, 89) = 1.21, p = .275, however the main effect of Time, F(1, 89) = 27.59, 
MSE = 18.00, p < .001, 2 = .24, and the Time x Group interaction, F(1, 89) = 
4.59, p = .035, 2 = .05, reached significance. Follow up t-tests revealed there was 
no difference in composite SRQ scores reported at baseline between the ego safe 
(M = 14.18, SD = 5.67) and ego threat groups (M = 14.04, SD = 5.99, t < 1). 
Following the stress induction manipulation, however, those in the ego threat 
condition (M = 18.72, SD = 6.63) showed significantly higher SRQ scores than 
those in the ego safe group (M = 16.14, SD = 5.95), t(1, 88) = 1.98, p = .050. The 
data therefore confirmed the efficacy of the ego threat instructions as an effective 
situational stress induction procedure.  
Results 
Data Diagnostics and Assumption Checking 
Response times < 200 ms were removed and RTs ± 3SD from each 
participant‟s mean score were removed (< 1% of trials). Prior to the main 
analyses, the predictor and criterion variables were screened for outliers and 
normality. As in Study 1.1.1, univariate outliers were considered significant with 
z-scores > 3.50. Using this criterion, two outliers were identified for processing 
efficiency on the backward span task. Analyses were performed with the 
univariate outliers included and removed and there was no change in the pattern 
of results, so the cases were retained. Mahalanobis Distance and Cook‟s D were 
computed to detect the presence of multivariate outliers, however none were 
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detected with p < .001. Assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity 
were satisfactory and tests for skewness and kurtosis were acceptable with 
consideration to the sample (non-clinical, undergraduate students) and the task. 
The full data set is reported for both forward and backward span (N = 90 for both 
data sets).  
Descriptive Statistics 
Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations of the predictors and 
zero-order correlations between the predictors and criterion variables for the 
forward and backward word span data are shown in Table 6. As shown, there was 
a significant positive relationship between cognitive trait anxiety and depression, 
such that those who reported higher cognitive trait anxiety also reported higher 
depression. There was a significant positive correlation between cognitive trait 
anxiety and mental effort on both the forward and backward tasks, which supports 
ACT‟s assumption that anxious individuals invest more effort. Furthermore, there 
were significant positive correlations between mental effort and both performance 
effectiveness and processing efficiency on both the forward and backward tasks, 
with individuals who invested greater mental effort performing with greater 
effectiveness and efficiency on both the simple and complex tasks.  
Main Analyses 
Separate moderated multiple regression analyses were conducted to 
determine whether cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, mental effort and 
their interactions predicted performance effectiveness and processing efficiency 
on the forward and backward word span tasks. For each test, the covariate 
(depression) was entered at Step 1, the component main effects (cognitive trait 
anxiety, situational stress and mental effort) were entered at Step 2, the two-way 
interaction terms (cognitive trait anxiety x situational stress, cognitive trait anxiety 
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x mental effort, and situational stress x mental effort) were entered at Step 3, and 
the interaction term for all three predictors (cognitive trait anxiety x situational 
stress x mental effort) was entered at Step 4. Predictor variables were mean 
centred prior to calculating the interaction terms.  
Table 6. 
Means, Standard Deviations, Zero-order and Inter-correlations of Depression, 
Cognitive Trait Anxiety, Mental Effort, Phonological Effectiveness and 
Phonological Efficiency for Forward Word Span (FWS) and Backward Word 
Span (BWS) Tasks. 
 M SD Depression Cognitive 
Trait  
Anxiety 
Mental 
Effort 
Depression 6.81 6.43    
Cognitive Trait Anxiety 18.40 5.19 .61***   
Mental Effort on FWS 81.27 30.12 .13 .19*  
FWS Effectiveness  5.98 1.46 -.10 .15 .22* 
FWS Efficiency  .64 .20 .10 .00 -.18* 
Mental Effort on BWS 66.11 30.12 .06 .25**  
BWS Effectiveness  3.96 1.42 -.03 .05 .29** 
BWS Efficiency .69 .42 .12 -.10 -.19* 
NOTE: p < .001***; p < .01**; p < .05* 
 
Phonological Effectiveness in Cognitive Anxiety 
Forward word span effectiveness. The unstandardised coefficients, beta 
weights and 95% confidence intervals for all variables at each step are shown in 
Table 7. At Step 1, depression accounted for < 1% of the variance in performance 
effectiveness, R = .10, F < 1. At Step 2, the addition of the main effects brought 
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about a significant increase in R
2
,
 
R = .35, ΔR2 = .11, ΔF (3, 85) = 3.58, p = .017, 
and the model accounted for 12% of the variance in effectiveness, which was 
significant, F (4, 89) = 2.91, p = .026. In terms of unique contribution, depression 
(unique variance = 5%) significantly and negatively predicted effectiveness, such 
that higher depression was associated with lower effectiveness, t = 2.62, p = .025. 
Cognitive trait anxiety (unique variance = 5%) was a significant and positive 
predictor of effectiveness, such that higher anxiety was associated with higher 
effectiveness, t = 2.27, p = .026, and there was a marginal trend for effort (unique 
variance = 4%) to be positively related to the criterion, such that higher effort 
tended to be associated with higher effectiveness, t = 1.97, p = .052. The main 
effect of situational stress was not significant, t < 1. With the inclusion of the two-
way interaction terms at Step 3, the model accounted for 13% of the variance in 
forward effectiveness, R = .36, however the increment was not significant, ΔR2 
= .01, ΔF (3, 82) < 1, and the model was not significant, F (7, 89) = 1.71, p 
= .117. At Step 4, with the inclusion of the three-way interaction term, the full 
model accounted for 13% of the variance in the criterion, but the unique 
contribution of the three-way interaction term was not significant, R = .37, ΔR2 
= .01, ΔF < 1, and the full model did not reach significance, F (8, 89) = 1.57, p 
= .149.  
Backward word span effectiveness. Table 8 shows the unstandardised 
coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence intervals for all variables at each 
step. At Step 1, depression accounted for < 1% of the variance in performance 
effectiveness, R = .03, F < 1. At Step 2, the addition of the main effects produced 
a significant increase in R
2
,
 
R = .32, ΔR2 = .10, ΔF (3, 85) = 3.14, p = .029, and 
the model accounted for 10% of the variance which was significant, F (4, 89) 
=2.37, p = .046. Mental effort (unique variance = 4%) significantly and positively
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Table 7.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Phonological Effectiveness in 
Forward Word Span 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 6.13 .23    5.68 6.57 
 Depression -.02 .02  -.10  -.07 .03 
Step 2 (Constant) 6.44 .25    5.94 6.93 
 Depression -.07 .03  -.30*  -.13 -.01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .08 .04  .30*  .01 .16 
 Situational Stress   -.06 .15  -.04  -.36 .24 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .20  .00 .02 
Step 3 (Constant) 6.46 .26    5.94 6.98 
 Depression -.07 .03  -.30  -.13 -.01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .09 .04  .30  .01 .16 
 Situational Stress -.07 .15  -.05  -.38 .23 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .21  .00 .02 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .02 .03  .07  -.04 .08 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.00 .01  -.02  -.01 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.06  -.00 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) 6.44 .26    5.92 6.97 
 Depression -.07 .03  -.31  -.13 -.01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .09 .04  .31  .01 .17 
 Situational Stress -.05 .16  -.03  -.36 .27 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .23  .00 .02 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .03 .03  .09  -.04 .09 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.00 .01  -.02  -.01 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  -.04  -.00 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress 
X Mental Effort 
-.00 .00  -.09  -.00 .00 
p < .05* 
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Table 8.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Phonological Effectiveness in 
Backward Word Span 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 3.99 .22    3.56 4.43 
 Depression -.01 .02  -.03  -.05 .04 
Step 2 (Constant) 3.99 .25    3.50 4.48 
 Depression -.00 .03  -.02  -.06 .05 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.00 .04  -.00  -.08 .07 
 Situational Stress   -.17 .15  -.12  -.47 .12 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .29*  .00 .02 
Step 3 (Constant) 3.92 .27    3.39 4.45 
 Depression .01 .03  .02  -.06 .07 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.01 .04  -.03  -.09 .07 
 Situational Stress -.18 .15  -.12  -.47 .12 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .29  .00 .02 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .01 .03  .03  -.05 .07 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .01 .01  .12  -.01 .02 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .03  -.00 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) 3.92 .27    3.38 4.46 
 Depression .01 .03  .02  -.06 .06 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.01 .04  -.03  -.09 .07 
 Situational Stress -.18 .16  -.13  -.50 .13 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .28  .00 .02 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .01 .03  .02  -.06 .07 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .01 .01  .11  -.01 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .02  -.00 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress 
X Mental Effort 
.00 .00  .02  -.00 .00 
p < .05* 
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predicted backward effectiveness, such that higher effort was associated with 
higher effectiveness, t = 2.66, p = .009, yet the main effects of situational stress 
and cognitive trait anxiety were not significant, t = 1.16, p = .250, and t < 1, 
respectively. With the inclusion of the two-way interaction terms at Step 3, the 
model accounted for 11% of the variance in backward effectiveness, however the 
increase in R
2
, R = .34, ΔR2 = .01, ΔF < 1, was not significant, and the model was 
not significant, F (7, 89) = 1.50, p = .178. At Step 4, with the three-way 
interaction term included, the increase in explainable variance on backward span 
effectiveness was not significant, R = .34, ΔR2 = .00, ΔF < 1, and the full model 
was not significant, F (8, 89) = 1.30, p = .254.  
Phonological Efficiency in Cognitive Anxiety 
Forward word span efficiency. The unstandardised coefficients, beta 
weights and 95% confidence intervals for all variables at each step are shown in 
Table 9. At Step 1, depression accounted for approximately 1% of the variance in 
forward efficiency, R = .10, F < 1. At Step 2, with inclusion of the component 
main effects, the model accounted for 5% of variance in the criterion, however the 
increase in R
2 
was not significant, R = .23, ΔR2 = .04, ΔF (3, 85) = 1.24, p = .301, 
and the model failed to reach significance, F (4, 89) = 1.15, p = .340. At Step 3, 
with the inclusion of the two-way interaction terms, the model accounted for 17% 
of the variance in forward span efficiency, R = .41, and ΔR2 = .12 was significant, 
ΔF (3, 82) = 3.87, p = .012; the overall model was also significant, F (7, 89) = 
2.38, p = .029. The two-way interactions cognitive trait anxiety x situational stress 
and cognitive trait anxiety x mental effort reached significance, and were further 
qualified by the three-way interaction at Step 4. With the three-way interaction 
term added at Step 4, there was a significant increase in R
2
, 
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Table 9.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Phonological Efficiency in Forward 
Word Span 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) .62 .03    .56 .68 
 Depression .00 .00  .10  -.00 .01 
Step 2 (Constant) .60 .04    .53 .67 
 Depression .01 .00  .17  -.00 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.00 .01  -.06  -.01 .01 
 Situational Stress -.01 .02  -.06  -.06 .03 
 Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.18  -.00 .00 
Step 3 (Constant) .59 .04    .52 .66 
 Depression .01 .00  .19  -.00 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.00 .01  -.09  -.01 .01 
 Situational Stress -.01 .02  -.03  -.05 .04 
 Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.23  -.00 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.01 .00  -.29*  -.02   -.00 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .00 .00  .06  -.00 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .23*  .00 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) .60 .04    .53 .67 
 Depression .01 .00  .20  -.00 .02 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.00 .01  -.10  -.01 .01 
 Situational Stress -.02 .02  -.07  -.06 .03 
 Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.27  -.00 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.01 .00  -.34  -.02 -.01 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .00 .00  .06  -.00 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .19  .00 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
.00 .00  .21*  .00 .00 
p < .05* 
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ΔR2 = .03, ΔF (1, 81) = 3.56, p = .047, and the full model accounted for 20% of 
the variance in the criterion, R = .45, which was significant, F (8, 89) = 2.58, p 
= .015. These results suggest that processing efficiency on forward word span 
varied as a function of cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress and mental effort.  
To decompose the three-way interaction, tests of simple slopes at high and 
low values on the cognitive trait anxiety and mental effort scales (calculated at ± 1 
SD from the mean score on each) were conducted at each level of situational 
stress. The data were analysed using IRSE software (IRSE; Meier, 2008) and the 
pattern of the interaction is shown in Figure 3.  
As can been seen in the right panel, at higher mental effort (+ 1 SD), 
cognitive trait anxiety was not associated with efficiency in either the ego safe, β 
< .01, t < 1, or ego threat conditions, β < .01, t < 1. As the left panel shows, at 
lower mental effort (- 1 SD), the relationship between cognitive trait anxiety and 
efficiency varied as a function of situational stress. Under ego threat, cognitive 
trait anxiety was significantly and negatively associated with efficiency, β = -.15, t 
= 3.34, p = .001, such that those who reported higher cognitive trait anxiety 
performed with lower processing efficiency. In the ego safe condition, a similar 
trend emerged, however the slope was not significant, β = -.05, t = 1.43, p = .158. 
Backward word span efficiency. The unstandardised coefficients, beta 
weights and 95% confidence intervals for all variables at each step are shown in 
Table 10. At Step 1, depression accounted for 1% of the variance in the criterion, 
R = .12, F (1,89) = 1.24, p = .268. At Step 2, with the main effects included, the 
model accounted for 9% of variance in backward span efficiency, however the 
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Figure 3. Relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, mental 
effort, and phonological efficiency in forward word span.   
 
increase in R
2 
was not significant, R = .29, ΔR2 = .07, ΔF (3, 85) = 2.24, p = .089, 
and the model was not significant, F (4, 89) = 2.00, p = .101. At Step 3, with the 
inclusion of the two-way interaction terms, the model accounted for 10% of the 
variance in efficiency, R = .32, ΔR2 = .01, however the increment was not 
significant, ΔF < 1, and the overall model was also non-significant, F (7, 89) = 
1.30, p = .261. At Step 4, the addition of the three-way interaction term brought 
about a significant increase in R
2
,
 
R = .41, ΔR2 = .07, ΔF (1, 81) = 6.74, p = .011, 
and the full model accounted for 17% of the variance in efficiency, which was 
significant, F (8, 89) = 2.09, p = .048. These results suggest that processing 
efficiency on backward word span varied as a function of the combined 
contributions of cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress and mental effort. 
To understand the pattern of the interaction, simple slopes tests at high and 
low values on the cognitive trait anxiety and mental effort scales (± 1 SD from the 
mean on each) at each level of situational stress were conducted using IRSE
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Table 10.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Phonological Efficiency in Backward 
Word Span 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) .64 .07    .51 .77 
 Depression .01 .01  .12  -.01 .02 
Step 2 (Constant) .57 .07    .43 .72 
 Depression .02 .01  .28  .00 .04 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.02 .01  -.23  -.04 .00 
 Situational Stress   -.02 .04  -.06  -.11 .06 
 Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.15  -.01 .00 
Step 3 (Constant) .57 .08    .42 .73 
 Depression .02 .01  .25  -.00 .04 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.02 .01  -.24  -.04 .00 
 Situational Stress -.02 .05  -.05  -.11 .07 
 Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.15  -.01 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.00 .01  -.02  -.02 .02 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.00 .00  -.11  -.01 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .05  -.00 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) .60 .08    .45 .76 
 Depression .02 .01  .25  -.00 .03 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.02 .01  -.20  -.04 .01 
 Situational Stress -.06 .05  -.14  -.15 .03 
 Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.19  -.01 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.01 .01  -.09  -.03 .01 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.00 .00  -.09  -.00 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  -.04  -.00 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress 
X Mental Effort 
.00 .00  .29*  .00 .00 
p < .05* 
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software (see Figure 2). As can be seen in the right panel, at higher mental effort, 
cognitive trait anxiety was not associated with efficiency in either the ego safe, β 
= .02, t < 1, or ego threat conditions, β = -.05, t = 1.30, p = .198. The left panel, 
however, shows that at lower mental effort, the relationship between cognitive 
trait anxiety and efficiency varied as a function of situational stress. Under ego 
threat, cognitive trait anxiety was significantly and negatively associated with 
efficiency, β = -.12, t = 2.75, p = .007, such that those who reported higher 
cognitive trait anxiety performed with lower processing efficiency. In the ego safe 
condition, a similar trend emerged, however the slope was not significant, β = -
.05, t <1.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, mental 
effort, and phonological efficiency in backward word span.   
 
Discussion of Anxiety and Phonological Performance 
Study 1.1 examined whether trait anxiety, situational stress, mental effort, 
and their interactions were associated with phonological effectiveness and 
efficiency, and whether these relationships were further moderated by cognitive 
load. Somatic and cognitive trait anxiety were operationalised using the respective 
subscales of the STICSA (Ree et al., 2000), whereas somatic stress was 
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manipulated through the threat of electric shock, and cognitive stress through ego 
threat instructions. The relationships between somatic anxiety and performance 
and between cognitive anxiety and performance were tested in separate 
experiments. In each study, the forward and backward word-span tasks reflected 
the low and high complexity conditions (respectively), and effort was measured 
using a visual analogue scale. Following ACT, it was predicted that performance 
effectiveness would be independent of both cognitive and somatic trait anxiety 
and situational stress in both the high and low phonological load conditions. For 
efficiency, however, significant three-way interactions were predicted, such that 
higher trait anxiety would be associated with lower efficiency in the stressful 
conditions (i.e., shock threat and ego threat) only, and that this relationship would 
be evident at lower, but not higher effort. This pattern was predicted as a function 
of both somatic and cognitive anxiety. The data found partial support for these 
predictions. 
Study 1.1.1 investigated whether somatic anxiety, situational stress and 
effort were associated with effectiveness and efficiency on simple (forward) and 
complex (backward) phonological processing tasks. The data suggested that 
performance effectiveness was not associated with the unique main effects or 
interactive relationships between trait anxiety, stress, and mental effort, on either 
the forward or backward tasks. In terms of efficiency, on the simple (forward 
span) task the data indicated that performance was independent of somatic trait 
anxiety, somatic situational stress and mental effort, however on the complex 
(backward span) task, a two-way interaction between trait anxiety and situational 
stress emerged. The pattern of the interaction was such that that under high 
somatic stress, somatic trait anxiety was not predictive of efficiency, whereas at 
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low stress, higher somatic trait anxiety predicted greater backward span 
efficiency. This relationship was not moderated by mental effort. 
Study 1.1.2 examined whether cognitive anxiety, stress and effort were 
associated with phonological processing, and the hypotheses were fully supported. 
Specifically, phonological effectiveness did not vary as a function of the unique 
main or interactive effects of cognitive trait anxiety, cognitive situational stress 
and mental effort on either the simple (forward span) or complex (backward span) 
task. The efficiency data, however, yielded significant three-way interactions for 
both the forward and backward tasks. For both tasks, higher cognitive trait anxiety 
was associated with lower efficiency under high cognitive stress, and at lower 
mental effort. At higher mental effort, cognitive trait anxiety and cognitive 
situational stress were not associated with efficiency. 
In accordance with the predictions of ACT, the present data indicated that 
trait anxiety (somatic and cognitive), situational stress (somatic and cognitive) and 
mental effort were not related to phonological effectiveness on either simple 
(forward span) or complex (backward span) tasks. Although these results are 
inconsistent with previous studies that have reported anxiety to be associated with 
poorer phonological effectiveness (e.g., Darke, 1988; Walker & Spence, 1964), 
they are in accord with other work that reported null results (e.g., Sorg & 
Whitney, 1992; Walkenhorst & Crowe, 2009). The exact reason for the 
inconsistent results between studies is unclear. Both Study 1.1.1 and Study 1.1.2 
employed measures of trait anxiety and situational stress that have been shown to 
illuminate the relationship between anxiety and performance on executive tasks in 
other work (e.g., Edwards, Edwards et al., 2015). Furthermore, as predicted by 
ACT, in both studies simple correlation tests revealed that greater mental effort 
was associated with better effectiveness, and those higher in trait anxiety invested 
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greater mental effort. The data did not, however, reveal either unique or 
moderated links between anxiety and phonological effectiveness. The inconsistent 
results across studies might therefore be best explained by the differential 
measures of anxiety and stress employed, and/or subtle variations in mental effort 
across investigations. On the basis of the available data, it seems the relationship 
between anxiety and phonological effectiveness is, at best, tenuous. 
The data suggested that somatic trait anxiety and somatic stress combine to 
predict phonological efficiency, such that higher anxiety was associated with 
higher efficiency at low but not high situational stress, and that this effect was 
restricted to tasks employing greater cognitive load (backward span). These data 
indicate that higher somatic trait anxiety might promote phonological efficiency 
on complex tasks, but only under conditions of low situational stress. The fact that 
the facilitative relationship between higher somatic trait anxiety and phonological 
efficiency was not evident under higher stress is suggestive of the idea that the 
relationship between somatic anxiety and stress on performance is additive, and 
that higher levels of both disrupt the efficiency with which phonological material 
is processed. These data are therefore somewhat consistent with theoretical views 
predicting a curvilinear relationship between performance and anxiety/arousal (cf. 
Yerkes & Dodson, 1908); performance efficiency is facilitated at moderate (high 
somatic anxiety + low stress) but not at higher levels of arousal (higher somatic 
anxiety + high stress). The results also suggest that the facilitative relationship 
between anxiety and performance is more likely to be manifest on moderately 
complex (backward span) rather than simple (forward span) tasks. 
The data indicated that somatic anxiety and cognitive anxiety are 
differentially related to phonological efficiency, such that cognitive trait anxiety, 
cognitive situational stress and mental effort combined interactively to predict 
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phonological efficiency on both the simple and the complex tasks. The 
relationship between cognitive trait anxiety and efficiency manifested under 
higher situational stress (ego threat) and at lower effort. Notwithstanding the 
different indices of processing efficiency, the data were conceptually comparable 
to those reported by Ikeda et al. (1996) who found that anxious individuals had 
longer RTs on a phonological task relative to those in the low anxious group. The 
present results further endorse the suggestion that anxiety and effort combine to 
produce an efficiency cost on phonological processing. The finding of a 
comparable pattern of results for both the simple and complex tasks suggests that 
for phonological efficiency the moderating effects of effort in the anxiety-
efficiency relationship are somewhat robust, albeit restricted to those who report 
lower effort in higher stress situations. In sum, the relationship between cognitive 
anxiety, stress, effort and the phonological loop are evident irrespective of task 
complexity, yet, as predicted by ACT, are specific to efficiency rather than 
effectiveness.  
It is important to consider the divergent patterns of data that emerged 
between the somatic and cognitive anxiety experiments. Under some conditions 
(low stress + complex task) higher somatic anxiety promoted phonological 
efficiency, whereas higher cognitive anxiety was associated with attenuated 
efficiency (high stress + lower effort) irrespective of task complexity. The exact 
reason for the differential patterns of results between studies is puzzling. Perhaps 
the simplest explanation might be made on the basis of the relationship between 
the resources required to complete the tasks, and how each type of anxiety might 
manifest within the cognitivedomain. It seems entirely plausible that somatic 
anxiety (e.g., elevated heart rate, shortness of breath, physical tension) may 
consume fewer cognitive resources than cognitive anxiety (e.g., worrisome 
84 
thoughts, fear and apprehension), and that the additional mental resources 
available in somatic anxiety may promote phonological efficiency, at least under 
the conditions specified above. However when cognitive resources are further 
expended, as in the case of higher cognitive anxiety, the effects of high stress and 
lower effort become additive, and lower phonological efficiency. This explanation 
is however speculative, and requires empirical confirmation.  
Study 1.1 provided a sound methodological inquiry into the relationship 
between anxiety and phonological performance, yet several limitations need 
mention. In the case of cognitive anxiety, it was noted that there were no 
differences in the patterns of data between the simple and complex tasks. One 
explanation for this result might be that the relationship between cognitive anxiety 
and phonological efficiency does not vary in accordance with task complexity. 
Alternatively, the manipulation of forward versus backward word span, as indices 
of simple versus complex phonological processing (respectively), may not have 
been sufficiently sensitive to reveal processing differences related to task 
complexity. For example, forward word span may not be simple enough, and/or 
backward span may not be complex enough, to operationalise appropriate 
differences in task complexity. It is important to note however that differences in 
performance between the tasks were observed as a function of somatic anxiety, 
and so the high and low task complexity manipulation employed here was likely 
fit for purpose. 
The data revealed that effort played an important role in moderating the 
link between cognitive trait anxiety and situational stress on phonological 
efficiency, however we did not investigate whether other factors related to effort 
and anxiety might also explain this relationship. For example, recent work has 
shown motivation to be related to effort and anxiety (e.g., Hayes, MacLeod, & 
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Hammond, 2009), worry to be related to verbal processing and anxiety (e.g., 
Walkenhorst & Crowe, 2009), and working memory capacity to be related to both 
anxiety and cognitive processing (e.g., Edwards, Moore et al., 2015; Johnson & 
Gronlund, 2009). Furthermore, ACT references individual differences in cognitive 
processing of emotional stimuli specifically with regard to inhibitory processes. 
The present study however employed neutral words only, and therefore it is not 
known whether threat and neutral words are differentially processed in the 
phonological loop.  
Together, these data provide empirical support for ACT and bring to light 
some of the mechanisms sustaining the relationship between anxiety and 
phonological functioning. The data are important for ACT, because they are the 
first to confirm that cognitive trait anxiety and situational stress interact to impair 
phonological efficiency to a great extent than effectiveness, and that mental effort 
plays an important role in moderating this relationship.  
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Study 1.2: Anxiety and Updating Performance 
Study 1.2 investigated the relationship between trait anxiety, situational 
stress, mental effort and updating using the reading span task. Again, somatic 
anxiety was examined in Study 1.2.1 (somatic trait anxiety and a somatic stressor) 
and cognitive anxiety was investigated in Study 1.2.1 (cognitive trait anxiety and 
a cognitive stressor). To avail a full test of ACT in terms of updating, measures of 
performance effectiveness and processing efficiency were collected (and analysed 
separately using multiple regression). Mental effort was included in the models.  
Hypotheses 
After controlling for depression, the predictions followed ACT, which 
suggests that anxiety impairs the updating function, efficiency more so than 
effectiveness, and only under stressful conditions. It was predicted that there 
would be no relationship between trait anxiety and situational stress on updating 
effectiveness, however it was anticipated that the updating efficiency data would 
reveal three-way (trait anxiety x situational stress x mental effort) interactions 
such that higher trait anxiety would be associated with lower efficiency but that 
this relationship would be restricted to those in the high stress condition and who 
reported lower effort. It was expected that this relationship would hold for both 
somatic and cognitive anxiety. 
Measurement of Updating Performance 
Updating effectiveness. Updating effectiveness was indexed using the 
weighted reading span scoring technique. Weighted scoring allocates more points 
to trials with more sentences, specifically: correct at the two sentence set-length, 
each trial equals 4 points; correct at the three sentence set-length, each trial equals 
9 points; correct at the four sentence set-length, each trial equals 16 points; correct 
at the five sentence set-length, each trial equal 25 points; and correct at the six 
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sentence set-length , each trial equals 36 points. Correct trials required 
participants to accurately recall all the last-words (in the correct order) and 
demonstrate that they understood the content (i.e., processing) by answering the 
true/false questions with >85% accuracy (see Conway et al., 2005). A total 
weighted score on the reading span task involved summing the points for each 
correctly recalled trial. Possible total weighted scores ranged from 4 to 378.  
Updating efficiency. Updating efficiency was determined on the basis of 
the relationship between updating effectiveness (accuracy) and RT. To aid 
interpretability, the ratio was multiplied by 1000 (cf. Edwards, Moore et al., 
2015), such that processing efficiency was calculated using the following 
equation: 
Updating Efficiency = 
 Weighted Reading Span Score  
X 1000 
RT on Correct Trials 
 
Study 1.2.1 Somatic Anxiety and Updating Performance 
Participants 
Ninety undergraduate students participated, aged between 18 and 55 years 
(M = 24.68 years, SD = 8.51; 64 females). In line with the procedure described 
earlier, assignment to the shock safe and shock threat groups was determined 
randomly, and the groups were balanced for sex and age.  
Validity of SRQ as an Index of Situational Stress 
Confirmation that the SRQ was an adequate measure of situational stress 
in the sample was confirmed by finding of a positive correlation between baseline 
SRQ and STICSA State Somatic scale scores, r(90) = .37, p < .001.  
Manipulation Check 
To qualify the threat of electric shock as an effective situational stress 
manipulation procedure, composite scores on the SRQ were entered into a 2 x 2 
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repeated measures ANOVA with Time (baseline vs. post-manipulation) and 
Group (shock safe vs. shock threat) as the factors. There was no significant main 
effect of Group, F < 1. The main effect of Time, F(1, 88) = 64.69, MSE = 14.02, p 
< .001, 2 = .42, and the Time x Group interaction, F(1, 88) = 5.33, p= .023, 2 
= .06, reached significance. Follow up t-tests revealed that at baseline, there was 
no difference in composite SRQ reported by individuals in the shock threat (M = 
11.89, SD = 5.06) and shock safe (M = 13.51, SD = 5.40) conditions, t(1, 88) = 
1.47, p = .145, and despite increases in SRQ composite scores following the stress 
manipulation, with those in the shock threat group reporting  marginally higher 
SRQ scores (M = 17.19, SD = 7.47) than those safe from shock (M = 16.71, SD = 
7.01), these effects were not significant, t < 1.  
Results 
Data Diagnostics and Assumption Checking 
RTs < 200 ms were removed and RTs ± 3SD from an individual‟s mean 
score were removed prior to analyses ( < 2% of trials). The data were inspected 
visually using box-plots. Predictor and criterion variables were screened for 
univariate outliers using the criterion, z-scores > 3.50 for multivariate outliers 
using computation of Mahalanobis Distance and Cook‟s D (i.e., p < .001). Two 
univariate outliers were identified, one for updating effectiveness and one for 
updating efficiency. No multivariate outliers were detected. Analyses were 
conducted with the two outliers included and removed and due to no change in the 
pattern of the results, the cases were retained.  The full data set met the 
assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity and is reported (N = 90).  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 11 displays the means and standard deviations, and zero-order and 
inter-correlations between predictors and criterions. As seen in the table, there was 
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a significant negative correlation between mental effort and performance 
effectiveness, such that those who reported investing higher mental effort 
performed with lower effectiveness. Somatic trait anxiety was positively related to 
both depression and effort; those who reported greater trait anxiety also tended to 
report higher depression and invest greater effort. Further, there was a significant 
positive inter-correlation between depression and mental effort; those reporting 
higher depression also reported higher mental effort.  
Table 11. 
Means, Standard Deviations, Zero-order and Inter-correlations of Depression, 
Somatic Trait Anxiety, Mental Effort, Updating Effectiveness and Updating 
Efficiency on the Reading Span Task. 
 M SD Depression Somatic 
Trait  
Anxiety 
Mental 
Effort 
Depression 6.14 6.13    
Somatic Trait Anxiety 15.18 3.81 .30**   
Mental Effort 96.83 25.98 .18* .27**  
Updating Effectiveness 32.62 21.16 -.09 -.08 -.18* 
Updating Efficiency 3.27 1.07 -.15 .03 -.10 
NOTE: p < .01** p < .05* 
 
Main Analyses 
Separate moderated multiple regression analyses were performed to 
determine whether somatic trait anxiety, situational stress, mental effort and their 
interactions predicted updating effectiveness and updating efficiency. For each 
analysis, depression was entered at Step 1, the main effects (somatic trait anxiety, 
situational stress and mental effort) were added at Step 2, the two-way interaction 
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terms were entered at Step 3, and at Step 4 of the model, the three-way interaction 
term (somatic trait anxiety x situational stress x mental effort) was included. 
Updating Effectiveness in Somatic Anxiety 
Table 12 displays the unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% 
confidence intervals for all variables. At Step 1, depression accounted for < 1% of 
the variance in updating effectiveness, R = .09, F < 1. At Step 2, the addition of 
the main effects did not add to the prediction of effectiveness, R = .19, ΔR2 = .03, 
ΔF < 1, and the model (accounting for 4% of the variance in effectiveness) was 
not significant, F < 1. At Step 3, with the inclusion of the two-way interaction 
terms, the model accounted for 7% of the variance in effectiveness, R = .27, Δ R2 
= .04, however, ΔF (3, 82) = 1.06, p = .373 and the overall model, F < 1, were not 
significant. At Step 4, with the addition of the three-way interaction term, the full 
model accounted for 8% of the variance in effectiveness, R = .28, ΔR2 = .01, 
however, ΔF < 1, and the full model, F <1, were not significant.  
Updating Efficiency in Somatic Anxiety  
The unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence 
intervals for all variables in the model are shown in Table 13. Depression was 
included as a covariate at Step 1 and accounted for < 1% of the variance in 
updating efficiency, R = .15, F = 2.09, p = .152. The component main effects were 
entered at Step 2, and the change in R
2 
accounted for 5% of the variance in 
efficiency, however, R = .23, ΔR2 = .03, ΔF <1, and the overall model, F (4, 89) = 
1.35, p = .316, were not significant. At Step 3, the addition of the two-way 
interaction terms did not produce a change in R
2
, R = .33, ΔR2 = .06, ΔF (3, 79) = 
1.69, p = .176, and the model, accounting for 11% of the variance in efficiency, 
was not significant, F (7, 89) = 1.43, p = .206. At Step 4, the three-way interaction
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Table 12. 
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Updating Effectiveness 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 34.55 3.17    28.24 40.86 
 Depression -.31 .37  -.09  -1.04 .42 
Step 2 (Constant) 33.85 3.32    27.25 40.45 
 Depression  -.20 .40  -.06  -.99 .59 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.11 .64  -.02  -1.38 1.15 
 Situational Stress .23 2.34  .01  -4.43 4.88 
 Mental Effort -.14 .09  -.17  -.32 .05 
Step 3 (Constant) 34.11 3.40    27.34 40.88 
 Depression  -.19 .40  -.06  -.99 .60 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .21 .70  .04  -1.18 1.61 
 Situational Stress .39 2.34  .02  -4.27 5.05 
 Mental Effort -.16 .09  -.20  -.34 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .19 .68  .03  -.15 1.53 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .17 .10  .21  -.03 .37 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.04 .03  -.19  -.09 .02 
Step 4 (Constant) 34.02 3.42    27.22 40.82 
 Depression  -.17 .40  -.05  -.97 .63 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .11 .72  .02  -1.33 1.54 
 Situational Stress .08 2.40  -.05  -4.70 4.86 
 Mental Effort -.20 .11  -.25  -.42 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .08 .70  .02  -1.31 1.47 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .20 .11  .24  -.02 .42 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.05 .03  -.24  -.11 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
.02 .03  .11  -.04 .08 
p < .05* 
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Table 13. 
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Updating Efficiency 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 3.44 .16    3.12 3.75 
 Depression -.03 .02  -.15  -.06 .01 
Step 2 (Constant) 3.41 .17    3.08 3.74 
 Depression  -.02 .02  -.13  -.06 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .03 .03  .11  -.03 .09 
 Situational Stress -.14 .12  -.13  -.37 .09 
 Mental Effort -.00 .01  -.09  -.03 .09 
Step 3 (Constant) 3.36 .17    3.02 3.69 
 Depression  -.02 .02  -.12  -.06 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .02 .04  .08  -.05 .09 
 Situational Stress -.14 .12  -.13  -.37 .09 
 Mental Effort -.00 .01  -.11  -.01 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .06 .03  .21  -.01 .13 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .00 .01  .09  -.01 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  -.02  -.00 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) 3.37 .17    3.03 3.70 
 Depression  -.02 .02  -.13  -.06 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .03 .04  .11  -.04 .10 
 Situational Stress -.11 .12  -.10  -.34 .13 
 Mental Effort -.00 .01  -.02  -.01 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .07 .03  .25  .00 .14 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .00 .01  .03  -.01 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .07  -.00 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
-.00 .00  -.20  -.01 .00 
p < .05* 
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term was entered into the model, however the change in R
2 
was not significant,
 
R 
= .35,
 ΔR2 = .02, ΔF (1, 81) = 1.36, p = .247, and the full model which accounted 
for 12% of the variance in updating efficiency was not significant, F (8, 89) = 
1.42, p = .199.  
 
Study 1.2.2 Cognitive Anxiety and Updating Performance 
Participants 
Participants comprised 90 students, aged between 18 and 55 years (M = 
24.06 years, SD = 8.31, 72 were female). In line with the procedure described 
earlier, assignment to the ego safe and ego threat groups was conducted randomly, 
such that participants in the safe condition in Study 1.2.1 served as controls (i.e., 
ego safe) for the 45 participants in the ego threat condition.  
Validity of SRQ as an Index of Situational Stress 
Support for the SRQ as an index situational stress was confirmed by a 
positive correlation between baseline SRQ and STICSA State Cognitive scale 
scores, r(90) = .48, p < .001.  
Manipulation Check  
The efficacy of the ego threat instructions as a means of elevating 
situational stress was examined using a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with 
Time (baseline vs. post-manipulation) and Group (shock safe vs. shock threat) as 
the factors and composite SRQ scores as the dependent variable. There was no 
significant main effect of Group, F(1, 88) = 1.43, MSE = 65.83, p = .236, however 
the  main effect of Time, F(1, 88) = 35.26, MSE = 21.57, p < .001, 2 = .29 was 
significant. The Time x Group interaction, however, F(1, 88) = 1.73, p = .192, 2 
= .02, was not significant. The main effect of Time was such that SRQ scores 
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were higher post-manipulation (ego safe M = 16.71, SD = 7.01; ego threat M = 
19.07, SD = 7.78) than at baseline (ego safe M = 13.51, SD = 5.40; ego threat M = 
14.04, SD = 5.99). 
Results 
Data Diagnostics and Assumption Checking 
Following removal of RTs < 200 ms and RTs ± 3SD from an individual‟s 
mean score (constituting < 2% of the trials), the dataset was inspected visually 
using box-plots and screen for univariate and multivariate outliers, as in Study 
1.2.1. One case met criteria for a univariate outlier and multivariate outlier for 
performance efficiency, however after conducting the analyses with and without 
the extreme case, the pattern of data remained unchanged. Therefore, the case was 
retained and the full data set is reported (N = 90).  
Descriptive Statistics 
The relevant means and standard deviations, and zero-order and inter-
correlations between predictors and criterions are shown in Table 14. There was a 
significant positive inter-correlation between cognitive trait anxiety and 
depression, such that those who reported higher cognitive trait anxiety reported 
higher depression, and a positive inter-correlation between cognitive trait anxiety 
and mental effort, such that those who reported higher cognitive trait anxiety 
reported higher mental effort. There was also a significant positive inter-
correlation between depression and mental effort, with those reporting higher 
depression also reporting investing greater effort. 
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Table 14. 
Means, Standard Deviations, Zero-order and Inter-correlations of Depression, 
Cognitive Trait Anxiety, Mental Effort, Updating Effectiveness and Updating 
Efficiency on the Reading Span Task. 
 M SD Depression Cognitive 
Trait  
Anxiety 
Mental 
Effort 
Depression 6.81 6.43    
Cognitive Trait 
Anxiety 
18.40 5.19 .61***   
Mental Effort 95.00 27.05 .20* .26**  
Updating Effectiveness 32.83 18.47 -.04 .04 -.06 
Updating Efficiency 3.21 1.27 -.06 -.01 -.05 
NOTE: p < .001*** p < .01** p < .05* 
Main Analyses 
To determine whether cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, mental 
effort and their combined contributions predict updating effectiveness and 
efficiency, separate moderated multiple regression analyses were conducted. For 
each analysis, depression was included as a covariate at Step 1; main effects 
(cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress and mental effort) were included at Step 
2; at Step 3, the two-way interaction terms (calculated using mean-centred scores) 
were included; and at Step 4, the three-way interaction term (cognitive trait 
anxiety x situational stress x mental effort) was added. 
Updating Effectiveness in Cognitive Anxiety 
The unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence 
intervals for all variables are shown in Table 15. At Step 1, depression accounted 
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Table 15. 
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Updating Effectiveness 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 33.69 2.86    28.00 39.37 
 Depression -.13 .31  -.04  -.73 .48 
Step 2 (Constant) 34.79 3.34    28.16 41.42 
 Depression  -.29 .39  -.10  -1.07 .50 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .43 .49  .12  -.55 1.41 
 Situational Stress -.44 2.03  -.02  4.48 3.60 
 Mental Effort -.05 .08  -.07  -.20 .11 
Step 3 (Constant) 34.67 3.52    27.66 41.68 
 Depression  -.27 .40  -.09  -1.07 .54 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .37 .51  .10  .65 1.39 
 Situational Stress -.48 2.06  -.03  -4.59 3.63 
 Mental Effort -.04 .08  -.06  -.20 .12 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .33 .42  .09  -.51 1.16 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.03 .08  -.04  -.18 .13 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .02  -.00  -.03 .03 
Step 4 (Constant) 34.55 3.56    27.47 41.64 
 Depression  -.26 .41  -.09  -1.07 .56 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .40 .52  .11  -.64 1.43 
 Situational Stress -.34 2.13  -.02  -4.57 3.89 
 Mental Effort -.04 .08  -.05  -.20 .12 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .34 .42  .10  -.50 1.18 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.02 .08  -.04  -.18 .14 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .02  -.00  -.03 .03 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
-.01 .02  -.04  -.04 .03 
p < .05* 
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for < 1% of the variance in updating effectiveness, R = .04, F < 1. At Step 2, with 
the inclusion of the main effects the model accounted for < 2% of the variance in 
effectiveness, R = .12, ΔR2 = .01, ΔF < 1, and the model was not significant, F <1. 
At Step 3, the inclusion of the two-way interaction terms did not increase the 
explainable variance in effectiveness, R = .15, ΔR2 = .01, ΔF <1, and the overall 
model that accounted for 2 % of variance in the criterion, F < 1, was not 
significant. At Step 4, the full model (including the three-way interaction term) 
accounted for 2% of the variance in effectiveness, R = .15, ΔR2 = .10, however, 
ΔF < 1, and the full model, F < 1, did not reach significance.   
Updating Efficiency in Cognitive Anxiety  
Table 16 displays the unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% 
confidence intervals for all variables. Depression accounted for < 1% of the 
variance in updating efficiency at Step 1, R = .06, F <1. At Step 2, the main 
effects failed to increase R
2
, R = .11, ΔR2 = .01, ΔF <1, and the overall model 
accounted for 1% of variance, F < 1. At Step 3, with the inclusion of the two-way 
interaction terms, R = .16, ΔR2 = .01, ΔF < 1, the model accounted for 2% of the 
variance in efficiency, F < 1. At Step 4, the full model accounted for 4% of 
variance in efficiency, however the inclusion of the three-way interaction term 
reflected no significant change in R
2
,
 
R = .21,
 ΔR2 = .02, ΔF (1, 81) = 1.62, p = 
.206, and the full model was not significant, F < 1.  
Discussion of Anxiety and Updating Performance 
Study 1.2 examined the relationship between trait anxiety, stress and effort 
on updating effectiveness and efficiency. ACT suggests that performance deficits 
in anxiety are observable only under stressful conditions. Thus separate 
observations were conducted to examine the performance of individuals high in 
somatic trait anxiety under a somatic situational stress (i.e., threat of electric  
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Table 16. 
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Updating Efficiency 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 3.30 .19    2.91 3.69 
 Depression -.01 .02  -.06  -.05 .03 
Step 2 (Constant) 3.31 .23    2.86 3.77 
 Depression  -.01 .03  -.07  -.07 .04 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .01 .03  .05  -.06 .08 
 Situational Stress -.10 .14  -.08  -.37 .18 
 Mental Effort -.00 .01  -.04  -.01 .01 
Step 3 (Constant) 3.32 .24    2.84 3.80 
 Depression  -.02 .03  -.08  -.07 .04 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .02 .04  .07  -.05 .09 
 Situational Stress -.10 .14  -.08  -.38 .18 
 Mental Effort -.00 .01  -.04  -.01 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.01 .03  -.05  -.07 .05 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .01 .01  .10  -.01 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  -.05  -.00 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) 3.36 .24    2.87 3.84 
 Depression  -.02 .03  -.10  -.07 .04 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .01 .04  .04  -.06 .08 
 Situational Stress -.14 .14  -.11  -.43 .15 
 Mental Effort -.00 .01  -.07  -.01 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.02 .03  -.07  -.07 .04 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .00 .01  .09  -.01 .02 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  -.05  -.00 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
.00 .00  .15  -.00 .00 
p < .05* 
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shock) and cognitive trait-anxious individuals‟ performance under cognitive 
situational stress (i.e., ego threat) using the reading span task. 
The predictions made here, however, were not supported for somatic 
anxiety (see Study 1.2.1) or cognitive anxiety (see Study 1.2.2) on either updating 
effectiveness or efficiency.  The data indicated that on the reading span task, 
updating effectiveness and processing efficiency did not vary as a function of trait 
anxiety, situational stress or effort, nor their interactions.  
In contrast to other studies (e.g., Calvo et al., 1992; Darke, 1988; Sorg & 
Whitney, 1992) the data from Study 1.2 revealed no relationship between anxiety 
(somatic or cognitive) and updating effectiveness. There are several reasons why 
this may be the case. One difference between previous work that reported 
associations between anxiety and updating effectiveness and the approach taken 
here lies in the measures of anxiety used. For example, Darke (1988) and Calvo et 
al. (1992) employed measures of test anxiety, whereas the current study employed 
indices of somatic and cognitive trait anxiety. One explanation for the differential 
patterns of results might therefore be that updating processes are more susceptible 
to anxiety associated with evaluative testing rather than the enduring somatic and 
cognitive symptoms investigated here. 
Sorg and Whitney (1992) employed a measure of trait anxiety and a 
situational stress manipulation involving playing competitive video games. Their 
data revealed that those individuals higher in trait anxiety were lower in updating 
effectiveness in the stressful condition. Despite the similarities between their 
approach and the one taken here, the present study failed to replicate Sorg and 
Whitney‟s results. A potential explanation for these differences might be that Sorg 
and Whitney did not include a processing check as was done in the present work, 
such that it might have been possible for their participants to recall a greater 
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number of last words at the expense of content processing. Storing last words 
while processing the sentence content for information in order to correctly answer 
the true/false questions (such were the requirements of the current task) may have 
overloaded the cognitive system to the extent that individual differences in 
anxiety and effort, and the stress manipulations (both somatic and cognitive), 
were unable to reveal significant performance differences in the data. 
It is also plausible that a floor effect in the present data may have 
confounded the relationship between anxiety and updating effectiveness. 
Updating effectiveness was operationalised using a weighted reading span scoring 
procedure that has been used by others (e.g., Darke, 1988). In the present study 
possible scores ranged between 4 and 378, however, inspection of the means and 
standard deviations between situational stress groups revealed low scores (i.e., < 
10% accuracy) and little variability, i.e., shock threat (M = 33.22, SD = 25.27), 
ego threat (M = 32.02, SD = 16.33), and safe (M = 33.64, SD = 20.55). Despite 
using the exact sentences from the original Daneman and Carpenter (1980) study, 
it seems likely that including the true/false semantic processing check may have 
made the task overly difficult, thus reducing the variance in performance.  
ACT predicts that updating efficiency deficits will be found in anxious 
individuals performing under stressful conditions, however neither the threat of 
shock (somatic stressor) nor ego-threat instructions (cognitive stressor) produced 
updating efficiency deficits as a function of either somatic or cognitive trait 
anxiety. To date there is no empirical literature for comparison of reading span 
efficiency, however the present data contradicts studies that have reported 
anxiety-related updating efficiency deficits on other updating tasks (e.g., n-back; 
Wong et al., 2013), yet concur with other studies that have not observed anxiety-
linked efficiency impairments (e.g., Fales et al., 2008; Walkenhorst & Crowe, 
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2009). While other work has used RT alone (e.g., Fales et al.; Walkenhorst & 
Crowe; Wong et al.), the efficiency ratio used here represents a novel approach to 
understanding the nature of this relationship and controls for the interpretational 
difficulties associated with previous approaches. Nonetheless given the close 
relationship been this ratio and the measure of effectiveness, it seems entirely 
plausible that performance floor effects might have limited the likelihood of 
revealing an association between the key variables of interest and updating 
efficiency.   
Taken together, the findings of Study 1.2 and its associated difficulties 
suggest that the relationship between anxiety and updating warrants further 
exploration. A methodological solution might be to reduce the length of the 
sentences (i.e., reduce the number of words in each sentence) to make the task less 
demanding and create greater variance in weighted span scores. This approach 
was adopted in Study 2.1. 
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Study 1.3: Anxiety and Inhibitory Performance 
Study 1.3 investigated the inter-relationships between trait anxiety, 
situational stress, mental effort and inhibition using a version of the Go-No-Go 
task. In accord with the other approaches in Study 1, trait anxiety was delineated 
into the somatic and cognitive dimensions using the STICSA (Ree et al., 2000), 
situational stress was induced using a somatic stress induction (i.e., shock threat) 
or a cognitive stress induction (i.e., ego threat), and mental effort was included in 
the model.  
Hypotheses 
After controlling for depression, the hypotheses were based on ACT. It 
was predicted that there would be no relationship between anxiety, stress and 
effort on inhibitory effectiveness, however a three-way (trait anxiety x situational 
stress x mental effort) interaction was predicted on inhibitory efficiency, such that 
higher trait anxiety would be associated with lower efficiency under higher 
situational stress, and that the relationship would be buffered by mental effort. 
The same pattern was predicted for somatic and cognitive anxiety. 
Measurement of Inhibitory Performance 
Inhibitory effectiveness. Inhibitory effectiveness was indexed using the 
signal detection theory parameter of stimulus sensitivity (d’; Pastore & Scheirer, 
1974; see Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999 for a review). The variable d’ accounts for 
the discrimination in response to different stimuli, thus accounting for the 
proportion of NoGo Errors and Correct Go trials, and has been used in other 
studies (e.g., Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010; Wong et al., 2013). Thus, inhibitory 
effectiveness was calculated using the following equation: 
Inhibitory Effectiveness = z (Correct Go)  –  z (NoGo Errors) 
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Inhibitory efficiency. To determine a measure of inhibitory efficiency that 
fits with ACT (i.e., the relationship between inhibitory accuracy and RT), 
efficiency was operationalised as the relationship between stimuli sensitivity (d’) 
and RT on Correct trials. To aid interpretation of the results, the ratio was 
multiplied by 1000 (cf. Edwards, Moore et al., 2015; Hoffman & Schraw, 2009). 
Thus, we calculated processing efficiency using the following equation: 
Inhibitory Efficiency =  
 z (Correct Go)  –  z (NoGo Errors)  
X 1000 
Mean RT on Correct Go Trials 
 
Study 1.3.1 Somatic Anxiety and Inhibitory Performance 
Participants 
Data from two participants were replaced due to equipment failure, 
returning the sample to 90 undergraduate students. After data cleaning, data from 
three further participants were eliminated on the basis of exclusion criteria for 
outliers (see below), leaving a final sample of 87 participants aged between 18 
and 55 years (M = 24.68 years, SD = 8.51; 64 females). Assignment to the shock 
safe and shock threat groups was conducted as per the procedure described earlier. 
Sex was proportionately distributed between the shock safe and shock threat 
conditions and the groups were comparable with respect to age, t(85) < 1.  
Validity of SRQ as an Index of Situational Stress 
Correlational analyses was conducted between composite SRQ scores at 
baseline and scores on the STICSA State Somatic scale to determine the efficacy 
of the SRQ as an appropriate measure of situational stress in the sample. Support 
for the SRQ as a satisfactory index of situational stress was confirmed with a 
positive relationship between the measures, r(87) = .34, p = .001.  
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Manipulation Check 
To determine the efficacy of the threat of electric shock as a situational 
stress induction procedure, composite scores on the SRQ were entered into a 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA with Time (baseline vs. post-manipulation) and 
Group (shock safe vs. shock threat) as the factors. There was no significant main 
effect of Group, F(1, 85) = 2.32, MSE = 44.06, p = .131. The main effect of Time, 
F(1, 85) = 36.92, MSE = 13.38, p < .001, 2 = .30, and the Time x Group 
interaction, F(1, 85) = 15.80, p < .001, 2 = .16, reached significance. Follow up t-
tests revealed that at baseline, there was no difference in composite SRQ reported 
by individuals in the shock threat (M = 12.40, SD = 4.58) and shock safe (M = 
13.07, SD = 5.28) conditions, t (1, 85) = 1.37, p = .173, however following the 
stress manipulation those in the shock threat group (M = 17.98, SD = 6.26) 
showed significantly higher SRQ scores than those in the shock safe group (M = 
14.24, SD = 5.16, t(1, 85) = 4.64, p < .001. 
Results 
Data Diagnostics and Assumption Checking 
Anticipatory RTs (< 200 ms) and RTs ± 3SD from each participant‟s mean 
score were removed prior to analyses (< 1% of trials). Predictor and criterion 
variables were screened for univariate outliers using the criterion, z-scores > 3.50, 
and box-plots were examined visually. A total of three univariate outliers were 
removed, such that two outliers were detected for inhibitory effectiveness (z-score 
= -5.78 and -4.78) and one outlier was found for inhibitory efficiency (z-score = 
3.80). Multivariate outliers were screened using computation of Mahalanobis 
Distance and Cook‟s D, however no highly influential cases were detected (p 
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< .001). The final data set of 87 participants met the assumptions of linearity and 
homoscedasticity, and is reported (N = 87).  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 17 displays the relevant means and standard deviations, and zero-
order and inter-correlations between predictors and criterions. As can be seen 
there were significant negative correlations between mental effort and 
effectiveness and efficiency, such that those who reported higher effort performed 
with lower effectiveness and lower efficiency.  There was a significant positive 
inter-correlation between somatic trait anxiety and depression, such that those 
who reported higher somatic trait anxiety also tended to report higher depression. 
Furthermore there was a significant positive inter-correlation between somatic 
trait anxiety and mental effort, with those reporting higher symptoms of somatic 
trait anxiety also reporting higher mental effort.  
Main Analyses 
Moderated multiple regression analyses were performed to determine 
whether somatic trait anxiety, situational stress, mental effort and their 
interactions predicted performance effectiveness and processing efficiency. For 
each analysis, depression was controlled for at Step 1, the component main effects 
(somatic trait anxiety, situational stress and mental effort) were entered at Step 2, 
the two-way interaction terms were entered at Step 3, and the interaction term 
including all three predictors (somatic trait anxiety x situational stress x mental 
effort) was entered at Step 4. 
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Table 17. 
Means, Standard Deviations, Zero-order and Inter-correlations of Depression, 
Somatic Trait Anxiety, Mental Effort, Inhibitory Effectiveness and Inhibitory 
Efficiency on the Go-No-Go Task. 
 M SD Depression Somatic 
Trait  
Anxiety 
Mental 
Effort 
Depression 6.13 6.15    
Somatic Trait Anxiety 15.28 3.82 .32***   
Mental Effort 58.14 33.01 -.05 .23*  
Inhibitory 
Effectiveness 
.00 1.31 -.01 -.07 -.33*** 
Inhibitory Efficiency .19 2.68 -.00 -.06 -.33*** 
NOTE: p < .001*** p < .01** p < .05* 
 
Inhibitory Effectiveness in Somatic Anxiety 
Table 18 shows the unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% 
confidence intervals for all variables. At Step 1, depression accounted for < 1% of 
the variance in performance effectiveness, R = .01, F < 1. At Step 2, the addition 
of the main effects brought about a significant increase in R
2
, R = .34, ΔR2 = .11, 
ΔF (3, 82) = 3.44, p = .021, and the model accounted for 11% of the variance in 
effectiveness, which was significant, F (4, 82) = 2.58, p = .043. In terms of unique 
contributions, the only significant predictor of effectiveness was mental effort 
which accounted for 11% of explainable variance; as such, higher mental effort 
was associated with lower effectiveness, t = 3.15, p = .002. At Step 3, with the 
inclusion of the two-way interaction terms, the model accounted for 12% of the
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Table 18. 
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Inhibitory Effectiveness 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) .17 .20    -.23 .57 
 Depression -.00 .02  -.01  -.05 .04 
Step 2 (Constant) .21 .20    -.19 .61 
 Depression  -.01 .02  -.04  -.06 .04 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .01 .04  .02  -.07 .09 
 Situational Stress .05 .14  .04  -.24 .33 
 Mental Effort -.01 .00  -.34*  -.02 -.01 
Step 3 (Constant) .24 .21    -.18 .66 
 Depression  -.01 .03  -.07  -.07 .04 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .00 .04  .01  -.08 .08 
 Situational Stress .06 .15  .04  -.24 .35 
 Mental Effort -.01 .00  -.35  -.02 -.01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .02 .04  .06  -.06 .10 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.01 .01  -.12  -.01 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .02  -.00 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) .25 .21    -.17 .68 
 Depression  -.01 .03  -.06  -.06 .04 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .00 .04  .03  -.08 .08 
 Situational Stress .03 .15  .03  -.26 .33 
 Mental Effort -.02 .01  -.40  -.03 -.01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .02 .04  .05  -.06 .09 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.00 .01  .10  -.01 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  -.03  -.00 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
.00 .00  .12  -.00 .00 
p < .05* 
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variance in effectiveness, R = .45, ΔR2 = .01, however the increase in R2 was not 
significant, ΔF < 1, and the overall model, F (7, 79) = 1.60, p = .148, failed to 
reach significance. At Step 4, with the addition of the three-way interaction term, 
the full model accounted for 13% of the variance in effectiveness, R = .36, ΔR2 
= .01, however the incremental increase in R
2 
was not significant, ΔF < 1, and the 
full model, F (8, 78) = 1.48, p = .177, was not significant.  
Inhibitory Efficiency in Somatic Anxiety  
The unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence 
intervals for all variables are shown in Table 19. Depression was entered at Step 1 
and accounted for < 1% of the variance in processing efficiency, R = .00, F < 1. 
At Step 2, the main effects were included and the change in R
2 
accounted for a 
further 11% of the variance in inhibitory efficiency, R = .33, Δ R2 = .11, Δ F (3, 
82) = 3.42, p = .021, and the overall model, F (4, 82) = 2.57, p = .044, reached 
significance. Mental effort was identified as contributing 11% of the unique 
variance in the criterion, such that high mental effort predicted lower efficiency, t 
= 3.24, p = .002. With the inclusion of the two- way interaction terms at Step 3, 
there was no significant change in R
2
, R = .35, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (3, 79) < 1, and the 
model, accounting for 12% of the variance in efficiency, was not significant, F (7, 
79) = 1.59, p = .150. At Step 4, the three-way interaction term was included in the 
model, however the change in R
2 
was not significant,
 Δ R2 = .01, Δ F < 1, and the 
full model, which accounted for 13% of the variance in processing efficiency, was 
not significant, F (8, 78) = 1.50, p = .171.  
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Table 19. 
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Inhibitory Efficiency 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) .20 .41    -.62 1.01 
 Depression -.00 .05  -.00  -.10 .09 
Step 2 (Constant) .28 .41    -.54 1.10 
 Depression  .01 .05  -.03  -.11 .09 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .01 .08  .02  -.15 .17 
 Situational Stress .08 .29  .03  -.50 .67 
 Mental Effort -.03 .01  -.34*  -.05 -.01 
Step 3 (Constant) .34 .43    -.52 1.20 
 Depression  -.03 .05  -.06  -.13 .08 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .01 .08  .01  -.16 .17 
 Situational Stress .11 .30  .04  -.49 .70 
 Mental Effort -.03 .01  -.35  -.05 -.01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .04 .08  .05  -.12 .20 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.01 .01  -.12  -.03 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .03  -.00 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) .38 .44    -.49 1.24 
 Depression  -.02 .05  -.05  -.13 .08 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .00 .08  .00  -.16 .17 
 Situational Stress .06 .30  .02  -.55 .66 
 Mental Effort -.03 .01  -.40  -.05 -.01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .03 .08  .04  -.13 .18 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.01 .01  -.10  -.03 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  -.03  -.01 .00 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
.00 .00  .13  -.00 .01 
p < .05* 
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Study 1.3.2 Cognitive Anxiety and Inhibitory Performance 
Participants 
Recruitment and prerequisite procedures were identical other studies in the 
present series. Participants in the safe condition in Study 1.3.1 served as low stress 
controls (i.e., ego safe) for the 45 participants in the ego threat condition. The 
final sample of 90 undergraduate psychology students were aged between 18 and 
55 years (M = 24.06 years, SD = 8.31; 72 females).  
Validity of SRQ as an Index of Situational Stress 
A significant positive correlation between composite SRQ scores at 
baseline and scores on the STICSA State Cognitive scale, r(87) = .35, p < .001, 
confirmed the SRQ as an appropriate measure of situational stress.  
Manipulation Check 
To establish the effectiveness of the ego threat instructions as a means of 
heightening situational stress, a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted 
with Time (baseline vs. post-manipulation) and Group (shock threat vs. shock 
safe) as the factors. Composite SRQ scores served as the dependent variable. The 
main effect of Group was not significant, however the main effect of Time, F(1, 
85) = 16.69, MSE = 20.00, p < .001, 2 = .16, and the Time x Group interaction, 
F(1, 85) = 5.60, p = .020, 2 = .06, were significant. There was no difference in 
SRQ scores between the ego threat (M = 13.16, SD = 5.71) and ego safe (M = 
13.07, SD = 5.28) groups at baseline, t < 1, however individuals in the ego threat 
condition (M = 17.53, SD = 7.48) showed significantly higher SRQ scores than 
those in the ego safe condition (M = 14.24, SD = 5.16) following the stress 
manipulation, t(85) = 4.64, p < .001. Results thus confirmed the efficacy of the 
stress induction procedure.  
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Results 
Data Diagnostics and Assumption Checking 
Data cleaning procedures were the same as the somatic anxiety sample. 
The same three univariate outliers (from Study 1.3.1) were removed (i.e., they 
were participants in the safe condition), such that two outliers were detected for 
performance effectiveness (z-score = -5.78 and -4.78) and one outlier was found 
for processing efficiency (z-score = 3.80). No additional univariate or multivariate 
outliers were identified, leaving a final data set of 87 participants (N = 87).  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 20 shows the means, standard deviations, zero-order and inter-
correlations of depression, cognitive trait anxiety, mental effort, performance 
effectiveness and processing efficiency. As can be seen in the table, there were 
significant negative zero-order correlations between mental effort and 
effectiveness and efficiency, such that those who reported higher effort performed 
with lower effectiveness and lower efficiency.  There was also a significant 
positive inter-correlation between depression and trait anxiety; those who reported 
higher depression also tended to report higher cognitive trait anxiety.  
Main Analyses 
Analyses consistent with those for the somatic anxiety data (see Study 
1.3.1) were performed on the cognitive anxiety data to determine whether 
cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, mental effort and their interactions 
predicted performance effectiveness and processing efficiency. Separate 
moderated regression analyses were conducted on the inhibitory effectiveness and 
inhibitory efficiency data.  
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Table 20. 
Means, Standard Deviations, Zero-order and Inter-correlations of Depression, 
Cognitive Trait Anxiety, Mental Effort, Inhibitory Effectiveness and Inhibitory 
Efficiency on the Go-No-Go Task. 
 M SD Depression Cognitive 
Trait  
Anxiety 
Mental 
Effort 
Depression 6.82 6.29    
Cognitive Trait Anxiety 18.26 4.97 .58***   
Mental Effort 59.99 31.63 -.15 -.03  
Inhibitory Effectiveness .00 1.72 .03 -.06 -.43*** 
Inhibitory Efficiency -.15 3.57 .03 -.06 -.42*** 
NOTE: p < .001*** 
 
Inhibitory Effectiveness in Cognitive Anxiety 
The unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence 
intervals for all variables at each step as shown in Table 21. At Step 1, depression 
accounted for < 1% of the variance in performance effectiveness, R = .03, F < 1. 
At Step 2, the main effects accounted for 19% of the variance in effectiveness, R 
= .44, ΔR2 = .19, which was significant, ΔF (3, 82) = 6.50, p = .001, and the 
model was significant, F (4, 82) = 4.90, p = .001. Mental effort (18%) was the 
only significant unique predictor of effectiveness, such that higher effort was 
associated with lower effectiveness. With the two-way interaction terms included 
at Step 3, the model accounted for 21% of the variance in the criterion, R = .45, 
however the increase in explainable variance failed to reach significance, ΔR2 = 
.01, ΔF < 1, and the overall model remained significant, F (7, 79) = 2.91, p = 
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Table 21.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Inhibitory Effectiveness 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) -.06 .27    -.60 .49 
 Depression .01 .03  .03  -.05 .07 
Step 2 (Constant) -.02 .29    -.59 .56 
 Depression .00 .03  .01  -.07 .07 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.03 .04  -.08  -.11 .06 
 Situational Stress .00 .17  .00  -.34 .35 
 Mental Effort -.02 .01  -.44*  -.04 -.01 
Step 3 (Constant) .05 .30    -.55 .65 
 Depression -.01 .04  -.03  -.08 .06 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.01 .05  -.03  -.10 .08 
 Situational Stress .01 .18  .01  -.34 .36 
 Mental Effort -.02 .01  -.41  -.03 -.01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .00 .04  .01  -.07 .07 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.00 .01  -.03  -.01 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.11  -.00 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) .00 .30    -.59 .59 
 Depression -.00 .04  -.01  -.07 .07 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.02 .05  -.06  -.11 .07 
 Situational Stress .03 .17  .02  -.31 .37 
 Mental Effort -.02 .01  -.45  -.04 -.01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.01 .04  -.03  -.08 .06 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.00 .01  -.08  -.02 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.16  -.00 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress 
X Mental Effort 
.00 .00  .22*  .00 .00 
p < .05* 
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.009. With the three-way interaction term included at Step 4, the full model 
accounted for 24% of the variance in effectiveness, R = .49, the increment was 
significant, ΔR2 = .04, ΔF (1, 78) = 3.93, p = .048, and the full model also reached 
significance, F(8, 78) = 3.13, p = .004.  
To decompose the three-way interaction and perform tests of simple slopes 
at high and low levels of trait anxiety and mental effort we used the Interactions in 
Multiple Linear Regression with SPSS and Excel (IRSE; Meier, 2008) program. 
Figure 5 shows the pattern of the interaction plotted at ± 1 SD from the mean 
score on each variable. 
 
 
Figure 5. Relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, stress, mental effort, and 
inhibitory effectiveness.   
 
The left panel shows that at lower mental effort (- 1SD) trait anxiety was 
not associated with inhibitory effectiveness in the ego threat or ego safe 
conditions, β = .02, t < 1, and β = .06, t = 1.79, p = .078, respectively. As can be 
seen in the right panel, at higher mental effort (+ 1 SD), trait anxiety was not 
associated with inhibitory effectiveness in the ego threat condition, β = -.06, t = 
1.70, p = .093. However in the ego safe condition, those who reported higher trait 
115 
anxiety demonstrated significantly lower effectiveness, β = -.27, t = 3.09, p = 
.003. 
Inhibitory Efficiency in Cognitive Anxiety  
Table 22 displays the unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% 
confidence intervals for all variables at each step. At Step 1, depression accounted 
for < 1% of the variance in processing efficiency, R = .04, F < 1. There was a 
significant increase in explainable variance at Step 2. The inclusion of the main 
effects accounted for 19% of the variance in processing efficiency, R = .43, ΔR2 = 
.18, ΔF (3, 82) = 6.17, p = .001, and the overall model was significant, F(4, 82) = 
4.66, p = .002. Upon inspection of the individual contributions of the variables, 
mental effort was the only significant predictor and accounted for 17% of the 
unique variance in inhibitory efficiency, such that higher effort was associated 
with lower efficiency. At Step 3, with the inclusion of the two-way interaction 
terms, the model accounted for 20% of the variance in the criterion, R = .44, 
however the increment in variance was not significant, Δ R2 = .01, Δ F (3, 79) < 1, 
although the model remained significant, F (7, 79) = 2.77, p = .012. At Step 4, the 
addition of the three-way interaction term brought about a significant increase in 
R
2
,
 ΔR2 = .04, ΔF(1, 78) = 3.95, p = .046, and the full model accounted for 24% of 
the variance in processing efficiency, which was significant, F (8, 78) = 3.00, p = 
.006. These results suggest that processing efficiency varied as a function of 
cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress and mental effort. 
IRSE (Meier, 2008) software was used to decompose the interaction and 
perform tests of simple slopes at high and low values on the cognitive trait anxiety 
and mental effort scales (calculated at ± 1 SD from the mean score on each). 
Figure 6 shows the pattern of the interaction. The left panel shows that at lower 
mental effort (- 1 SD), there was no relationship between trait anxiety and  
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Table 22.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Inhibitory Efficiency 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) -.28 .57    -1.41 .86 
 Depression .02 .06  .03  -.10 .14 
Step 2 (Constant) -.22 .60    -1.41 .98 
 Depression .01 .07  .02  -.13 .15 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety  -.06 .09  -.09  -.24 .11 
 Situational Stress .01 .36  .00  -.71 .73 
 Mental Effort -.05 .01  -.42*  -.07 -.03 
Step 3 (Constant) -.07 .63    -1.33 1.18 
 Depression -.01 .08  -.02  -.16 .14 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.03 .10  -.05  -.22 .16 
 Situational Stress .03 .37  .01  -.70 .76 
 Mental Effort -.05 .01  -.40  -.07 -.02 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .01 .08  .01  -.14 .16 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.01 .01  -.04  -.03 .02 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.10  -.01 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) -.18 .62    -1.42 1.05 
 Depression .00 .07  .00  -.15 .15 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.05 .09  -.07  -.24 .13 
 Situational Stress .07 .36  .02  -.65 .78 
 Mental Effort -.05 .01  -.44  -.07 -.03 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.01 .08  -.02  -.16 .14 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.01 .01  -.09  -.03 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.15  -.01 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
.00 .00  .22*  .00 .03 
p < .05* 
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inhibitory efficiency in the ego threat condition, β = .03, t < 1.  For those in the 
ego safe condition however, there was a tendency for higher trait anxiety to be  
associated with higher efficiency, yet this effect failed to reach significance, β = 
.07, t = 1.94, p = .056. The right panel shows that at higher mental effort (+ 1 SD), 
higher trait anxiety was marginally associated with lower inhibitory efficiency in 
the ego threat condition, β = -.08, t = 1.98, p = .050, and significantly in the ego 
safe condition, β = -.11, t = 3.44, p = .001. 
 
 
Figure 6. Relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, stress, mental effort, and 
inhibitory efficiency.   
Discussion of Anxiety and Inhibitory Performance 
Study 1.3 investigated the relationship between somatic and cognitive trait 
anxiety, somatic and cognitive stressors, and mental effort in predicting inhibitory 
control using the Go-No-Go task. A number of procedural problems in the current 
literature were controlled, including appropriate measures of inhibitory 
effectiveness and efficiency. For somatic anxiety the data suggested that the 
predictors did not combine to predict effectiveness or efficiency; mental effort 
alone was related to both criteria, such that higher effort was related to lower 
inhibitory effectiveness and efficiency. For cognitive anxiety there was a 
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significant interaction between trait anxiety, situational stress and mental effort. 
Specifically, at lower mental effort, trait anxiety was not associated with 
effectiveness or efficiency, whereas at higher mental effort, higher trait anxiety 
was predictive of lower effectiveness in the low stress condition, and lower 
efficiency irrespective of situational stress.  
 Inhibitory effectiveness and efficiency did not vary with the interactive 
effects of somatic trait anxiety, situational stress and/or effort. The data concurred 
with other studies using the Go-No-Go task that used both number of errors 
(Righi et al., 2009) and stimulus sensitivity (d’; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010; 
Wong et al., 2013) as the measures of effectiveness. The results were also 
consistent with Derakshan, Ansari, et al., (2009) and Ansari and Derakshan 
(2010), who employed the antisaccade task and failed to find a reliable 
relationship between anxiety and accuracy. The data however were inconsistent 
with previous reports suggesting that higher anxiety is related to lower inhibitory 
efficiency (e.g., Ansari & Derakshan, 2010; Derakshan, Ansari, et al., 2009; 
Pacheco-Unguetti et al.; Wong et al.). An important methodological distinction 
between the approach employed here and that of Ansari and Derakshan, 
Derakshan, Ansari et al., Pacheco-Unguetti et al. (2010) and Wong et al. (2013) 
was that the current study employed a measure specific to somatic trait anxiety 
and a somatic stress manipulation, whereas they used subscales of the State Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger et al., 1983), which captures the combined 
cognitive and somatic symptoms of anxiety. Perhaps, therefore, the most 
parsimonious account for the differential patterns of data between these earlier 
studies and those reported here is that inhibitory effectiveness and efficiency 
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deficits might be unrelated to the somatic components of anxiety, and better 
explained by its cognitive symptoms.  
The data revealed interactive relationships between cognitive trait anxiety, 
situational stress and mental effort on inhibitory effectiveness and efficiency. 
Results suggested that poorer effectiveness was associated with higher cognitive 
trait anxiety at higher effort and low stress (nb. a similar trend was evident for 
those in the high cognitive stress condition but the effect did not quite reach 
statistical significance). These data are therefore inconsistent with the findings of 
others (Ansari & Derakshan, 2010; Derakshan, Ansari, et al., 2009; Righi et al., 
2009; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 2010; Wong et al., 2013) who did not report a 
relationship between anxiety and inhibitory effectiveness. The exact reason for the 
discrepant findings across studies is unclear. One explanation might lie in 
differences between the dependent measures used. For example, Ansari and 
Derakshan (2010), and Derakshan, Ansari, et al. (2009) used the antisaccade task 
and number of errors as the criterion, and Righi et al. (2009) employed the Go-
No-Go task and number of errors as the criterion. It is therefore tempting to 
conclude that the current approach, which accounted for discrimination between 
errors on NoGo trials and correct responses on Go trials (i.e., d’), might reflect a 
more sensitive measurement of effectiveness than errors alone. Other studies, 
however, have used the Go-No-Go task and d’ as the measure of effectiveness 
(e.g., Pacheco-Unguetti et al.; Wong et al.), and failed to find a relationship 
between anxiety and effectiveness. The disparity of data patterns across studies is 
therefore unlikely to be explained by the tasks and/or measures of effectiveness. 
Perhaps the simplest explanation is that poorer inhibitory effectiveness is more 
closely associated with cognitive anxiety as opposed to measures that capture both 
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cognitive and somatic symptoms of anxiety. Importantly, the data suggest that this 
relationship is restricted to conditions in which cognitive stress is low and self-
reported mental effort is high (see below for further discussion).     
The efficiency data provided further support for the idea that cognitive 
trait anxiety is related to deficits in inhibitory processing. At lower effort, 
cognitive trait anxiety was not associated with inhibitory efficiency, whereas at 
higher effort, higher cognitive trait anxiety was linked to lower efficiency in both 
ego safe and ego threat conditions. These data are conceptually consistent with 
previous reports demonstrating that anxiety is associated with lower efficiency on 
tasks of inhibition (e.g., Derakshan, Ansari, et al., 2009; Pacheco-Unguetti et al., 
2010; Righi et al., 2009; Wong et al., 2013). Importantly, the findings reported 
here confirm the robustness of this association across tasks (antisaccade; Go-No-
Go) and measures of efficiency, and discount the possibility of a speed-accuracy 
confound as an alternative explanation for the results.  
It should be noted that a main effect of effort was observed on all tests, 
such that higher effort was associated lower effectiveness and efficiency, and 
independently of the measure of trait anxiety and/or stress manipulation. 
Furthermore, the interactive relationships between cognitive anxiety and 
situational stress on effectiveness and efficiency were restricted to those who 
reported higher mental effort, whereas it was hypothesised that this relationship 
would be limited to those who reported lower effort. ACT predicts that effort 
buffers against the effects of trait anxiety and stress, and recent reports have 
linked anxiety to deficits in shifting (Edwards, Edwards et al., 2015) and 
phonological efficiency (Study 1.1) at lower but not higher effort. As such, the 
finding that higher effort was associated with lower efficiency in the present study 
121 
is puzzling. Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, and Myers (2013) argued that under 
some conditions higher perceived effort can be associated with lower 
performance, particularly on repetitive tasks that involve attending to two or more 
criteria at once. According to Kurzban et al., the need for criterion prioritisation 
(momentarily prioritise one criterion over another) can lead to lower performance 
across time despite a concurrent increase in the subjective experience of effort, at 
least on relatively simple tasks. The structure of the Go-No-Go task employed in 
the present experiment seems to fit with the necessary preconditions described by 
Kurzban et al. as it was repetitive (256 trials), required simultaneous attention to 
two or more criteria (inhibit a response on target present trials vs. initiate response 
on target absent trials) and response prioritisation (speed vs. accuracy). If Kurzban 
et al.‟s explanation is to be accepted for the inverse relationship between effort 
and performance observed here, the data also suggest that this phenomenon might 
be further exacerbated by cognitive anxiety and stress, and that it manifests both 
in terms of inhibitory effectiveness and efficiency. The theoretical perspective of 
Yerkes and Dodson (1908) may also constitute a descriptive account for the 
pattern of the relationship between effort and inhibitory efficiency found here 
(i.e., increased effort predicts poorer efficiency). Specifically, the results reported 
here may represent the inverted U relationship described by Yerkes and Dodson, 
such that the exertion of too much effort leads to poorer processing. 
ACT (Eysenck et al., 2007) predicts that anxiety disrupts the balance 
between top-down and bottom-up attentional systems, with preferential resource 
allocation given to the stimulus driven system over the goal-driven system in the 
presence of threat. The current procedure permitted an assessment of the 
contribution of internal threat to inhibitory performance by employing only 
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neutral stimuli (rather than threat stimuli) on the central tasks. Importantly, the 
data established that internal threat contributes to deficits in inhibitory 
performance. A limitation of this approach, however, is that the approach adopted 
does not permit confirmation of whether the presence of external threat (e.g., 
stimulus threat content) further moderates the interrelationships between cognitive 
anxiety, situational stress and effort. The question is examined in Study 2.2. 
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Study 1.4: Anxiety and Shifting Performance 
Study 1.4 tested the predictions of ACT by examining the relationship 
between trait anxiety, situational stress and mental effort on shifting effectiveness 
and efficiency using the WCST. Consistent with the other studies in this series, 
the predictive model included somatic and cognitive trait anxiety, somatic and 
cognitive situational stress and mental effort. The data for somatic and cognitive 
anxiety were again analysed separately. 
Hypotheses  
After controlling for depression, the hypotheses for the current study were 
guided by the evidence describing the anxiety-shifting link and were based on the 
predictions derived from ACT. It was expected that there would be no relationship 
between anxiety and shifting effectiveness, however, it was predicted that shifting 
efficiency would vary with the combined associations of trait anxiety, situational 
stress and mental effort. Specifically, it was hypothesised that higher trait anxiety 
would be associated with lower efficiency in the high stress conditions, and this 
relationship would be moderated by mental effort.  
Measurement of Shifting Performance 
Shifting effectiveness. In accord with Goodwin and Sher (1992) and 
Caselli and colleagues (2004) the number of perseverative errors on the WCST 
were recorded. However, as this measure is an index of an inability to shift, 
shifting effectiveness (or ability to shift) was operationalized as the percentage of 
responses that were not perseverative errors. Thus, shifting effectiveness was 
calculated as follows: 
 
Shifting Effectiveness = 100% - Percentage of Perseverative Errors 
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Shifting efficiency. To determine a measure of shifting efficiency that fits 
with ACT (i.e., the relationship between accuracy and RT), shifting efficiency 
was operationalised as the inverse of shifting inefficiency. Shifting efficiency, 
therefore, was interpreted as the relationship between the number of trials where a 
participant was not able to shift (i.e., number of perseverative errors) and their 
mean RT for those trials. To aid interpretation of the results, the ratio was 
multiplied by 1000 (cf. Edwards, Moore et al., 2015; Hoffman & Schraw, 2009). 
Shifting efficiency was calculated using the following equation: 
Shifting Efficiency = 1 – 
 Number of Perseverative Errors  
X 1000 
Mean RT on Perseverative Error Trials 
 
Study 1.4.1 Somatic Anxiety and Shifting Performance 
Participants 
Participants comprised 90 undergraduate university students aged between 
18 and 55 years (M = = 24.68 years, SD = 8.51; 64 female). Participants were 
randomly assigned to either the shock safe (9 males, 36 females) or shock threat 
(17 males, 28 females) condition based on their arrival at the laboratory. The 
groups were comparable with respect to sex and age, t(88) < 1. 
Validity of SRQ as an Index of Situational Stress 
To determine the ability of the SRQ to measure somatic situational stress 
in the sample, a bivariate correlation was conducted between composite SRQ 
scores at baseline and scores on the STICSA State Somatic scale. There was a 
significant positive relationship between the measures, r(90) = .32, p = .002, 
confirming the SRQ as an appropriate index of somatic situational stress.  
  
125 
Manipulation Check 
 To confirm the ability of the threat of electric shock to induce somatic 
situational stress in the sample, a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with Time 
(baseline vs. post-manipulation) and Group (ego threat vs. ego safe) as the factors 
was conducted on the composite SRQ scores. There was no significant main 
effect of Group, F(1, 88) < 1, however the main effect of Time, F(1, 88) = 82.51, 
MSE = 15.64, p < .001, 2 = .48, and the Time x Group interaction, F(1, 88) = 
17.50, p < .001, 2 = .17, was significant. Follow up t-tests revealed that at 
baseline, there was no difference in composite SRQ reported by individuals in the 
shock threat (M = 11.89, SD = 5.06) and shock safe (M = 13.51, SD = 5.40) 
conditions, t(1, 88) = 1.47, p = .145, however following the stress manipulation 
those in the shock threat group (M = 19.71, SD = 7.35) showed significantly 
higher SRQ scores than their shock safe counterparts (M = 16.40, SD = 6.49, t(1, 
88) = 2.26, p = .026.  
Results 
Data Diagnostics and Assumption Checking 
Prior to analyses, response times < 200 ms and ± 3SD from each 
participant‟s mean score were removed (< 1% of trials), and the predictor and 
criterion variables were screened for outliers and normality. Univariate outliers 
were considered significant with z-scores > 3.50. Using this criterion, one 
univariate outlier was identified for processing efficiency and the same case was 
identified as a multivariate outlier using Mahalanobis Distance at p < .001. 
Analyses were conducted with this outlier included and removed, and 
conceptually the pattern of results did not change, therefore the case was retained. 
All variables were within acceptable limits for normality and tests for skewness 
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and kurtosis were acceptable with consideration to the sample (non-clinical, 
undergraduate students). The assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were 
adequately met. Untransformed variables were used in all analyses and the full 
data set was reported (N = 90).  
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 23 shows the zero-order correlations between the predictors and 
criterion variables, and the inter-correlations among the predictors. As can be 
seen, there were no significant zero-order correlations between the predictors and 
performance effectiveness or processing efficiency. There was a significant 
positive inter-correlation between depression and somatic trait anxiety, such that 
higher depression was associated with higher somatic trait anxiety. Further, there 
was a significant positive inter-correlation between somatic trait anxiety and 
mental effort, such that those who reported higher anxiety also tended to report 
higher effort. 
Main Analyses 
Separate moderated multiple regression analyses were conducted to 
determine whether somatic trait anxiety, somatic situational stress, mental effort, 
and their interactions predicted effectiveness and efficiency on the WCST. For 
each test, at Step 1, depression was entered as a covariate; at Step 2 the main 
effects (somatic trait anxiety, situational stress and mental effort) were entered; at 
Step 3 the two-way interaction terms were entered; and at Step 4 the three-way 
interaction term (somatic trait anxiety x situational stress x mental effort) was 
entered. Interaction terms were calculated using mean-centred anxiety and effort 
scores.  
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Table 23. 
Means, Standard Deviations, Zero-order and Inter-correlations of Depression, 
Cognitive Trait Anxiety, Mental Effort, and Shifting Effectiveness and Shifting 
Efficiency on the WCST. 
 M SD Depression Somatic 
Trait  
Anxiety 
Mental 
Effort 
Depression 6.14 6.13    
Somatic Trait Anxiety 15.18 3.81 .30**   
Mental Effort 64.39 30.84 .10 .21*  
Shifting Effectiveness 85.80 6.88 -.06 -.05 -.12 
Shifting Efficiency 990.44 5.55 -.07 -.06 -.07 
NOTE: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001*** 
 
Shifting Effectiveness in Somatic Anxiety 
The unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence 
intervals for all variables at each step are shown in Table 24. At Step 1, 
depression accounted for < 1% of the variance in effectiveness, R = .06, F < 1. At 
Step 2, with the inclusion of the main effects, the model accounted for 2% of the 
variance in effectiveness, R = .13, and the increases in explainable variance was 
not significant, ΔR2 = .01, ΔF < 1, and the model was not significant, F < 1. At 
Step 3, with the addition of the two-way interaction terms, the model accounted 
for 3% of the variance in the criterion, R = .16, however the increment was not 
significant, ΔR2 = .01, ΔF < 1, and the overall model failed to reach significance, 
F (7, 89) < 1. At Step 4, the full model accounted for 3% of the variance in 
effectiveness, but the unique contribution of the three-way interaction term was 
not 
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Table 24. 
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Shifting Effectiveness 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 86.20 1.03    84.15 88.25 
 Depression -.07 .12  -.06  -.30 .17 
Step 2 (Constant) 86.05 1.09    83.89 88.21 
 Depression -.04 .13  -.04  -.30 .22 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.02 .21  -.01  -.43 .40 
 Situational Stress -.22 .77  -.03  -1.74 1.31 
 Mental Effort -.03 .03  -.11  -.07 -.02 
Step 3 (Constant) 86.02 1.12    83.80 88.24 
 Depression -.04 .13  -.04  -.30 .22 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.03 .22  -.02  -.46 .40 
 Situational Stress -.24 .78  -.04  -1.79 1.31 
 Mental Effort -.02 .03  -.11  -.07 .03 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.14 .22  -.07  -.57 .30 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .01 .03  .05  -.04 .06 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .01  .07  -.01 .02 
Step 4 (Constant) 86.02 1.12    83.79 88.26 
 Depression -.04 .13  -.04  -.30 .23 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.04 .23  -.02  -.30 .23 
 Situational Stress -.25 .79  -.04  -1.82 1.31 
 Mental Effort -.03 .03  -.11  -.08 .03 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.14 .22  -.08  -.08 .03 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .01 .03  .05  -.04 .06 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .01  .06  -.01 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress 
X Mental Effort 
.00 .01  .02  -.01 .01 
p < .05* 
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significant, R = .17, ΔR2 = .00, ΔF < 1, and the full model was not significant, F < 
1. These results suggest that shifting effectiveness was unrelated to somatic 
anxiety (i.e., somatic trait anxiety or somatic situational stress) and mental effort. 
Shifting Efficiency in Somatic Anxiety 
The unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence 
intervals for all variables at each step of the model are shown in Table 25. 
Depression accounted for < 1% of the variance in processing efficiency at Step 1, 
R = .07, F < 1. When the main effects were included in the model at Step 2, the 
model accounted for 1% of the variance in efficiency, however there was no 
significant increase in R
2
, R = .10, ΔR2 = .01, ΔF < 1, and the model was not 
significant, F < 1. At Step 3, with the two-way interaction term included, the 
model accounted for 3% of the variance in the criterion, R = .18, and the 
increment was not significant, ΔR2 = .02, ΔF < 1, nor was the model, F < 1. At 
Step 4, the inclusion of three-way interaction term meant the model accounted for 
7% of the variance in processing efficiency, however the increase in explainable 
variance was not significant,
 
R = .26, ΔR2 = .04, ΔF = 3.15, p = .080, and the full 
model, F < 1, failed to reach significance. These results suggest that shifting 
efficiency did not vary as a function of somatic anxiety or mental effort, or their 
combined contributions.  
Study 1.4.2 Cognitive Anxiety and Shifting Performance 
Participants 
A sample of 90 undergraduate psychology students aged between 18 and 
55 years (M = 24.06 years; SD = 8.31) participated (72 were female). Participants 
in the safe condition in Study 1.4.1 served as low stress controls (i.e., ego safe) for 
the 45 participants under ego threat instructions here.  
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Table 25.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Shifting Efficiency 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 990.83 .83    989.17 992.48 
 Depression -.06 .10  -.07  -.26 .13 
Step 2 (Constant) 990.70 .88    988.94 992.45 
 Depression -.04 .11  -.05  -.25 .17 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.05 .17  -.03  -.38 .29 
 Situational Stress -.18 .62  -.03  -1.42 1.05 
 Mental Effort -.01 .02  -.05  -.05 .03 
Step 3 (Constant) 990.73 .90    988.94 992.52 
 Depression -.04 .12  -.05  -.25 .17 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.05 .17  -.03  -.39 .30 
 Situational Stress -.20 .63  -.04  -1.44 1.05 
 Mental Effort -.01 .02  -.04  -.05 .03 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.19 .18  -.13  -.54 .16 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .02 .02  .11  -.02 .06 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .01  .05  -.01 .01 
Step 4 (Constant) 990.71 .89    988.95 992.48 
 Depression -.04 .11  -.05  -.25 .17 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.14 .18  -.10  -.50 .22 
 Situational Stress -.33 .62  -.06  -1.56 .91 
 Mental Effort -.02 .02  -.11  -.06 .02 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.21 .17  -.14  -.56 .14 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .02 .02  .13  -.02 .07 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .01  -.01  -.01 .01 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
.01 .01  .23  -.00 .02 
p < .05* 
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Validity of SRQ as an Index of Situational Stress 
Confirmation that the SRQ was an appropriate measure of situational 
stress was confirmed by the significant positive correlation between composite 
SRQ scores at baseline and scores on the STICSA State Cognitive scale, r(90) 
= .37, p = .001. 
Manipulation Check 
In accord with Study 1.1, 1.2, & 1.3, the efficacy of the ego threat 
instructions as a situational stress induction procedure was examined using a 2 x 2 
repeated measures ANOVA with Time (baseline vs. post-manipulation) and 
Group (ego threat vs. ego safe) as the factors, and scores on the SRQ as the 
dependent variable. The main effect of Group was non-significant, however the 
main effect of Time, F(1, 89) = 31.08, MSE = 862.50, p < .001, 2 = .26, and the 
Time x Group interaction, F(1, 89) = 5.47, MSE = 293.20, p = .022, 2 = .06, were 
significant. The interaction reflected the fact that at baseline, there was no 
difference in composite SRQ scores between the ego threat (M = 14.11, SD = 
6.04) and ego safe (M = 14.18, SD = 5.66) groups, t < 1, however following the 
stress manipulation individuals in the ego threat condition (M = 20.36, SD = 7.80) 
showed significantly higher SRQ scores than those in the ego safe condition (M = 
16.73, SD = 6.81, t(1, 87) = 2.34, p = .021. 
Results 
Data Diagnostics and Assumption Checking 
Response times < 200 ms and ± 3SD from each participant‟s mean score 
were removed (< 1% of trials). Prior to the main analyses, the data were screened 
for outliers and normality. Univariate outliers were considered significant with z-
scores > 3.50. One outlier for performance effectiveness and one outlier for 
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processing efficiency were identified using this criterion. Visual inspection of the 
values in box-plots confirmed the outliers as realistic in a student sample, and the 
data from these participants were retained. Mahalanobis Distance and Cook‟s D 
were computed to detect the presence of multivariate outliers and highly 
influential cases. One multivariate outlier was detected with p < .001. Analyses 
were performed with this outlier included and removed and as the substantive 
pattern of results did not change, the case was retained. All variables were within 
acceptable limits for normality, and tests for skewness and kurtosis were 
acceptable with consideration to the sample (non-clinical, undergraduate 
students). The assumptions of linearity and homoscedasticity were adequately 
met. The full data set was reported (N = 90).  
Descriptive Statistics 
Zero-order correlations between the predictors and criterion variables, and 
the inter-correlations among the predictors are shown in Table 26. As shown in 
the table, there were no significant zero-order correlations between the predictors 
and effectiveness or efficiency. The only significant inter-correlation was the 
relationship between Depression and Cognitive Trait Anxiety, such that those who 
reported higher depression also tended to report higher cognitive trait anxiety. 
Main Analyses 
Separate moderated multiple regression analyses were conducted to 
determine whether cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, mental effort and 
their interactions predicted performance effectiveness and processing efficiency. 
For each test, depression was entered at Step 1; the main effects (cognitive trait 
anxiety, situational stress and mental effort) were entered at Step2; the two-way 
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interaction terms were entered at Step 3; and the three-way interaction term 
(cognitive trait anxiety x situational stress x mental effort) was entered at Step 4.  
Table 26. 
Means, Standard Deviations, Zero-order and Inter-correlations of Depression, 
Cognitive Trait Anxiety, Mental Effort, and Shifting Effectiveness and Shifting 
Efficiency on the WCST. 
 M SD Depression Cognitive 
Trait  
Anxiety 
Mental 
Effort 
Depression 6.81 6.43    
Cognitive Trait Anxiety 18.40 5.19 .61***   
Mental Effort 66.11 30.12 -.02 .12  
Shifting Effectiveness 85.36 7.36 -.03 -.19 .04 
Shifting Efficiency 989.86 6.21 .04 -.20 .05 
NOTE: p < .001*** 
 
Shifting Effectiveness in Cognitive Anxiety 
Table 27 shows the unstandardised coefficients, Beta weights and 95% 
confidence intervals for all variables at each step. At Step 1, depression accounted 
for < 1% of the variance in performance effectiveness, R = .03, F < 1. At Step 2, 
the main effects accounted for 6% of the variance in effectiveness, R = .24, 
however the increase in explainable variance was not significant, ΔR2 = .06, ΔF 
(3, 85) = 1.64, p = .187, and the model was not significant, F (4, 89) = 1.25, p = 
.298. With the inclusion of the two-way interaction terms at Step 3, the model 
accounted for 8% of the variance in the criterion, R = .28; the increment however 
was not significant, ΔR2 = .02, ΔF < 1, and the model was not significant, F (7, 
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Table 27. 
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Shifting Effectiveness 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 85.57 1.14    83.31 87.83 
 Depression -.03 .12  -.03  -.27 .21 
Step 2 (Constant) 84.18 1.31    81.59 86.78 
 Depression .17 .16  .15  -.14 .48 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.42 .19  -.29  -.80 -.04 
 Situational Stress .09 .78  .01  -1.47 1.64 
 Mental Effort .02 .03  .08  -.03 .07 
Step 3 (Constant) 84.29 1.37    81.56 87.02 
 Depression .17 .16  .15  -.16 .49 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.40 .20  -.28  -.79 .00 
 Situational Stress .09 .79  .01  -1.48 1.65 
 Mental Effort .02 .03  .09  -.038 .07 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.16 .15  -.11  -.47 .15 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.02 .03  -.09  -.07 .03 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.00 .01  -.01  -.01 .01 
Step 4 (Constant) 84.30 1.37    81.57 87.02 
 Depression .17 .16  .15  -.15 .49 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.38 .20  -.27  -.77 .02 
 Situational Stress -.02 .79  -.00  -1.60 1.55 
 Mental Effort .02 .03  .08  -.03 .07 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.18 .15  -.13  -.48 .13 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.02 .03  -.10  -.08 .03 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.00 .01  -.05  -.01 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress 
X Mental Effort 
.01 .01  .13  -.00 .02 
p < .05* 
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89) = 1.00, p = .437. At Step 4, the full model accounted for 9% of the variance in 
effectiveness, but the unique contribution of the three-way interaction term was 
not significant, R = .31, ΔR2 = .02, ΔF (1, 81) = 1.34, p = .251, and the full model 
failed to reach significance, F (8, 89) = 1.05, p = .409.  
Shifting Efficiency in Cognitive Anxiety 
Table 28 shows the unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% 
confidence intervals for all variables at each step. At Step 1, depression accounted 
for < 1% of the variance in processing efficiency, R = .04, F < 1. At Step 2, there 
was a significant increase in R
2 
with the component main effects accounting for 
9% of the variance in processing efficiency, R = .30, ΔR2 = .09, ΔF (3, 85) = 2.81, 
p = .044, however the overall model failed to reach significance, F (4, 89) = 2.14, 
p = .082. With the inclusion of the two-way interaction terms at Step 3, the model 
accounted for 13% of the variance in the criterion, R = .36, however the increment 
was not reliable, ΔR2 = .04, ΔF (3, 82) = 1.08, p = .361, and the model was not 
significant, F (7, 89) = 1.69, p = .122. At Step 4, the addition of the three-way 
interaction term brought about a significant increase in R
2
,
 ΔR2 = .05, ΔF (1, 81) = 
4.66, p = .034, and the full model accounted for 17% of the variance in processing 
efficiency, which was significant, F (8, 89) = 2.13, p = .042. These results suggest 
that processing efficiency varied as a function of cognitive trait anxiety, 
situational stress and mental effort.  
IRSE (Meier, 2008) software was used to decompose the interaction and 
perform tests of simple slopes at high and low values on the trait anxiety and 
mental effort scales (calculated at ± 1 SD from the mean score on each). Figure 7 
shows the pattern of the interaction. The right panel shows that at higher mental 
effort (+ 1 SD), higher cognitive trait anxiety was associated with poorer  
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Table 28.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Shifting Efficiency 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 989.60 .96    987.68 991.51 
 Depression .04 .10  .04  -.17 .24 
Step 2 (Constant) 988.12 1.08    985.97 990.26 
 Depression .26 .13  .27  .00 .51 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.45 .16  -.38  -.76 -.13 
 Situational Stress .91 .65  .03  -1.10 1.48 
 Mental Effort .02 .02  .10  -.02 .06 
Step 3 (Constant) 988.29 1.13    986.05 990.54 
 Depression .24 .13  .25  -.02 .50 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.42 .16  -.35  -.74 -.09 
 Situational Stress .20 .65  .03  -1.09 1.48 
 Mental Effort .02 .02  .10  -.02 .06 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.22 .13  -.19  -.47 .03 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.00 .02  -.01  -.05 .04 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .01  -.01 .01 
Step 4 (Constant) 988.31 1.10    986.11 990.50 
 Depression .24 .13  .25  -.02 .50 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety -.40 .16  -.33  -.72 -.08 
 Situational Stress .03 .64  .01  -1.24 1.30 
 Mental Effort .02 .02  .09  -.02 .06 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.25 .12  -.21  -.49 .00 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  -.01 .02  -.03  -.05 .04 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.00 .00  -.06  -.01 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
.01 .00  .23*  .00 .02 
p < .05* 
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efficiency in both the ego safe, β = -.36, t = 1.92, p = .050, and ego threat 
conditions, β = -.38, t = 2.54, p = .013. The left panel shows that at lower mental 
effort (- 1 SD), cognitive trait anxiety varied as a function of situational stress and 
the test for the differences between slopes was significant, t = 2.86, p = .005. 
Under ego threat, cognitive trait anxiety was a significant negative predictor of 
shifting efficiency, β = -.71, t = 3.45, p = .001, such that those who reported 
higher cognitive trait anxiety demonstrated lower efficiency. In the ego safe 
condition, a similar trend emerged, however the slope failed to reach significance, 
β = -.28, t = 1.53, p = .131. 
 
Figure 7. Relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, mental 
effort, and shifting efficiency.   
 
Discussion of Anxiety and Shifting Performance 
The present study provided a systematic test of the relationship between 
trait anxiety, situational stress and mental effort on shifting effectiveness and 
efficiency. After controlling for depression, the data confirmed that somatic trait 
anxiety, somatic stress, and effort were not associated with either shifting 
effectiveness or efficiency. The results also suggested that cognitive trait anxiety, 
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cognitive stress and effort did not predict performance effectiveness. However for 
processing efficiency, there was a significant interaction between cognitive trait 
anxiety, stress and effort. At higher effort, higher trait anxiety was associated with 
poorer efficiency in both the high and low stress conditions. At lower effort, trait 
anxiety did not predict efficiency in the ego safe condition, however the 
relationship was highly significant and most pronounced for those in the high 
stress condition.  
The data indicated that shifting effectiveness did not vary as a function of 
somatic or cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress or effort. The data reported 
here therefore contradict previous reports that higher anxiety is associated with 
poorer accuracy on shifting tasks (e.g., Ansari et al., 2008; Derakshan, Smyth et 
al., 2009) and specifically, more perseverative errors on the WCST (e.g., Caselli 
et al., 2004; Goodwin & Sher, 1992). It is important to note that despite using 
different indices of performance effectiveness on the WCST between studies (i.e., 
we used the inverse proportion of the percentage of perseverative errors, whereas 
Caselli et al. and Goodwin and Sher used the percentage of perseverative errors), 
the scoring algorithms are mathematically equivalent and therefore cannot account 
for differences in the patterns of findings. The data are however consistent with 
other studies that have failed to find a predictive relationship between anxiety and 
shifting effectiveness (e.g., Edwards et al., 2014).  
The reason for the mixed results between studies is unclear. One 
explanation might be that the link between anxiety and shifting effectiveness is 
task and/or sample specific. For example, the mixed pro- and anti-saccade task 
(Ansari et al., 2008) and a mathematical task-switching paradigm (Derakshan, 
Smyth et al., 2009) have both demonstrated efficacy in revealing anxiety-related 
effectiveness deficits in healthy individuals, whereas we used the WCST which 
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has predominantly been used in neuropsychological studies (see Miyake et al., 
2000). The fact that Caselli et al. (2004) and Goodwin and Sher (1992) reported 
anxiety-related effectiveness deficits in sub-clinical samples, whereas we did not 
observe this relationship in a non-select sample, raises the possibility that the 
WCST may be too easy for normal, healthy undergraduates and that more 
demanding tasks are required to reveal shifting deficits in effectiveness in such 
samples.  
An alternative possibility is that processes other than shifting might vary 
between the WCST and the other attentional-shifting tasks (e.g., problem-solving 
or decision making ability) and/or that other factors such as motivation and/or age 
(our M = 24 years vs. Caselli et al. M = 55 years vs. Goodwin & Sher M not 
reported) might vary between samples. It is difficult to specify precisely the 
nature of the relationship between anxiety and shifting effectiveness in the 
absence of systematic investigations into the role played by such variables. 
Perhaps the soundest explanation for the relationship between anxiety and shifting 
effectiveness is that it is tenuous at best, and seems to be influenced by subtle 
procedural and sampling variations across studies.  
The results also suggested that shifting efficiency was not predicted by 
somatic trait anxiety, somatic stress, effort, or their interactions. Perhaps the 
simplest explanation for these results is that somatic anxiety and stress do not 
combine and manifest within the cognitive system in such a way as to consume 
sufficient resources for their separate and/or combined effects to attenuate the 
efficiency of shifting processes. The data did however confirm that cognitive trait 
anxiety was associated with poorer shifting efficiency, and that this relationship 
was most pronounced at lower effort and under higher situational stress (i.e., ego 
threat). Despite different indices of processing efficiency, our data were 
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conceptually similar to those reported by Goodwin and Sher (1992) and confirm 
that cognitive anxiety confers an efficiency cost on WCST performance. The data 
also confirm that this relationship is robust, as it tends to hold across samples and 
experimental paradigms (Ansari et al., 2008; Derakshan, Smyth et al., 2009; 
Edwards, Moore et al., 2015).  
The results offer mixed support for the central assumptions of ACT 
(Eysenck et al., 2007). The data are consistent with the assumption that cognitive 
anxiety impairs processing efficiency to a greater extent than performance 
effectiveness on tasks involving the shifting function. However, in addressing the 
potential account that anxious individuals recruit additional effort to avoid 
performance effectiveness deficits, it was expected that invested mental effort 
would predict effectiveness, yet this was not the case. This null finding raises the 
possibility that individuals higher in anxiety rely on cognitive resources other than 
mental effort (e.g., motivation) in order to achieve accuracy equivalent to their 
less anxious counterparts, at least in a non-clinical university undergraduate 
sample. This possibility is investigated in Series 2.  
The pattern of shifting efficiency data supports the broader assumption of 
ACT that anxiety (trait anxiety and situational stress collectively) is associated 
with processing efficiency deficits on shifting tasks. The data however suggest 
that these deficits are restricted to cognitive manifestations of anxiety and stress, 
rather than somatic ones. Importantly, the index of efficiency used allowed an 
investigation into the cost of shifting efficiency by accounting for individual 
differences in effectiveness (c.f. Edwards, Moore et al., 2015) and was based 
directly on the respective definition from ACT. The finding that mental effort 
buffers the anxiety-stress-efficiency link has important implications for ACT.  
Contrary to the predictions of ACT, at higher effort, trait anxiety alone predicted 
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poorer shifting efficiency independently of situational stress. Full support for 
ACT was observed at lower effort, with trait anxiety predicting poorer shifting 
efficiency in the high stress but not low stress condition.  
 Study 1.4 provided the first systematic investigation into the relationship 
between somatic and cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress and mental effort on 
shifting effectiveness and efficiency. A novel measure of efficiency capable of 
controlling for individual differences in performance accuracy was employed. 
After controlling for depression, our data indicated that somatic anxiety, somatic 
stress, effort and their interactions were not associated with shifting effectiveness 
or efficiency. Our results also suggested that cognitive anxiety, cognitive stress 
and effort were not related to effectiveness, but interacted to predict efficiency. At 
higher effort, higher trait anxiety was associated with poorer efficiency 
independently of situational stress, whereas at lower effort this relationship was 
highly significant and most pronounced for those in the high stress condition. The 
data are important for ACT because they are the first to confirm that cognitive 
trait anxiety and situational stress interact to impair shifting efficiency to a greater 
extent than effectiveness, and that effort plays an important role in moderating 
this relationship.  
Chapter Summary 
 
The studies reported in Chapter 4 investigated the inter-relationships 
between trait anxiety, situational stress and invested mental effort in predicting 
phonological, updating, inhibitory, and shifting effectiveness and efficiency. The 
approach taken here made an important distinction between somatic and cognitive 
anxiety and stress and as such, their interrelationships with each of the cognitive 
functions were investigated separately. In Study 1.1 the data confirmed that 
cognitive anxiety, stress, and effort combined to predict phonological efficiency 
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(but not effectiveness) on both simple (forward span) and complex (backward 
span) tasks, such that higher trait anxiety was associated with lower efficiency at 
lower, but not higher effort, and these patterns were only observed in the high 
stress conditions. In Study 1.2, the data suggested that somatic and cognitive 
anxiety, stress, and effort were not associated with updating effectiveness or 
efficiency. One interpretation of these results is to accept there is no relationship 
between these variables and the updating function. Alternatively, perhaps the task 
employed was too difficult, which in turn produced a floor effect in the data. This 
possibility was addressed in a modified replication of the study (see Study 2.1), 
which is reported in Chapter 6. Study 1.3 suggested that cognitive trait anxiety, 
stress, and effort interacted to predict inhibitory effectiveness and efficiency. 
Higher trait anxiety was associated with lower effectiveness at low stress and 
higher effort, whereas higher trait anxiety predicted lower efficiency at higher 
effort, irrespective of the stress manipulation. Study 1.4 indicated that higher 
cognitive trait anxiety, stress, and effort interacted to predict shifting efficiency, 
but not effectiveness. Specifically, higher trait anxiety was associated with lower 
efficiency irrespective of stress at higher effort, and with lower efficiency at lower 
effort in the high stress condition only. The evidence for relationships between 
somatic anxiety, stress and effort on each function was somewhat less compelling 
than for cognitive anxiety. With the exception that somatic anxiety predicted 
facilitated phonological efficiency at low stress, it was not associated with either 
effectiveness or efficiency on the other functions. To this end, the experiments 
reported in Chapter 6 did not include somatic anxiety and somatic stress as 
factors. 
The studies reported in Chapter 4 accounted for multiple methodological 
problems in the current literature and provided a robust test of the predictions of 
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ACT. Although the data revealed that effort moderated the relationship between 
cognitive trait anxiety and situational stress on phonological, inhibition and 
shifting tasks, the present approach did not clarify which factors might underpin 
individual differences in invested effort, and whether they too are associated with 
anxiety. For example, ACT suggests that motivation is associated with effort and 
predicts that high-anxious individuals have higher motivation for somewhat 
demanding tasks with clear goals, yet they have low motivation for tasks that lack 
clear goals and rely on low cognitive load. Although there is some evidence to 
support this notion (e.g., Hayes, MacLeod, & Hammond, 2009), no studies have 
examined the role of motivation on the anxiety-performance relationship using 
executive tasks (i.e., inhibition, shifting or updating). This question is addressed in 
Chapter 6. 
A final limitation of the approach adopted in the current chapter concerns 
the nature of stimuli employed. Each study employed neutral stimuli and so the 
methodology did not permit an investigation into whether threat and neutral 
stimuli have differential effects on the effectiveness and efficiency with which 
material is processed. ACT specifies that anxiety over-stimulates the stimulus 
driven attentional system at the expense of top down processing to the extent that 
threat material is preferentially processed. This interpretation seems entirely 
plausible given the volume of work that has confirmed attentional biases for threat 
in anxiety (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007 for a review). As such, the preferential 
allocation of resources to threat would seem more closely related to attentional 
processes (inhibition and shifting) as opposed to those functions associated with 
memory (phonological processing and updating). Thus the inhibition and shifting 
studies reported in Chapter 6 investigated whether threat and neutral material have 
differential effects on performance effectiveness and processing efficiency.   
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CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENTAL SERIES 2: GENERAL METHOD 
Introduction 
Experimental Series 1 tested the predictions of ACT with respect to the 
relationship between trait anxiety, situational stress, effort, and phonological, 
updating, inhibitory and shifting performance. Despite confirming empirical 
support for many of the assumptions of ACT, there were several issues that 
warranted further investigation. First, Study 1.2 did not produce data confirming a 
relationship between anxiety and updating performance, and one possible account 
for the null result was that the reading span task was too difficult (i.e., floor 
effect). Second, despite data confirming that effort moderated the relationships 
between anxiety and performance on phonological, inhibition and shifting tasks, it 
remains to be tested whether individual differences in motivation might also 
buffer the anxiety-cognitive performance link, and further, test this predictive 
model on an updating task. Third, Study 1.3 and 1.4 examined the relationship 
between anxiety and processes linked closely to attention (i.e., inhibition and 
shifting), however the tasks used in those studies employed neutral stimuli only. A 
comprehensive test of ACT requires an investigation of inhibitory and shifting 
performance on tasks that include both neutral and threat-related stimuli. 
Experimental Series 2 is a three-study investigation that addresses these issues. 
The present chapter includes an overview of the empirical work that has 
investigated the role of motivation in anxiety-cognitive performance literature, 
and reviews work that has examined attentional biases for threat in anxiety. The 
chapter describes and justifies the methodology used in this experimental series 
(i.e., Study 2.1, Study 2.2, and Study 2.3). 
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Motivation and Attentional Control Theory 
According the Locke and Latham (2002) it is almost an axiom to say that 
cognition and motivation go together to affect performance, such that thinking 
(cognition) requires some degree of value-directed effort (motivation). Several 
fields of psychology, such as personality, and organisational and social 
psychology, have taken motivation as a construct of study which has resulted in 
numerous theories to describe and account for its relationship to behaviour and 
thought (e.g., Bandura & Cervone, 1986; Hollenbeck, Williams, & Klein, 1989; 
Locke & Latham, 1990). 
The goal setting theory focusses on motivation with respect to the 
relationship between goals and task performance (Locke & Latham, 1990) and 
aligns closely to the interpretation of motivation described by ACT. The goal 
setting theory suggests that higher levels of performance are achieved when the 
goal is moderately difficult relative to when the goal is easy or ambiguous. 
Furthermore, goals that are both desirable and achievable are more likely to 
motivate people to mobilise effort to control their behaviour to attain them (Locke 
& Latham, 2002). Thus, motivation is interpreted as being synonymous with goal 
commitment or the individual‟s determination to achieve a goal (see Klein, 
Wesson, Hollenback, Wright, & DeShon, 2001). 
As a brief review, ACT proposes that highly anxious individuals are aware 
of processing deficits (i.e., worrisome thoughts consuming available cognitive 
resources) and use compensatory strategies such as deploying additional mental 
effort to achieve comparable performance effectiveness to their low-anxious 
counterparts. However, the increase in effort to overcome anxiety-related 
performance shortfalls comes at the cost of poorer processing efficiency. In the 
most recent reviews of ACT (Berggren & Derakshan, 2012; Eysenck & 
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Derakshan, 2011), the authors suggest that like effort, motivation plays an 
important role in moderating the relationship between anxiety and cognitive 
performance. Specifically, ACT suggests that if goals of the task are clear, 
anxious individuals will likely experience increased motivation, and in turn 
engage more cognitive resources, resulting in better performance than those lower 
in anxiety (Eysenck & Derakshan, 2011).  
Evidence from recent neuroimaging studies suggests that individuals 
performing a cognitive task in a high motivation condition displayed greater 
neural connectivity in areas specific to cognitive control (i.e., medial and lateral 
prefrontal cortex) compared to participants in a low motivation condition (e.g., 
Kouneiher, Charron, & Koechlin, 2009; Szatkowska, Bogorodzki, Wolak, 
Marchewka, & Szeszkowski, 2008). These studies, however, did not investigate 
the influence of anxiety on these processes. There is limited literature regarding 
the relationship between anxiety, motivation and cognitive performance, and no 
studies to date have precisely clarified the motivation-anxiety link using executive 
tasks (i.e., updating, inhibition, shifting). However, the finding that motivation 
and cognitive control subserve the same hierarchical function has implications for 
ACT. If motivation varies with cognitive control (in accord with ACT) and 
anxiety, then individual differences in motivation need to be measured and 
included in the statistical modelling to offer a more complete understanding of the 
relationship between anxiety and performance. 
Some studies have employed external incentives, or rewards, to investigate 
the association between anxiety, motivation and cognitive performance. For 
example, Calvo (1985) and Eysenck (1985) used monetary incentives to induce 
motivation in high and low anxious groups performing cognitive tasks (i.e., a 
reasoning task and letter-transformation task, respectively). Both authors reported 
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no relationship between anxiety, motivation and performance in high-anxious 
individuals, however enhanced performance was noted for those lower in anxiety. 
According to ACT, those higher in anxiety use greater processing resources than 
their low-anxious counterparts and therefore it is possible that the high-anxious 
individuals were at full processing-capacity thereby offering less scope for 
incentives to enhance their performance. In other work, Hayes, MacLeod and 
Hammond (Experiment 3 & 4, 2009) reported that high anxious individuals 
performed worse on an incidental learning task in a low motivational condition 
relative to those on an intentional learning task in a high motivational condition. 
Consistent with ACT, these data suggest that anxious individuals may have been 
motivated to recruit additional resources to improve performance when the task 
was intentional, with clear goals.  
As noted, there are limited empirical studies to form the baseline for the 
assumptions of ACT that the relationship between anxiety and cognitive 
performance is moderated by individual differences in motivation. Further 
empirical investigations are required to confirm this theoretical account. One of 
the aims of the current series of experimental studies was to clarify the anxiety-
motivation link on updating, inhibition, and shifting processes. 
Attentional Bias for Threat 
ACT is premised on the idea that anxiety impairs attentional control by 
causing an imbalance between the top-down (i.e., goal-driven) and the bottom up 
(i.e., stimulus driven) attentional systems. In anxious individuals, the stimulus 
driven system becomes overactive, which in turn reduces the cognitive resources 
required to complete ongoing goal-driven activities. According to ACT, cognitive 
resources are preferentially allocated to internal and external stimulus-driven 
inputs, which manifest as facilitated engagement and delayed disengagement from 
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material representing threat-related stimuli of evolutionary significance. Under 
this model, worrisome thoughts operate as internally generated threat-related 
stimuli. In Chapter 4, the data from studies that examined the relationship between 
anxiety and cognitive performance on tasks using neutral stimuli were reported. 
The interrelationships between trait anxiety, stress and performance on attentional 
tasks employing threat-related stimuli are examined in Study 2.2 and 2.3, and the 
data from these studies are reported in Chapter 6.  
A wealth of literature provides support for the notion that compared to 
those lower in anxiety, high-anxious individuals preferentially attend to threat-
related stimuli (e.g., Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; Koster, 
Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005) and have difficulty disengaging 
from threat (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowels, & Dutton, 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). 
According to ACT, attentional control is thought to be more related to difficulties 
disengaging from threat-related stimuli, such that it refers to the degree to which 
the threat stimulus holds attention and impedes switching from the threat to 
another stimulus (e.g. Derryberry & Reed, 2002; see also Cisler & Koster, 2010). 
ACT suggests that in the presence of threat-related stimuli, anxiety enhances the 
detection of threat (i.e., bottom-up processing) and hinders performance that 
requires switching attention from it (i.e., top-down regulatory control).  
Attentional biases for threat in anxiety have been observed on numerous 
tasks, for example, the emotional Stroop (e.g., Edwards et al., 2006; MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1988), dot-probe (e.g., MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998), antisaccade (e.g., Derakshan, Ansari et al., 2009; Reinholdt-Dunne et al., 
2012), spatial cuing (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 
2009), and visual search tasks ( e.g., Cisler et al., 2009; Rinck, Becker, Kellerman 
& Roth, 2003). In a prototypical version of the emotional Stroop task (Stroop, 
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1935), participants are presented with threat-related (e.g., cancer, danger) and 
neutral words (e.g., table, chair) in letter strings of various colours (e.g., red, 
green, blue, and yellow), and the participants‟ task is to name the colour of the 
lettering as quickly and accurately as possible while ignoring the semantic content 
of the item. An attentional bias for threat is inferred on the basis of longer colour-
naming latencies on threat-related trials relative to neutral word trials, presumably 
because the content of the item engages cognitive resources at the expense of 
performing the colour-naming task. For example, Edwards et al. (2006) used a 
modified version of the emotional Stroop to examine the relationships between 
trait anxiety and situational stress in the processing of emotional material. Under 
conditions in which participants had conscious access to the items, their data 
suggested that trait anxiety and stress combined interactively to predict selective 
attentional processes. Specifically, high trait anxious participants who were 
performing under a high stress condition (i.e., threat of electric shock) were 
slower to colour-name threat items relative to control items, compared to 
participants who reported lower trait anxiety and/or when in the low stress 
condition. Similar data using the emotional Stroop have confirmed that compared 
to non-anxious controls, anxious individuals often take longer to name the colour 
of threat-related compared to neutral items, which is taken as evidence of an 
attentional bias to threat (e.g., MacLeod & Rutherford, 1992; Miller & Patrick, 
2000).  
Despite the efficacy of the emotional Stroop in demonstrating the 
automatic nature of attentional biases for threat in anxiety, there are a number of 
inherent interpretational difficulties associated with the task, the most important 
of which is that the mechanisms underpinning the response are not well 
understood (for reviews see e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, Watts, 
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MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). To overcome problems associated with the Stroop, 
a number of researchers turned to modified versions of the dot-probe task, which 
can be used to determine the allocation of spatial attention on the basis of manual 
reaction times to visual probes (e.g., MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). In the 
dot-probe task, participants are presented with threat and neutral words in the 
upper and lower (or left and right) portions of the computer screen. Following 
presentation of the items, the screen is then blanked and a probe is presented in 
the location occupied of one of the words. The participants‟ task is to press a 
button identifying the location (or shape status) of the probe as quickly and 
accurately as possible. Attentional biases to threat are inferred on the basis of 
faster reaction times to probes replacing threat words relative to neutral words, 
presumably because the participants‟ attention was directed to that portion of the 
visual display. Multiple studies have demonstrated that anxious individuals are 
faster at responding to probes replacing threat than neutral words (e.g., MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata; for reviews see e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). Although data from dot-probe studies have demonstrated attentional biases 
for threat-related stimuli, the structure of the task cannot confirm whether anxiety 
is associated with inhibitory or shifting deficits as the task does not require 
competition for attention, and participants may simply choose to direct their 
attention towards threat (see Edwards, Burt, & Lipp, 2010). An appropriate test of 
the inhibition and shifting functions requires competition for cognitive resources 
such that participants must inhibit a response to one stimulus (or aspect of a 
stimulus) in preference to another, and for shifting they must redirect their 
response (or response set) from one stimulus or event type to another. 
The antisaccade task is a widely-used and appropriate measure of 
inhibitory control, such that to saccade away from a target the participant is 
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required to inhibit a reflexive prosaccade  towards a target stimulus (see also 
Chapter 2). In a study using the antisaccade task, Derakshan, Ansari et al. 
(Experiment 2; 2009) found that relative to those lower in anxiety, high-anxious 
individuals took longer to saccade away from threat-related stimuli (inhibitory 
efficiency for threat differentiation), however there were no differences in error 
rates (inhibitory effectiveness for threat differentiation). These data support the 
notion that anxious individuals experience poorer inhibitory efficiency, but not 
effectiveness, in the presence of threat. Further replication of these results using 
other tasks is required to confirm the robustness of the conclusion that anxiety is 
associated with threat-related inhibitory deficits.   
To-date, few studies have included both neutral and threat material in the 
Go-No-Go task or the WCST as indices of inhibition and shifting, respectively. 
Furthermore, the use of these tasks and appropriate measures of effectiveness and 
efficiency in a single study investigating the unique and interactive replationships 
between trait anxiety, situational stress, and motivation is required to provide a 
robust test of the predictions of ACT. This work was undertaken in the present 
thesis and the results are described in Study 2.2  and 2.3 (see Chapter 6). 
General Method 
Experimental Series 2 examined the inter-relationships between cognitive 
trait anxiety, situational stress and motivation in predicting updating, inhibitory 
and shifting effectiveness and efficiency. Study 2.1 investigated updating 
performance using a simplified (shortened) version of the reading span task and 
explored whether mental effort (Study 2.1.1) and motivation (Study 2.1.2) 
moderated the relationship between anxiety and performance. The relationships 
between cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, and motivation in predicting 
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differential threat processing on inhibitory (Study 2.2) and shifting (Study 2.3) 
tasks were examined. 
Participants 
 
 In accord with Experimental Series 1, undergraduate students were 
recruited from the Bond University Psychology Participation Pool, and only those 
who reported English as their native language, who had normal or corrected to 
normal vision, and who had normal colour vison were invited to participate. 
Ninety-four undergraduate psychology students (aged between 18 and 53 years, M 
= 26.25, SD = 9.62) were recruited, and of these 22 were male and 72 were 
female. In return for participation students received research credit towards an 
introductory psychology subject. All were provided a handout describing features 
of anxiety and depression and details of the university‟s counselling service. 
Participants provided written informed consent and then completed the 
psychometric measures. Consistent with the recruitment criteria specified in 
Experimental Series 1, individuals who scored in the extremely severe range 
(above 28) on the DASS- Depression scale were excluded. Of the original sample 
of 94, two participants were released due to high depression, one participant was 
excluded because he was not a native speaker of English, and one participant 
exercised her right to withdraw.  
Based on their arrival at the laboratory, participants were systematically 
assigned to either low- situational stress (ego safe) or high- situational stress (ego 
threat) groups, such that every second participant was allocated to the stress 
manipulation condition. Final sample demographic details are provided in the 
corresponding empirical sections that follow. 
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Stress Induction 
The ego treat instructions used in Experimental Series 2 were identical to 
those employed in Experimental Series 1. As a brief review, participants in the 
ego threat condition were told that their performance was related to their 
intelligence and that it was being evaluated against other volunteers. Immediately 
following the practice trials, participants were told that their performance was 
somewhat slower and less accurate than others. This instructions was repeated 
during breaks. Those in the ego safe condition were told their participation was 
greatly appreciated, and that most people find the tasks quite interesting. 
Facilities and Equipment 
Data collection took place in a sound-attenuated laboratory in the 
Cognitive Psychology Laboratories of the School of Psychology at Bond 
University. 
Experimental Hardware  
All stimuli were presented on an ACER E1-531 laptop computer with an 
Intel B960 processor running at 2.2 GHz connected to a 17-inch monitor. 
Participants wore a Dick Smith PC headset microphone which was connected to 
the laptop and captured their vocal responses. 
Experimental Software 
The presentation of stimuli for tasks was controlled using Visual Basic 6.0 
software. The software also recorded RT latencies (ms) and errors.  
Cognitive Tasks 
The measures of updating (reading span task), inhibition (Go-No-Go task), 
and shifting (WCST) employed in Experimental Series 1 were employed in 
Experimental Series 2. Tasks were presented in a counterbalanced order using a 
Latin square design. Based on participants‟ order of arrival at the laboratory, three 
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task sequences were administered:  Sequence A contained reading span, then 
WCST, and Go-No-Go; Sequence B contained WCST, Go-No-Go, and reading 
span; and Sequence C contained Go-No-Go, reading span, and WCST.  
Reading Span Task 
The reading span task was conceptually similar to the one used in Study 
1.2. However, the 25 sentences from Daneman and Carpenter‟s (1980) reading 
span test, and the five practice sentences from Masson and Miller‟s (1983) study, 
were shortened to make the memory task less difficult and to reduce the 
likelihood of a potential floor-effect confound in the data. All sentences contained 
12 words each, and each ended in a different word. The associated true/false 
questions employed for the cloze test were also reduced and simplified. Appendix 
J contains the list of sentences used. Task administration and scoring procedures 
(i.e., weighted reading span score) were identical to those used for the reading 
span task employed in Study 1.2.  
 Go-No-Go Task 
 The administration and scoring procedures for the Go-No-Go task were 
the same as for Study 1.3 (see Chapter 3). Participants were instructed to respond 
to any word that did not contain the letter „a‟ (i.e. target-absent trials or Go trials) 
and inhibit a response to any word that did contain the letter „a‟ (i.e., target-
present trials or No-Go trials). Following two blocks of practice trials containing 
neutral words, there were 16 test blocks, each containing 16 words. Half the 
blocks employed neutral words and half employed threat-related words. The 
threat-related and control stimuli were derived from a subset of items used by 
Edwards et al. (2006), and were balanced for length and frequency using counts 
from the British National Corpus of approximately 89 million words (Kilgarriff, 
1998). Appendix K contains the list of threat-related and neutral words used. 
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Within each block, half of the items contained the target letter „a‟ such that there 
were equal numbers of target-absent and target-present words. Two stimulus sets 
(A and B) were constructed, and the blocks were presented in a fixed randomised 
order with no more than two trial types (threat-related or neutral) presented in 
sequence. Set B was the reverse of Set A to ensure that any sequencing effects 
that occurred inadvertently in the randomisation process were balanced across 
participants. The sets were administered alternately to each situational stress 
group based on their arrival at the laboratory. Following Study 1.3, the dependent 
variables were derived from the accuracy and response time data based on the 
relationship between the number of correct Go responses and No-Go errors for the 
threat and neutral trials. Further details of the scoring procedure are below. 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task 
The administration and scoring procedures used for the WCST in Study 
2.3 were identical to those employed in Study 1.4 (see Chapter 3), such that 
participants were shown 128 stimulus cards and asked to match them to four fixed 
target cards. For this task, the 65mm x 65 mm cards were divided into two 64 card 
blocks (A and B) such that one block (A) contained only neutral target cards and 
neutral stimulus cards, and (B) contained only threat-related target cards and 
corresponding threat-related stimulus cards. Neutral target and stimulus cards 
were those used in Study 1.4 (see Appendix E) and threat-related target cards and 
a list of the threat-related words used for the stimulus cards are included in 
Appendix L. The threat-related and neutral words were balanced for length and 
frequency (see Appendix L). Based on their arrival at the laboratory participants 
in each situational stress group completed the blocks in a counterbalanced order, 
such that half completed set A then B, whereas the other half completed the 
reverse order. The score of interest was the percentage of perseverative errors 
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(i.e., errors made when the participant continued to unsuccessfully use a matching 
category after being told their selections were incorrect). 
Psychometric Measures 
DASS-21 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995)  
The DASS is a 21 item self-report measure designed to assess depression, 
anxiety and stress symptoms over the past week. Only scores from the Depression 
subscale were included in the analyses. Further details of administration, scoring, 
and reliability and validity can be found in Chapter 3.  
STICSA (Ree et al., 2000) 
The STICSA is a self-report measure of the somatic and cognitive 
dimensions of state and trait anxiety. Only scores on the Cognitive subscales were 
analysed in the studies reported in the present chapter. Further details of 
administration, scoring, reliability and validity are described in Chapter 3. 
RSME (Zijlstra, 1993) 
The RSME is a visual analogue scale designed to measure self-reported 
mental effort. A full description is provided in Chapter 3. 
SRQ  
The SRQ is a measure of situational stress and its properties are described 
in Chapter 3.  
The Revised HWK Goal Commitment Scale (HWK; Klein et al., 2001) 
The HWK is a 5-item self-report measure of goal commitment and 
determination to reach a goal (Klein et al., 2001).  
Scoring. Participants respond to statements using a 5-point Likert scale 
with anchors 1= strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. The items are as 
follows: (1) It’s hard to take this goal seriously, (2) Quite frankly, I don’t care if I 
achieve this goal or not, (3) I am strongly committed to pursuing this goal, (4) It 
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wouldn’t take much to abandon this goal, and (5) I think this is a good goal to 
shoot for. Negative item statements are reverse scored (i.e., items 1, 2, & 4). 
Possible scores on the measure range from 5 to 25, with higher scores reflecting 
greater goal commitment and motivation. 
Reliability and validity. Factor analytic studies have found the HWK 
scale to be uni-dimensional, indicating it measures motivations as a single 
construct. The questionnaire has been reported to have satisfactory internal 
consistency, α = .74 and α = .82 (Klein et al., 2001; Vergara & Roberts, 2011, 
respectively). In a study examining the validity of the revised HWK, Jaros (2009) 
reported that the five items align with the determination to achieve a goal (cf. 
Locke & Latham, 1990). 
Experimental Series 2 
The series of experiments reported in the following chapter builds on the 
existing empirical work that has examined the relationships between anxiety, 
situational stress, and motivation on cognitive performance (i.e., updating, 
inhibitory and shifting), and extends the findings from the studies reported in 
Experimental Series 1. In each study, cognitive trait anxiety was operationalised 
using the cognitive trait scale from the STICSA (Ree et al., 2000) and situational 
stress was manipulated using ego threat instructions. Motivation was measured 
using the short five-item HWK scale. To permit comparison with the data 
reported in Experimental Series 1, the reading span task was employed as the 
measure of updating, the Go-No-Go task as the measure of inhibition, and the 
WCST as the index of shifting performance. To enable an investigation into how 
attentional biases for threat are related to the anxiety-performance relationship, the 
inhibition and shifting tasks contained threat-related and neutral stimuli. 
Performance effectiveness was operationalised as the quality of performance and 
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processing efficiency was indexed by the ratio of accuracy to RT (cf. Series 1). 
Scores on the DASS-Depression subscale (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) were 
treated as a covariate in data analyses.  
Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a sound-attenuated laboratory, and 
the procedure took approximately 120 minutes for each. Upon arrival at the 
laboratory they provided written informed consent and then completed the 
STICSA, DASS, and the SRQ (i.e., SRQ at baseline). Two participants who 
scored above 28 (extremely severe) on the DASS Depression Scale were thanked 
and released (in accord with the University‟s ethics requirements).  The three 
tasks were undertaken in a counter-balanced order based on participants‟ order of 
arrival at the laboratory, and they were randomly assigned to either the low 
situational stress (ego safe) or high situational stress condition (ego threat) 
conditions, such that every second participant was allocated to the ego threat 
condition. Instructions for the stress manipulation were provided prior to the first 
task. Following these instructions, participants completed the SRQ a second time 
(i.e., SRQ at post-manipulation). They were then provided with instructions for 
the first task and completed the HWK. Prior to undertaking each task they were 
reminded to work as quickly and accurately as possible. The stress induction 
instructions were repeated immediately prior to completing each task, and 
followed by administration of the SRQ. Participants also completed the RSME 
following the reading span task only. Upon completion of the three tasks 
participants were thanked, debriefed and released. 
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CHAPTER 6: EXPERIMENTAL SERIES 2 
Study 2.1: Anxiety and Updating Performance 
Study 2.1 examined the relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, 
situational stress and updating performance. Separate statistical models were used 
to investigate the moderating effects of mental effort (Study 2.1.1) and motivation 
(Study 2.1.2) on these relationships.  Cognitive trait anxiety was operationalised 
using the cognitive dimension of the STICSA (Ree et al., 2000), situational stress 
was manipulated using ego-threat instructions, and mental effort and motivation 
were indexed using the RSME (Zijlstra, 1993) and HWK (Klein et al., 2001), 
respectively. Study 2.1 employed a revised version of the reading span task to 
reduce the possibility of a floor effect confound (i.e., the task was too difficult) in 
Study 1.2.  
Hypotheses 
After controlling for depression, the predictions were guided by empirical 
support for the relationship between anxiety and updating performance (see 
Chapter 2) and ACT (see Chapter 1), which suggests that anxiety impairs 
updating performance under stressful conditions and that performance deficits 
will be more pronounced on efficiency than effectiveness. For Study 2.1.1, the 
prediction was that there would be no relationship between cognitive trait anxiety 
and situational stress on updating effectiveness. However, it was anticipated that 
updating efficiency would vary with trait anxiety, situational stress, and effort, 
such that high trait anxiety would be related to lower efficiency and that this 
relationship would be restricted to those who reported lower effort in the ego 
threat condition. For Study 2.1.2, it was predicted that the separate and combined 
associations of trait anxiety, situational stress and motivation would not be 
associated with updating effectiveness, yet the relationships between these factors 
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would combine to predict updating efficiency deficits. In particular, it was 
hypothesised higher trait anxiety would be associated with lower efficiency when 
performing under ego threat instructions, and that this relationship would be 
restricted to those who reported lower task motivation. 
Measurement of Updating Performance 
Updating effectiveness. In accord with Study 1.2, updating effectiveness 
was operationalised using a weighted reading span score (see Chapter 3). For 
review, the total weighted score on the reading span task involved summing the 
points for each correctly recalled trial, where trials in two sentence set-lengths 
scored 4 points, three sentence set-lengths scored 9 points, four sentence set-
lengths scored 16 points, five sentence set-lengths scored 25 points, and six 
sentence set-lengths scored 36 points (maximum total weighted score = 378).  
Updating efficiency. Updating efficiency was operationalised in accord 
with Study 1.2 that defined it as the ratio of updating effectiveness relative to RT 
on correct trials. Updating efficiency was calculated using the following equation: 
 
Updating Efficiency = 
 Weighted Reading Span Score  
X 1000 
RT on Correct Trials 
 
Participants 
Participants comprised 90 undergraduate students, aged between 18 and 53 
years (M = 26.66 years, SD = 9.90), and 70 were female. Based on their order of 
arrival at the laboratory they were assigned to either the ego safe or ego threat 
groups. The groups did not differ on age, t(88) = 1.08, p = .285, n.s., and sex 
distributions were approximately equivalent in the ego safe (36 females; 9 males) 
and ego threat  (38 females; 7 males) groups.   
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Validity of SRQ as an Index of Situational Stress 
To determine the efficacy of the SRQ as a measure of cognitive situational 
stress in the sample, a bivariate correlation was conducted between composite 
SRQ scores at baseline and STICSA State Cognitive scale scores. The results 
revealed a significant positive correlation between the measures, r(90) = .49, p 
< .001, confirming the SRQ to be an appropriate index of situational stress.  
Manipulation Check  
To qualify the ego threat instructions as an effective situational stress 
manipulation procedure, composite SRQ scores were entered into a 2 x 2 repeated 
measures ANOVA with Time (baseline vs. post-manipulation) and Group (ego 
safe vs. ego threat) as the factors. The only significant effect to emerge was a 
main effect of Time, F(1, 88) = 15.22, MSE = 31.12, p < .001, 2 = .15; 
irrespective of the stress manipulation SRQ scores were higher post-manipulation 
(M = 15.69; SD = 6.41) than at baseline (M = 12.44; SD = 6.16). The main effect 
of Group, F(1, 88) = 1.25, MSE = 48.17, p = .267, and the Time x Group 
interaction, F < 1, failed to reach significance.  
Study 2.1.1 Anxiety, Effort and Updating Performance 
Data Diagnostics and Assumption Checking 
Data cleaning was conducted in accordance with Study 1.2. Anticipatory 
RTs (< 200 ms) and RTs ± 3SD from an individual‟s mean were removed (< 1% 
of trials). There were no univariate (z-scores < 3.50) or multivariate (Mahalanobis 
Distance p < .001) outliers on updating effectiveness or updating efficiency. The 
full data set is reported (N = 90). 
Descriptive Statistics 
The means, standard deviations, zero-order and inter-correlations of 
predictor and criterion variables are shown in Table 29. As can be seen, there was 
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a significant positive zero-order correlation between mental effort and 
performance effectiveness, such that those who reported investing more mental 
effort also tended to have higher effectiveness. Further, there was a significant 
positive inter-correlation between cognitive trait anxiety and depression, such that 
those who reported higher cognitive trait anxiety also reported higher depression.  
Main Analyses 
Separate moderated multiple regression analyses were conducted to 
determine whether cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, mental effort and 
their interactions predicted effectiveness and efficiency on the reading span task. 
At Step 1, depression was entered as a covariate, at Step 2 the main effects 
(cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress and mental effort) were included, at Step 
3 the two-way interaction terms were entered, and at Step 4 the three-way 
interaction (cognitive trait anxiety x situational stress x mental effort) was entered.  
 
Table 29. 
Means, Standard Deviations, Zero-order and Inter-correlations of Depression, 
Cognitive Trait Anxiety, Mental Effort, Updating Effectiveness and Updating 
Efficiency on the Reading Span Task. 
 M SD Depression Cognitive 
Trait  
Anxiety 
Mental 
Effort 
Depression 7.58 7.27    
Cognitive Trait Anxiety 18.10 5.47 .68***   
Mental Effort 106.68 24.64 -.08 .02  
Updating Effectiveness 47.42 40.47 -.00 .10 .25** 
Updating Efficiency 3.29 1.78 .02 .03 .12 
NOTE: p < .001*** p < .01**  
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Updating Effectiveness 
The unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence 
intervals for all variables can be seen in Table 30. At Step 1, depression accounted 
for < 1% of the variance in updating effectiveness, R < .01, F < 1. At Step 2, with 
the addition of the component main effects, the model accounted 14% of the 
variance in effectiveness, R = .37; the increase in explainable variance was 
significant, ΔR2 = .14, ΔF (3, 85) = 4.53, p = .005, and the model was significant, 
F (4, 89) = 3.39, p = .013. Both situational stress and mental effort made unique 
contributions in terms of predicting updating effectiveness. Mental effort 
accounted for 6% of explainable variance, such that higher mental effort was 
related to higher effectiveness, t = 2.30, p = .024, and situational stress accounted 
for 7% of explainable variance with those in the ego threat group (high stress 
condition) displaying poorer effectiveness than those in the ego safe group (low 
stress condition), t = 2.47, p = .016. At Step 3, the two-way interaction terms were 
entered and the model accounted for 18% on variance in the criterion, R = .42, 
however the increase in R
2 
was not significant,
 ΔR2 = .04, ΔF (3, 82) = 1.41, p 
= .247, although the overall model remained significant, F(7, 89) = 2.57, p = .019. 
At Step 4, with the inclusion of the three-way interaction term, the model 
accounted for 19% of the variance in updating effectiveness, however although 
the overall model remained significant, F (8, 89) = 2.34, p = .026, the incremental 
increase in R
2 
was not significant, R = .43, ΔR2 = .01, ΔF < 1.   
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Table 30. 
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Updating Effectiveness 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 47.47 6.21    35.12 59.81 
 Depression -.01 .59  -.00  -1.19 1.17 
Step 2 (Constant) 51.83 7.09    37.73 65.92 
 Depression  -.58 .77  -.10  -2.11 .95 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety 1.47 1.03  .20  -.57 3.51 
 Situational Stress 10.14 4.10  .25*  1.98 18.29 
 Mental Effort .38 .17  .23*  .05 .72 
Step 3 (Constant) 51.04 7.12    36.88 65.19 
 Depression  -.49 .77  -.09  -2.01 1.03 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety 1.56 1.04  .21  -.50 3.62 
 Situational Stress 10.14 4.10  .25  1.99 18.29 
 Mental Effort .48 .17  .29  .14 .82 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .14 .80  .02  -1.45 1.73 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .35 .17  .21  .00 .69 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort -.00 .03  -.01  -.07 .06 
Step 4 (Constant) 51.55 7.15    37.33 65.78 
 Depression  -.50 .77  -.09  -2.03 1.02 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety 1.78 1.07  .24  -.34 3.90 
 Situational Stress 10.33 4.11  .26  2.15 18.50 
 Mental Effort .50 .18  .31  .15 .85 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .19 .80  .03  -1.41 1.79 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .34 .17  .21  -.01 .69 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .01 .03  .02  -.06 .07 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
.03 .03  .10  -.04 .10 
p < .05* 
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Updating Efficiency 
Table 31 displays the unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% 
confidence intervals for all variables. At Step 1, depression accounted for < 1% of 
the variance in updating efficiency, R = .02, F <1. At Step 2, the component main 
effects brought no incremental increase in R
2
, R = .28, ΔR2 = .08, ΔF (3, 85) = 
2.33, p = .081, and the overall model that accounted for 8% of variance in 
updating efficiency was not significant, F(4, 89) = 1.74, p = .148. At Step 3, the 
inclusion of the two-way interaction terms meant the model accounted for 10% of 
the variance in the criterion, R = .31, however the increment in explainable 
variance was not significant, ΔR2 = .02, ΔF < 1, and the model, F (7, 89) = 1.26, p 
= .279, was not significant. At Step 4, the full model accounted for 10% of 
variance in efficiency, R = .31; the addition of the three-way interaction term 
reflected no significant change in R
2
,
 ΔR2 = .00, ΔF < 1, and the full model was 
not significant, F(8, 89) = 1.11, p = .366.  
 
Study 2.1.2. Anxiety, Motivation and Updating Performance 
Data Diagnostics and Assumption Checking 
Study 2.1.2 employed the same data as for Study 2.1.1 and included the 
HWK data as the measure of motivation. The full set of 90 participants was again 
screened for univariate and multivariate outliers. No cases met criteria for 
univariate (z-scores < 3.50) or multivariate outliers (Mahalanobis Distance  
p < .001) for performance effectiveness or processing efficiency, thus the full data 
set was retained (N = 90). 
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Table 31. 
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Updating Efficiency 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 3.30 .27    2.75 3.85 
 Depression .01 .03  .02  -.05 .06 
Step 2 (Constant) 3.36 .32    2.72 4.00 
 Depression  -.01 .04  -.04  -.08 .06 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .03 .05  .08  -.07 .12 
 Situational Stress .44 .19  .25  .07 .81 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .11  -.01 .02 
Step 3 (Constant) 3.38 .33    2.72 4.03 
 Depression  -.01 .04  -.04  -.08 .06 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .03 .05  .10  -.06 .13 
 Situational Stress .46 .19  .26  .08 .84 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .14  -.01 .03 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .03 .04  .10  -.04 .11 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .01 .00  .12  -.01 .03 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .01 .00  .08  -.00 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) 3.39 .33    2.72 4.05 
 Depression  -.01 .04  -.04  -.08 .06 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety .04 .05  .11  -.06 .14 
 Situational Stress .50 .19  .26  .08 .84 
 Mental Effort .01 .01  .15  -.01 .03 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .03 .04  .10  -.04 .11 
 Situational Stress X Mental Effort  .01 .01  .12  -.01 .02 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Mental Effort .00 .00  .10  -.00 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Mental Effort 
.00 .00  .04  -.00 .00 
p < .05* 
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Descriptive Statistics 
Table 32 displays the means, standard deviations, zero-order and inter-
correlations of predictor and criterion variables. As shown, the only significant 
effect to emerge was the positive inter-correlation (reported above) between 
cognitive trait anxiety and depression, such that those who reported higher 
symptoms of cognitive trait anxiety also reported higher depression.  
 
Table 32. 
Means, Standard Deviations, Zero-order and Inter-correlations of Depression, 
Cognitive Trait Anxiety, Motivation, Updating Effectiveness and Updating 
Efficiency on the Reading Span Task. 
 M SD Depression Cognitive 
Trait  
Anxiety 
Motivation 
Depression 7.58 7.27    
Cognitive Trait Anxiety 18.10 5.47 .68***   
Motivation 20.42 4.08 -.04 .09  
Updating Effectiveness 47.42 40.47 -.00 .10 .16 
Updating Efficiency 3.29 1.78 .02 .03 -.06 
NOTE: p < .001***  
 
 
Main Analyses 
Analyses were performed to determine whether cognitive trait anxiety, 
situational stress, motivation and their interactions predicted performance 
effectiveness and processing efficiency on the updating data.  
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Updating Effectiveness 
Table 33 displays the unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% 
confidence intervals for all variables. At Step 1, depression accounted for < 1% of 
the variance in updating effectiveness, R < .01, F < 1. At Step 2, with the addition 
of the main effects the model accounted 10% of the variance in effectiveness, R 
= .31, the increment was significant, ΔR2 = .10, ΔF (3, 85) = 3.01, p = .034, and 
the model approached significance, F (4, 89) = 2.26, p = .069. Situational stress 
accounted for 6% of the unique explainable variance in updating effectiveness; 
those who performed under ego threat instructions were less effective on the 
updating task than those in the ego safe condition, t = 2.32, p = .022. With the 
inclusion of the two-way interaction terms at Step 3, the model accounted for 11% 
of variance in the criterion, R = .33, however the increase in explainable variance 
ΔR2 = .01, ΔF < 1, and the overall model were not significant F (7, 89) = 1.46, p 
= .194. At Step 4, the addition of the three-way interaction term meant the overall 
model accounted for 11% of the variance in updating effectiveness, R = .33, 
however the increment, ΔR2 < .01, ΔF < 1, and full model, F (8, 89) = 1.26, p 
= .276, were not significant.   
Updating Efficiency  
The unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence 
intervals for all variables are shown in Table 34. Depression accounted for < 1% 
of the variance in updating efficiency at Step 1, R = .01, F <1. At Step 2, the 
model accounted for 7% of the variance in efficiency, R = .27, however the 
increment, ΔR2 = .07, ΔF (3, 85) = 2.25, p = .089, and model failed to reach 
significance, F (4, 89) = 1.68, p = .161. At Step 3, the model accounted for 16%
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Table 33. 
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Updating Effectiveness 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 47.47 6.21    35.12 59.81 
 Depression -.01 .59  -.00  -1.19 1.17 
Step 2 (Constant) 52.59 7.27    38.13 67.04 
 Depression  -.68 .78  -.12  -2.25 .89 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety 1.52 1.06  .21  -.59 3.63 
 Situational Stress 9.85 4.24  .25  1.42 18.27 
 Motivation 1.26 1.18  .11  -1.07 3.60 
Step 3 (Constant) 52.76 7.41    38.01 67.51 
 Depression  -.73 .81  -.13  -.234 .88 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety 1.35 1.14  .18  -.91 3.61 
 Situational Stress 10.71 4.35  .27  2.07 19.35 
 Motivation 1.78 1.28  .16  -.76 4.33 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .33 .83  .05  -1.31 1.98 
 Situational Stress X Motivation -.29 1.23  -.03  -2.74 2.16 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Motivation .31 .27  .14  -.23 .86 
Step 4 (Constant) 52.71 7.71    37.37 68.04 
 Depression  -.72 .83  -.13  -2.38 .93 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety 1.35 1.19  .18  -1.03 3.72 
 Situational Stress 10.72 4.38  .27  2.00 19.44 
 Motivation 1.78 1.29  .16  -.77 4.34 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .34 .85  .05  -1.35 2.02 
 Situational Stress X Motivation -.31 1.36  -.03  -3.00 2.39 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Motivation .31 .28  .13  -.24 .87 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Motivation 
-.01 .29  -.00  -.58 .56 
p < .05* 
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Table 34. 
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Updating Efficiency 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) 3.30 .27    2.76 3.85 
 Depression -.00 .03  -.01  -.05 .05 
Step 2 (Constant) 3.43 .32    2.79 4.08 
 Depression  -.02 .04  -.07  -.09 .05 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .04 .05  .12  -.06 .13 
 Situational Stress .50 .19  .27  .10 .85 
 Motivation -.05 .05  -.10  -.15 .05 
Step 3 (Constant) 3.42 .32    2.79 4.05 
 Depression  -.02 .04  -.06  -.08 .05 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .01 .05  .02  -.09 .10 
 Situational Stress .56 .19  .32  .19 .93 
 Motivation .00 .06  .00  -.11 .11 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .04 .04  .12  -.03 .11 
 Situational Stress X Motivation -.09 .05  -.19  -.20 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Motivation .03 .01  .29*  .01 .05 
Step 4 (Constant) 3.37 .33    2.72 4.03 
 Depression  -.01 .04  -.05  -.08 .06 
 Somatic Trait Anxiety -.00 .05  -.00  -.10 .10 
 Situational Stress .57 .19  .32  .20 .94 
 Motivation .00 .06  .00  -.11 .11 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .04 .04  .13  -.03 .11 
 Situational Stress X Motivation -.11 .06  -.22  -.22 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Motivation .03 .01  .28  .01 .05 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Motivation 
-.01 .01  -.06  -.03 .02 
p < .05* 
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of the variance in efficiency, R = .40 and there was a significant change in R
2
,
 ΔR2 
= .09, ΔF (3, 82) = 2.87, p = .041, and the model also reached significance, F(7, 
89) = 2.26, p = .037. The two-way interaction between cognitive trait anxiety x 
motivation explained 7% of the unique variance in updating efficiency which was 
significant, t = 2.49, p = .015. The pattern of this interaction is discussed below. 
The interactions between cognitive trait anxiety x situational stress and situational 
stress x motivation were not significant. At Step 4, the inclusion of the three-way 
interaction term meant the overall model accounted for 17% of the variance in the 
criterion,
 
R = .41,
 
however there was no significant change in R
2
,
 ΔR2 < .01, ΔF < 
1. At Step 4 the full model remained marginally significant, F (8, 89) = 2.00, p = 
.057.  
IRSE software (Meier, 2008) was used to decompose the two-way 
interaction between cognitive trait anxiety and motivation and conduct tests of 
simple slopes. Figure 8 shows the pattern of the interaction plotted at ± 1 SD from 
the mean score of cognitive trait anxiety and motivation. As can be seen, higher 
cognitive trait anxiety was associated with higher updating efficiency at higher 
motivation, β = .20, t = 3.56, p = .001, whereas higher cognitive trait anxiety was 
related to lower efficiency at lower motivation, β = -.20, t = 2.42, p = .018. 
 
Discussion of Anxiety and Updating Performance 
Study 2.1 investigated the relationships between cognitive trait anxiety and 
situational stress on updating effectiveness and efficiency. The predictions 
followed those specified by ACT which suggests that anxiety impairs the updating 
function under stressful conditions. Specifically, updating effectiveness deficits 
may not be evident under conditions in which anxious individuals are able to 
invest additional cognitive resources such as mental effort and/or motivation on 
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the task, however the effort cost is revealed as poorer updating efficiency. 
Accordingly, separate analyses were carried out to explore whether mental effort 
(Study 2.1.1) and motivation (Study 2.2) moderated the relationships between 
anxiety, stress and updating performance.
 
 
Figure 8. Relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, motivation and updating 
efficiency.  
 
Study 2.1.1 tested the prediction that updating effectiveness would vary 
independently of the combined associations between cognitive trait anxiety, 
situational stress and mental effort. The data supported this prediction as there 
were no combined or moderated links between trait anxiety, situational stress, and 
effort on updating effectiveness. There were however significant unique main 
effects between mental effort and effectiveness, and situational stress and 
effectiveness. Specifically, higher effort predicted higher effectiveness, and poorer 
effectiveness was associated with higher situational stress (ego threat), relative to 
lower stress (ego safe).  
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Although the data from Study 2.1.1 are consistent with other studies that 
did not observe anxiety-related deficits in performance accuracy using both the n-
back (e.g., Walkenhorst & Crowe, 2009; Wong et al., 2013) and reading span 
(e.g., Harris & Cumming, 2003) tasks, they are in contrast to other studies 
reporting that higher anxiety was associated with poorer accuracy the reading span 
task (e.g., Calvo et al., 1992; Darke, 1988; Sorg & Whitney, 1992). Perhaps the 
differences between results reported in the present experiment and those reported 
by Darke, Calvo et al., and Sorg and Whitney might be explained by the different 
indices of anxiety used. For example, Darke examined test anxiety and situational 
stress (manipulated using ego threat instructions), Calvo et al. investigated test 
anxiety and situational stress (manipulated using ego threat instructions), Sorg and 
Whitney included trait anxiety and situational stress (manipulated by playing 
competitive video games), whereas Study 2.1.1 used a measure of cognitive trait 
anxiety and ego threat instructions. Given the different measures of anxiety and 
stress manipulations employed across studies, it seems plausible that subtle 
variations in how these factors are operationalised might have a profound effect 
on the probability of revealing anxiety-related deficits in updating effectiveness.  
Importantly however, there are now two confirmed reports demonstrating 
that poorer updating effectiveness might be more closely linked to situational 
stress than trait anxiety. For example, the data from Study 2.1.1 revealed a 
significant unique relationship between situational stress and effectiveness such 
that those in the ego threat condition were less effective on last word recall 
performance than those in the ego safe condition. These data are conceptually 
consistent with those reported by Vytal et al. (2012) who found lower 
performance effectiveness on the n-back task in those participants who performed 
under stressful conditions, relative to those who performed under low stress 
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conditions. Considered together, these results suggest that situational stress alone 
might be an important predictor of updating effectiveness. Although it is tempting 
to conclude that this relationship is somewhat robust as it holds across different 
measures of updating (i.e., the n-back and reading span tasks), further replications 
of these data across tasks is required before this explanation can gain further 
acceptance. 
Updating efficiency did not vary as a function of trait anxiety, situational 
stress, mental effort, or their interactions, and as such, did the data did not support 
the predictions of ACT. In the absence of published performance efficiency data 
from studies employing the reading span task, the results of the present study were 
compared to data derived from earlier work using the n-back task. The results 
from Study 2.1.1 are inconsistent with those reported Wong et al. (2013) who 
found that highly trait anxious individuals took longer to identify previously 
presented items on the n-back relative to their low-anxious counterparts. Although 
the exact reasons for the differential patterns of data between Study 2.1.1 and 
Wong et al. are unclear, perhaps the most parsimonious explanation might lie in 
the different tasks (reading span vs. n-back) and indices of updating efficiency 
used (their index was RT, whereas the ratio of effectiveness to RT was used here). 
The present efficiency results are however consistent with other studies that did 
not report anxiety-linked updating efficiency deficits (e.g., Fales et al., 2008; 
Vytal et al., 2012; Walkenhorst & Crowe, 2009, Study 1.2). Together, these data 
suggest that the relationships between trait anxiety, situational stress and updating 
effectiveness are not robust, and are likely sensitive to subtle differences in the 
indices of anxiety, tasks, and measures of effectiveness employed.  
It is important to note that mental effort was a positive predictor of 
updating effectiveness, such that those who reported greater effort were more 
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effective on the updating task. Although these data are consistent with the notion 
that effort improves performance accuracy, there was no evidence that trait 
anxiety and/or situational stress were positively associated with effort.  
Notwithstanding a potential floor effect in the Study 1.2 data, the results from 
Study 2.1.1 also failed to find interactive relationships between trait anxiety, 
situational stress and mental effort on updating performance despite using an 
easier task and subsequently more sensitive measures of effectiveness and 
efficiency. Therefore, the data from the two studies reported in the present thesis 
(Study 1.2 and Study 2.1.1) suggest that trait anxiety, situational stress, and 
mental effort do not interact in such a way as to affect the performance of highly 
anxious individuals in the manner specified by ACT.  
Study 2.1.2 examined whether motivation buffered the relationship 
between trait anxiety, situational stress and updating performance. In accord with 
the assumptions of ACT, it was hypothesised that trait anxiety, situational stress 
and motivation would not interact to predict updating effectiveness.  It was also 
hypothesised high trait anxiety would be associated with lower efficiency when 
performing under ego threat instructions, and that this relationship would be 
restricted to those who reported lower task motivation.  
Consistent with the prediction for updating effectiveness, the results 
suggested that trait anxiety, situational stress, and motivation did not interact to 
predict performance accuracy on the reading span task. Although these data are 
incongruent with those reported by Hayes et al. (2009) who found that high 
anxious individuals performed better in an incidental learning paradigm under 
high motivational conditions than did less motivated participants, they are 
consistent with Calvo (1985) who reported that anxiety and motivation were 
unrelated to performance  on a reasoning task. These data suggest that 
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performance effectiveness on tasks requiring ongoing concentration (updating and 
reasoning) is less sensitive to anxiety and motivation than are tasks in which 
performance is ancillary.  
The prediction for updating efficiency was partially supported. The data 
indicated that motivation and cognitive trait anxiety interact to predict efficiency, 
but that this relationship is not further moderated by situational stress. The 
observed interaction was such that at higher motivation, higher trait anxiety 
predicted greater efficiency, whereas at lower motivation, higher trait anxiety was 
associated with poorer efficiency. It was not possible to reconcile the updating 
efficiency data with previous empirical investigations into the relationship 
between anxiety, motivation and updating, as neither Calvo nor Hayes et al. 
included RT in their measures. In related work however, Eysenck (1985) reported 
that high trait anxious individuals‟ mean solution times on correct trials 
(efficiency) on a letter transformation task did not differ between low and high 
motivation conditions. Although these results are discordant from the updating 
efficiency data reported in the present study, the task employed by Eysenck was 
not an assessment of updating, but rather a computation task involving multiple 
components of working memory. The data reported in the present study are the 
first to confirm a relationship between trait anxiety and updating efficiency, and 
that this relationship is moderated by motivation.  
Despite revealing the important role of motivation in updating 
effectiveness and efficiency, there are some important theoretical considerations 
with respect to the operationalisation of this construct that require consideration. 
For example, Humphreys and Revelle (1984) suggest that motivation has both a 
personality and a situational dimension, such that individuals with high trait-like 
motives (to achieve) are also prone to increased achievement motivation when 
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faced with an achievement-situation. Motives (personality trait) may therefore 
vary with trait anxiety and updating performance. Despite employing the HWK to 
index goal-directed achievement motivation for the current task, the absence of a 
measure of trait-motives makes this notion purely speculative. As such, future 
studies should explore the motive-motivation connection and how these factors 
relate to anxiety and updating performance. 
In summary, Study 2.1 investigated systematically whether cognitive trait 
anxiety and situational stress interact to predict updating effectiveness and 
efficiency, and whether these relationships were further moderated by mental 
effort (Study 2.1.1) and motivation (Study 2.1.2). The results afforded only partial 
support for ACT. Specifically, the updating effectiveness data indicated that 
performance deficits manifest under high stress conditions, whereas the efficiency 
data confirmed that trait anxiety and motivation interact to predict updating 
efficiency. In accord with ACT, higher trait anxiety and higher motivation 
combined to predict more efficient updating, whereas higher trait anxiety and 
lower motivation were associated with poorer efficiency. Importantly, the present  
procedures were able to confirm that it is motivation, rather than effort, that plays 
an important role in moderating the relationship between anxiety and updating 
efficiency.  
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Study 2.2: Anxiety and Inhibitory Threat Differentiation 
Study 2.2 examined the separate and combined relationships between 
cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, motivation and inhibitory control, using 
a Go-No-Go task that included an equal proportion of neutral and threat-related 
words. Cognitive trait anxiety was indexed by the cognitive dimension of the 
STICSA (Ree et al., 2000), situational stress was induced using ego-threat 
instructions, and motivation operationalised using the HWK (Klein et al., 2001). 
In order to develop an inhibitory control measure for threat words relative to 
neutral words, a threat differential index was calculated. For inhibitory 
effectiveness the index was derived by contrasting the quality of performance on 
threat relative to neutral words (inhibitory effectiveness index), whereas the 
efficiency index was determined using the effectiveness index divided by the 
difference between RTs on threat words compared to neutral words (inhibitory 
efficiency index). These measures are described more fully below. 
Hypotheses 
After controlling for depression, the predictions were derived from ACT 
(see Chapter 1) which suggests that anxiety impairs the inhibition function and 
that impairments are greater in the presence of threat- relative to neutral- stimuli. 
Furthermore threat inhibitory deficits were predicted to be more pronounced on 
the measure of efficiency than effectiveness. Thus, no relationship between 
cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, motivation and the inhibitory 
effectiveness index was predicted. However, the efficiency of threat inhibition 
was expected to vary with the inter-relationships between trait anxiety, situational 
stress, and motivation, such that higher trait anxiety would predict poorer threat 
inhibition efficiency, and that this relationship would be restricted to those who 
reported lower motivation in the ego threat condition.   
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Measurement of Inhibitory Threat Differentiation 
Inhibitory effectiveness index. A threat differential index was created to 
enable a comparison of inhibitory effectiveness on threat words relative to neutral 
words in the Go-No-Go task. As in Study 1.3, inhibitory effectiveness was 
indexed as the stimulus sensitivity parameter from signal detection theory (d’; 
Pastore & Scheirer, 1974; see Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999 for a review), and 
accordingly, inhibitory effectiveness scores for threat and neutral words were 
calculated separately (i.e., d’threat & d’neutral). The inhibitory effectiveness index 
was calculated by deducting the measure of effectiveness for neutral words from 
effectiveness for threat words, such that negative scores represented poorer 
inhibitory effectiveness on threat words compared to neutral words, whereas 
positive scores represented better performance on threat words relative to neutral 
words. The following equation was used to calculate the threat effectiveness 
index: 
Inhibitory Effectiveness Index = 
 
d’threat - d’neutral 
 
 
 
NOTE:  
d’threat = inhibitory effectiveness on threat words (see Study 1.3) 
d’neutral = inhibitory effectiveness on neutral words (see Study 1.3) 
 
Inhibitory efficiency index. To contrast inhibitory efficiency for threat 
words with neutral words in the Go-No-Go task, an inhibitory efficiency index 
was created. In accordance with Study 1.3, inhibitory efficiency was indexed as 
the relationship between stimulus sensitivity and RT on Correct Go trials, hence 
efficiency scores for threat words and neutral words were calculated separately. 
The inhibitory efficiency index was calculated by deducting the measure of 
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inhibitory efficiency for neutral words from the efficiency for threat words. 
Following the inhibitory effectiveness index described above, negative inhibitory 
efficiency index scores represented poorer inhibitory efficiency on threat relative 
to neutral words trials, whereas positive scores were indicative of more efficient 
inhibitory processing on threat trials that neutral trials. The inhibitory efficiency 
index was calculated using the following equation: 
Inhibitory 
Efficiency Index   
= 
 d’threat 
- 
d’neutral  
 X 1000 Mean RT on Correct 
Go Trials threat 
Mean RT on Correct 
Go Trials neutral 
 
Participants 
The same sample from Study 2.1 was used; 90 undergraduate psychology 
students aged between 17 and 56 years (M = 27.67 years; SD = 11.81) participated 
(74 were female).   
Validity of SRQ as an Index of Situational Stress 
As the same sample was employed as for Study 2.1, support for the SRQ 
as an appropriate index of situational stress in the sample was established earlier 
(i.e., positive correlation between SRQ scores at baseline and STICSA State 
Cognitive scale, see Study 2.1).   
Manipulation Check 
To determine the efficacy of the ego-threat instructions as a means of 
elevating situational stress, SRQ scores were used as the dependent variable in a 2 
x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with Time (baseline vs. post-manipulation) and 
Group (ego threat vs. ego safe) as the factors.  The main effect of Group was not 
significant, F(1, 89) = 3.58, MSE = 29.97, p = .068, 2 = .04, however the main 
effect of Time, F(1, 89) = 12.58, MSE = 17.48, p = .001, 2 = .13, and the Time x 
Group interaction, F(1, 89) = 4.81, p = .031, 2 = .05, were significant. Follow up 
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t-tests revealed that whereas there was no difference in composite SRQ scores 
between the ego threat (M = 12.89, SD = 6.80 ) and ego safe (M = 12.04, SD = 
5.50) groups at baseline, t < 1, following the ego threat instructions individuals in 
the ego threat condition (M = 16.42, SD = 7.16) had significantly higher SRQ 
scores than those in the ego safe condition (M = 12.84, SD = 5.20), t(1, 88) = 2.68, 
p = .009. Thus the effectiveness of the manipulation was confirmed. 
Results 
Data Diagnostics and Assumption Checking 
Data cleaning procedures were the same as in Study 1.3, such that RT < 
200 ms were considered anticipatory and were removed as were RTs ± 3 SD from 
each participant‟s mean score (< 1% of trials). No univariate or multivariate 
outliers were identified (using the same criteria as Study 1.3) leaving a final data 
set of 90 participants (N = 90). 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 35 shows the means, standard deviations, zero-order and inter-
correlations of depression, cognitive trait anxiety, motivation, performance 
effectiveness threat differential index and processing efficiency threat differential 
index. As seen in the table, there was a significant positive inter-correlation 
between depression and cognitive trait anxiety, such that those who reported 
higher symptoms of depression also tended to report higher cognitive trait anxiety. 
There were significant zero-order correlations between motivation and inhibitory 
effectiveness and efficiency threat differential indices; those who reported higher 
motivation performed with better inhibitory effectiveness and efficiency for threat 
words relative to neutral words.  
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Table 35. 
Means, Standard Deviations, Zero-order and Inter-correlations of Depression, 
Cognitive Trait Anxiety, Motivation, Inhibitory Effectiveness Index and 
Inhibitory Efficiency Index on the Go-No-Go Task. 
 M SD Depression Cognitive 
Trait  
Anxiety 
Motivation 
Depression 7.51 7.27    
Cognitive Trait Anxiety 18.10 5.47 .68***   
Motivation 20.88 3.83 -.06 .11  
Inhibitory Effectiveness Index .03 .86 -.06 .08 .23* 
Inhibitory Efficiency Index .10 1.75 .05 .07 .22* 
NOTE: p < .001***, p < .05* 
 
Main Analyses 
To determine whether cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, motivation 
and their interactions predicted scores on the threat differential effectiveness and 
efficiency indices, separate moderated regression analyses were conducted on 
each measure. For these analyses, depression was entered at Step 1, the main 
effects (cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, and motivation) were included at 
Step 2, the two-way interactions terms were entered at Step 3, and the three-way 
interaction (cognitive trait anxiety x situational stress, x motivation) was included 
at Step 4. Mean centred scores were used to calculate the multiplicative 
interaction terms. 
Inhibitory Effectiveness Index 
Table 36 shows the unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% 
confidence intervals for all variables at each step of the model. Depression was 
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Table 36.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Inhibitory Effectiveness Index 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) -.02 .13    -.28 .25 
 Depression .01 .01  .06  -.02 .03 
Step 2 (Constant) -.02 .16    -.34 .30 
 Depression .01 .02  .06  -.03 .04 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .00 .02  .01  -.05 .05 
 Situational Stress .00 .10  .00  -.18 .18 
 Motivation .05 .03  .23  .00 .10 
Step 3 (Constant) .03 .16    -.28 .34 
 Depression .01 .02  .07  -.03 .04 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .01 .02  .06  -.04 .06 
 Situational Stress -.01 .09  -.01  -.18 .17 
 Motivation .02 .03  .07  -.04 .07 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .00 .02  .03  -.03 .04 
 Situational Stress X Motivation -.05 .03  -.21*  -.10 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Motivation -.01 .01  -.23  -.02 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) .04 .16    -.28 .35 
 Depression .01 .02  .06  -.03 .04 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .01 .02  .07  -.04 .06 
 Situational Stress -.01 .09  -.01  -.19 .17 
 Motivation .02 .03  .07  -.04 .07 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .00 .02  .02  -.03 .04 
 Situational Stress X Motivation -.04 .03  -.19  -.10 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Motivation -.01 .01  -.21  -.02 .00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress 
X Motivation 
.00 .01  .06  -.01 .02 
p < .05* 
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entered at Step 1, and accounted for < 1% of the variance in effectiveness threat 
differentiation, R = .06, F < 1. The main effects were added at Step 2, and 
accounted for 6% of the variance in threat differentiation, R = .24, however the 
increment, ΔR2 = .06, ΔF(3, 85) = 1.66, p = .182, and model, F(4, 89) = 1.31,  
p = .272, were not significant. At Step 3, the contribution of the two-way 
interaction terms meant the model accounted for 15% of the variance in the 
criterion, R = .39, and the increment in explainable variance was significant, ΔR2 
= .09, ΔF (3, 82) = 3.00, p = .035, and the model was significant, F(7, 89) = 2.19, 
p = .043. There was a significant two-way interaction between situational stress x 
motivation that accounted 4% of variance in efficiency (see below). The cognitive 
trait anxiety x situational stress interaction and the cognitive trait anxiety x 
motivation interaction were not significant. At Step 4, with the inclusion of the 
three-way interaction term, the overall model accounted for 15% of the variance 
in the threat differentiation effectiveness, R = .39, however the increment, ΔR2 
< .01, ΔF(1, 81) < 1, and the overall model were not significant, F(8, 89) = 1.83,  
p = .083.  
To decompose the two-way interaction between situational stress and 
motivation, tests of simple slopes were performed using the IRSE program 
(Meier, 2008). Figure 9 shows the pattern of the interaction plotted at ± 1 SD from 
the mean score on motivation at each level of situational stress (ego safe vs. ego 
threat). As seen in the figure, there was a trend for higher motivation to be 
associated with poor inhibitory effectiveness on threat relative to control trials in 
both the ego safe and ego threat conditions. The reliability of these effects 
however, failed to reach significance in ego safe and ego threat conditions, β = 
.17, t = 1.16, p = .248, β = -.20, t = 1.34, p = .184, respectively.  
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Figure 9. Relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, motivation, and inhibitory 
effectiveness index. (Note: Negative scores represent poorer inhibitory 
effectiveness on threat relative to neutral words, whereas positive scores represent 
better inhibitory effectiveness on threat compared to neutral words).  
Inhibitory Efficiency Index 
Table 37 displays the unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% 
confidence intervals for all variables at each step. At Step 1, depression accounted 
for < 1% of the variance in the threat inhibitory efficiency index, R = .05, F < 1. 
At Step 2, with the inclusion of the main effects the model accounted for 5% of 
the variance in threat inhibitory efficiency, R = .23, however the increment was 
not significant, ΔR2 = .05, ΔF (3, 85) = 1.53, p = .212, and the overall model was 
not significant, F (4, 89) = 1.21, p = .311. At Step 3, with the inclusion of the two-
way interaction terms, the model accounted for 15% of the variance in the 
criterion, R = .38. The increment in explainable variance, ΔR2 = .09, ΔF (3, 82) = 
2.93, p = .039, and full model were significant, F (7, 89) = 2.02, p = .046.
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Table 37.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Inhibitory Efficiency Index 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) .00 .27    -.53 .53 
 Depression .10 .03  .05  -.04 .06 
Step 2 (Constant) -.01 .32    -.65 .63 
 Depression .02 .04  .06  -.06 .09 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety  .00 .05  .01  -.09 .10 
 Situational Stress -.01 .19  -.01  -.38 .36 
 Motivation .10 .05  .23  .00 .20 
Step 3 (Constant) .09 .32    -.54 .08 
 Depression .02 .03  .07  -.05 .08 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .01 .05  .04  -.08 .11 
 Situational Stress -.02 .18  -.01  -.38 .34 
 Motivation .03 .06  .07  -.08 .14 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .10 .04  .03  -.06 .08 
 Situational Stress X Motivation -.10 .05  -.22*  -.20 -.00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Motivation -.02 .01  -.21  -.05 .00 
Step 4 (Constant) .09 .32    -.54 .73 
 Depression .02 .04  .07  -.05 .08 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .02 .05  .05  -.08 .11 
 Situational Stress -.02 .18  -.01  -.39 .34 
 Motivation .03 .06  .07  -.08 .14 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  .01 .04  .02  -.06 .08 
 Situational Stress X Motivation -.10 .06  -.21  -.21 .02 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Motivation -.02 .01  -.20  -.05 .01 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Motivation 
.00 .01  .03  -.02 .03 
p < .05* 
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The situational stress x motivation interaction accounted significantly and 
uniquely for 4% of the variance in threat inhibitory efficiency. The pattern of this 
two-way interaction is described below. The cognitive trait anxiety x situational 
stress and cognitive trait anxiety x motivation interactions failed to reach 
significance. At Step 4, the three-way interaction term did not add significantly to 
the explainable variance in threat inhibitory efficiency,
 Δ R2 = .00, ΔF (1, 81) < 1, 
and the full model which accounted for 15% of the variance in the criterion, R = 
.38, was not significant, F (8, 89) = 1.73, p = .103.  
IRSE (Meier, 2008) software was used to interpret the pattern of the 
situational stress x motivation interaction and perform tests of simple slopes at 
high and low values on the motivation scale (calculated at ± 1 SD from the mean 
score on each). Figure 10 shows the pattern of the interaction.  As shown in the 
figure, at both levels of situational stress there was a tendency for higher 
motivation to be related to poorer inhibitory efficiency on threat relative to neutral 
trials. In the ego safe condition however, this effect failed to reach significance, β 
= .77, t = 1.76, p = .081, whereas in the ego threat condition higher motivation 
was related to significantly poorer inhibitory efficiency for threat words relative to 
neutral words, β = -.85, t = 2.16, p = .034.  
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Figure 10. Relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, motivation, and inhibitory 
efficiency index. (Note: Negative scores represent poorer inhibitory efficiency for 
threat relative to neutral words, whereas positive scores represent better inhibitory 
efficiency for threat compared to neutral words). 
 
Discussion of Anxiety and Inhibitory Threat Differentiation 
Study 2.2 investigated whether cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, 
and motivation would interact to predict the effectiveness and efficiency with 
which inhibitory responses to threat relative to neutral stimuli were made. A 
modified version of the Go-No-Go task that included both threat-related and 
neutral words was employed, and the hypotheses were derived from ACT. For 
inhibitory effectiveness it was predicted that cognitive trait anxiety, stress and 
motivation would not interact to predict the effectiveness (accuracy) of inhibitory 
responses on threat relative to control words trials (as measured by the threat 
inhibitory effectiveness index). For inhibitory efficiency, a trait anxiety x 
situational stress x motivation interaction was predicted such that higher trait 
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anxiety would be associated with poorer threat inhibition, and that this 
relationship would be restricted to those who reported lower motivation in the ego 
threat condition (as measured on the threat inhibitory efficiency index). Contrary 
to the hypotheses, the data revealed conceptually similar response patterns for the 
inhibitory effectiveness and efficiency measures. Situational stress and motivation 
interacted to predict differential inhibitory effectiveness and efficiency, and these 
results were not moderated by cognitive trait anxiety.  
The data suggested that higher motivation was associated with poorer 
inhibitory effectiveness on threat relative to neutral word trials in both the ego 
threat and ego safe conditions. Despite the fact the motivation x situational stress 
interaction was significant, the tests of the simple slopes were not reliable, making 
interpretation of these data difficult. The efficiency data were somewhat less 
complex. The efficiency of response inhibition on threat- relative to neutral word 
trials was poorer for individuals under higher situational stress who reported 
higher motivation. Motivation did not predict differential threat efficiency for 
individuals in the ego safe condition. 
Procedural and task differences across studies make reconciliation of 
previous data with those reported here somewhat difficult. For example, Edwards 
et al. (2006) reported data indicating that trait anxiety and situational stress 
interacted to predict threat inhibitory efficiency. Using a modified version of the 
emotional Stroop task, their results suggested that higher trait anxiety was related 
to poorer inhibitory efficiency on threat relative to neutral words trials, and that 
this effect was restricted to conditions in which situational stress was high 
(manipulated using threat of electric shock). The present data, however, suggested 
that threat inhibitory efficiency was more closely related to higher situational 
stress and lower motivation, rather than trait anxiety. The results from Study 2.2 
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also contradict the data reported by Derakshan, Ansari et al. (2009) who employed 
the antisaccade task as their measure of inhibitory control. Their results suggested 
that those higher in trait anxiety had longer RTs on threat-related than neutral 
trials (threat differentiation efficiency) relative to those lower in trait anxiety. In 
that study differences in error rates on the threat and neutral word trials between 
high and low anxious individuals (threat differentiation effectiveness) were not 
significant. 
A number of methodological differences may explain discrepancies in the 
data patterns between the present study and those reported by Edwards et al. 
(2006) and Derakshan, Ansai et al. (2009). For example, these studies employed 
different tasks (Stroop vs. antisaccade vs. Go-No-Go), manipulations of 
situational stress (shock threat vs. absent vs. ego threat), measures of trait anxiety 
(trait anxiety scale from the STAI vs. Trait-Cognitive Scale from the STICSA), 
and indices of inhibitory threat processing (RT alone vs. ratio of effectiveness 
divided by RT). Perhaps most importantly, these previous investigations did not 
include a measure of motivation in their modelling.  
Study 1.3 investigated the relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, 
situational stress, and mental effort on inhibitory control using the Go-No-Go task 
and neutral words as stimuli. In that experiment, mental effort was a significant 
moderator of the relationship between trait anxiety and situational stress on both 
the effectiveness and efficiency measures. Higher trait anxiety was associated 
with lower inhibitory effectiveness for those who reported higher effort in the low 
stress condition. Higher trait anxiety was also predictive of lower inhibitory 
efficiency for those who reported higher effort, irrespective of situational stress. It 
is important to note that in the current study poorer threat response inhibition was 
restricted to those individuals who reported higher motivation in the high stress 
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condition. Taken together, the data across both studies confirm that higher effort 
(Study 1.3) and motivation (present study) were each associated with poorer 
inhibitory efficiency, and that higher motivation is associated with reduced 
effectiveness and efficiency on threat relative to neutral trials. These results are 
somewhat problematic for the assumptions of ACT that predict effort and 
motivation should buffer against the effects of trait anxiety and stress on cognitive 
tasks. Although these factors protect against poorer performance on phonological 
(Study 1.1) and other executive tasks such as updating (Study 2.1.2) and shifting 
(Edwards, Edwards et al., 2015; Study 1.4), they have tended to have the reverse 
effect on the inhibitory processes as measured by the tasks employed in the 
present thesis.  
The exact reasons why higher effort and motivation were associated with 
poorer inhibitory performance is unclear, particularly given that motivation was a 
prospective measure (current study) and effort was reported following the task 
(Study 1.3). As suggested by Kurzban et al. (2013), higher effort might be 
associated with lower performance on repetitive tasks that involve attending to 
two or more criteria at once. If the Kurzban et al. account is accepted as an 
explanation for the inverse relationship between effort and performance observed 
in Study 1.3, the present data also suggest that this relationship might extend to 
the association between prospective motivation and inhibitory performance. 
Alternatively, the effects of motivational effort might be understood in terms of 
response demand conflict, such that higher effort is associated with an increase in 
arousal initiated by the requirement to respond as quickly as possible. If this were 
the case, higher effort would predict poorer performance as observed here.  
The finding that motivation plays a key role in the link between anxiety, 
inhibition and attentional bias for threat should prompt further research to use 
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methodological designs capable of elucidating the influence of other factors that 
vary with trait anxiety and with inhibitory processing of threat. For example, 
studies have demonstrated that working memory capacity is related to attentional 
control (see McCabe, Roediger III, McDaniel, Balota & Hambrick, 2010) and 
capacity has also been shown to be associated with anxiety and performance on 
cognitive tasks such as antisaccade (e.g., Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004), 
achievement (e.g., Owens, Stevenson, Hadwin & Norgate, 2012) and dual-task 
paradigms (e.g., Edwards, Moore et al., 2015; Johnson & Gronlund, 2009). 
Similarly, a recent study has shown that cognitive load is associated with 
performance and varies disproportionately for anxious relative to non-anxious 
individuals (e.g., Berggren, Richards, Taylor & Derakshan, 2013). Future research 
may benefit from exploring the effect of these factors using the Go-No-Go 
paradigm. 
The present study provided a robust test of the associations between trait 
anxiety, situational stress and motivation on threat inhibitory control. Unlike 
previous investigations that have implicated trait anxiety as an important predictor 
of threat inhibition (e.g., Derakshan, Ansari et al., 2009; Edwards et al., 2006), the 
data reported here indicated that the effectiveness and efficiency with which an 
inhibitory response is made on threat relative to neutral trials is more closely 
related to situational stress and motivation. Although the data implicate these 
factors as important variables in the relationship between anxiety and cognitive 
control, they do not vary in the manner specified by ACT. Future conceptual 
replications of these results across other inhibition tasks, and measures of 
motivation and stress, will necessitate appropriate modifications to future 
iterations of ACT, at least in terms of inhibitory control. 
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Study 2.3: Anxiety and Shifting Threat Differentiation 
Study 2.3 investigated the inter-relationships between cognitive trait 
anxiety, situational stress, motivation and shifting threat differentiation, using a 
WCST task that included both neutral and threat-related words. In accord with 
Study 2.2, cognitive trait anxiety was measured using the cognitive dimension of 
the STICSA (Ree et al., 2000), situational stress was manipulated using ego-threat 
instructions, and motivation was operationalised as scores on the HWK (Klein et 
al., 2001). In order to examine shifting threat differentiation (shifting performance 
on threat words relative to neutral words), shifting effectiveness and efficiency 
indices were created. These measures are described below. 
Hypotheses 
Unlike the inhibition function, ACT does not make precise predictions 
regarding the relationship between anxiety and the shifting function in the 
presence of threat. The hypotheses for Study 2.3, therefore, follow the general 
assumptions of ACT, such that performance deficits should more likely be 
observed on efficiency than effectiveness, and that anxiety impairs attentional 
control in the presence of threat. After controlling for depression, it was predicted 
that there would be no relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, situational 
stress and shifting effectiveness, however the inter-relationships between trait 
anxiety, situational stress, and motivation would predict poorer shifting efficiency 
(i.e., poorer processing of threat words relative to neutral words). Specifically, 
higher trait anxiety was expected to predict poorer shifting efficiency on threat 
relative to neutral trials, and this relationship would be restricted to those in the 
ego threat condition and who reported lower motivation.  
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Measurement of Shifting Threat Differentiation  
Shifting effectiveness index. To contrast shifting effectiveness on threat 
words with neutral words using the WCST, a threat differential index was created. 
As in Study 1.4, performance effectiveness was indexed as the percentage of 
responses that were not perseverative errors (i.e., a measure of ability to shift; see 
Chapter 4). Shifting effectiveness scores were calculated for threat and neutral 
words separately, and the differential threat shifting effectiveness index was 
determined by deducting the measure of performance effectiveness for neutral 
words from performance effectiveness for threat words. As such, negative scores 
represent less effective shifting on threat relative to neutral words, whereas 
positive scores reflect more effective shifting on threat compared to neutral words. 
The following equation was used to calculate the threat differential index for 
shifting effectiveness: 
 
Shifting 
Effectiveness Index   
 
= 
 
 
Shifting Effectiveness threat 
 
- 
 
 
Shifting Effectiveness neutral 
 
NOTE:  
Shifting Effectiveness threat = shifting effectiveness on threat words (see Study 1.4) 
Shifting Effectiveness neutral = shifting effectiveness on neutral words (see Study 
1.4) 
Shifting efficiency index. To compare shifting efficiency for threat words 
with neutral words in the WCST task, a differential threat shifting efficiency 
index was created. In accordance with Study 1.4, shifting efficiency was 
calculated as the inverse of an inability to shift, such that the ratio of the number 
of perseverative errors to mean RT on perseverative error trials was deducted 
from 1 (see Chapter 4, Study 1.4). The differential threat shifting efficiency index 
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was calculated by deducting the measures of processing efficiency for neutral 
words from processing efficiency for threat words. Thus, negative scores 
represent less efficient shifting on threat relative to neutral words, whereas 
positive scores reflect more efficient shifting on threat compared to neutral word 
trials. The shifting efficiency threat differential index was calculated using the 
following equation: 
 
Shifting 
Efficiency Index   
 
= 
 
 
Shifting Efficiency threat 
 
- 
 
 
Shifting Efficiency neutral 
 
NOTE:  
Shifting Efficiency threat = Processing Efficiency on threat words (see Study 1.4) 
Shifting Efficiency neutral = Processing Efficiency on neutral words (see Study 1.4) 
Participants 
The sample from Study 2.1 and Study 2.2 was used. Participants 
comprised 90 undergraduate psychology students aged between 17 and 56 years 
(M = 27.67 years; SD = 11.81; 74 were female).   
Validity of SRQ as an Index of Situational Stress 
In accord with Study 2.1 and Study 2.2, the SRQ was confirmed as an 
appropriate index of situational stress (i.e., positive correlation between SRQ 
scores at baseline and STICSA State Cognitive scale; see Study 2.1 & 2.2).   
Manipulation Check 
To determine the efficacy of ego-threat instructions as a reliable procedure 
for elevating situational stress, SRQ scores were used as the dependent variable in 
a 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA with Time (baseline vs. post-manipulation) 
and Group (ego threat vs. ego safe) as the factors.  The main effect of Group was 
non-significant, however the main effect of Time, F(1, 89) = 52.18, MSE = 18.52, 
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p < .001, 2 = .37, and the Time x Group interaction, F(1, 89) = 4.99, p = .028, 2 
= .05, were significant. Follow up t-tests revealed that at baseline, there was no 
difference in composite SRQ scores between the ego threat (M = 12.89, SD = 
6.80) and ego safe (M = 12.04, SD = 5.50) groups, t < 1, however following the 
ego threat instructions individuals in the ego threat condition (M = 18.91, SD = 
7.84) had significantly higher SRQ scores than those in the ego safe condition (M 
= 15.24, SD = 6.62, t(1, 88) = 2.40, p = .019). The data confirmed the instructions 
to be an appropriate procedure for inducing situational stress. 
Results 
Data Diagnostics and Assumption Checking 
Data cleaning and outlier screening procedures were the same as in Study 
2.1 and 2.2. No univariate or multivariate outliers were identified, thus the full 
data set is reported (N = 90).   
Descriptive Statistics 
The means, standard deviations, zero-order and inter-correlations of 
depression, cognitive trait anxiety, motivation, shifting effectiveness threat 
differential index and shifting efficiency threat differential index are shown in 
Table 38. As shown, there was a significant positive inter-correlation between 
depression and cognitive trait anxiety, with higher depression related to higher 
cognitive trait anxiety. There were no significant zero-order correlations in the 
shifting data. 
Main Analyses 
Separate moderated regression analyses were performed to determine 
whether cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, motivation and their interactions 
predicted scores on the differential threat shifting effectiveness index and 
differential threat shifting efficiency index. For both analyses, depression was 
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included as a covariate at Step 1, the main effects (cognitive trait anxiety, 
situational stress, and motivation) were added at Step 2, the two-way interaction 
terms were included at Step 3, and at Step 4, the three-way interaction term 
(cognitive trait anxiety x situational stress, x motivation) was entered. Mean 
centred scores were used to calculate multiplicative interaction terms. 
 
Table 38. 
Means, Standard Deviations, Zero-order and Inter-correlations of Depression, 
Cognitive Trait Anxiety, Motivation, Shifting Effectiveness Index and Shifting 
Efficiency Index on the WCST. 
 M  SD     Depression Cognitive 
Trait  
Anxiety 
Motivation 
Depression 7.51 7.27    
Cognitive Trait Anxiety 18.10 5.47 .68***   
Motivation 20.66 3.41 .01***    .16  
Shifting Effectiveness Index -.75 6.72 -.05***    .05 .14 
Shifting Efficiency Index -.56 2.78 -.06*** .03 .17 
NOTE: p < .001*** 
 
Shifting Effectiveness Index  
The unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% confidence 
intervals for all variables are displayed in Table 39. Depression was entered at 
Step 1, and accounted for < 1% of the variance in differential threat shifting 
effectiveness, R = .05, F < 1. The main effects were added at Step 2, and 
accounted for 3% of the variance in the criterion, R = .17; the increment in 
explainable variance, ΔR2 = .03, ΔF < 1, and the model, F < 1, were not 
significant. At Step 3, the contribution of the two-way interaction terms meant the  
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Table 39.  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Shifting Effectiveness Index 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) -.41 1.03    -2.44 1.63 
 Depression -.05 .10  -.05  -.24 .15 
Step 2 (Constant) .18 1.25    -2.30 2.66 
 Depression -.12 .14  -.13  -.40 .15 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .15 .19  .12  -.22 .52 
 Situational Stress -.13 .73  -.02  -1.58 1.33 
 Motivation .24 .22  .12  -.20 .67 
Step 3 (Constant) -.19 1.20    -2.58 2.19 
 Depression -.07 .13  -.08  -.33 .19 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .11 .18  .09  -.25 .47 
 Situational Stress -.32 .70  -.05  -1.71 1.08 
 Motivation .02 .22  .01  -.42 .46 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.44 .14  -.35*  -.71 -.16 
 Situational Stress X Motivation -.06 .21  -.03  -.48 .35 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Motivation -.10 .05  -.24*  -.20 -.00 
Step 4 (Constant) -.24 1.2    -2.63 2.16 
 Depression -.07 .13  -.08  -.33 .19 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .08 .19  .06  -.29 .06 
 Situational Stress -.23 .71  -.03  -1.65 1.19 
 Motivation .02 .22  .01  -.42 .46 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.41 .14  -.33  -.69 -.13 
 Situational Stress X Motivation -.12 .22  -.06  -.56 .32 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Motivation -.10 .05  -.24  -.20 -.00 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress 
X Motivation 
-.04 .05  -.09  -.13 .06 
p < .05* 
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model accounted for 15% of the variance in the criterion, R = .39, and the change 
in R
2 
was significant, ΔR2 = .15, ΔF (3, 82) = 3.00, p = .012, and the model was  
significant, F(7, 89) = 2.18, p = .048. In terms of the unique contributions, the 
cognitive trait anxiety x situational stress (unique variance 10%), t = 3.16,  
p = .002, and cognitive trait anxiety x motivation (unique variance 4%), t = 2.06,  
p = .043, interactions were significant. The situational stress x motivation 
interaction was not significant, t < 1. The patterns of the significant interactions 
are discussed below. At Step 4, the three-way interaction term did not 
significantly increase R
2
, R = .39, ΔR2 = .01, F < 1, and the overall model which 
accounted for 16% of the variance in threat effectiveness differentiation was not 
significant, F (8, 89) = 1.87, p = .077.  
IRSE (Meier, 2008) was used to decompose the two-way interactions and 
perform tests of simple slopes. Figure 11 shows the pattern of the two-way 
interaction between cognitive trait anxiety and situational stress, plotted at ± 1 SD 
from the mean score of cognitive trait anxiety at each level of situational stress 
(ego safe vs. ego threat). As can be seen in the figure, lower cognitive trait anxiety 
was associated with significantly better shifting effectiveness for threat compared 
to neutral words under ego threat relative to the ego safe condition, β = .30, t = 
2.74, p = .007, whereas higher cognitive trait anxiety was predictive of 
significantly poorer shifting effectiveness for threat relative to neutral words 
under ego threat relative to the ego safe condition, β = -.37, t = 3.12, p = .003.      
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Figure 11. Relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, and 
shifting effectiveness index.  (Note: Negative scores represent poorer shifting 
effectiveness on threat relative to neutral words, whereas positive scores represent 
better shifting effectiveness on threat compared to neutral words). 
 
The pattern of the two-way interaction between cognitive trait anxiety and 
motivation, plotted at ± 1 SD from the mean score of each variable, is displayed in 
Figure 12. As shown, there was a tendency for higher cognitive trait anxiety to 
predict poorer shifting effectiveness for threat at higher relative to lower 
motivation, however this effect did not reach significance, β = -.27, t = 1.33, p = 
.187.  Lower cognitive trait anxiety was associated with better shifting 
effectiveness for threat at higher motivation, and this effect was marginally 
significant, β = .30, t = 1.98, p = .050.  
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Figure 12. Relationship between cognitive trait anxiety, motivation, and shifting 
effectiveness index. (Note: Negative scores represent poorer shifting effectiveness 
on threat relative to neutral words, whereas positive scores represent better 
shifting effectiveness on threat compared to neutral words). 
Shifting Efficiency Index 
Table 40 displays the unstandardised coefficients, beta weights and 95% 
confidence intervals at each step. At Step 1, depression accounted for < 1% of the 
variance in the shifting efficiency index, R = .06, F < 1. The main effects were 
added at Step 2, and the change in R
2 
accounted for 4% of the variance in the 
criterion, R = .19, however the increment, ΔR2 = .03, Δ F < 1, and model, F < 1 
were not significant. At Step 3, the two-way interaction terms did not increase R
2
, 
R = .27, ΔR2 = .73, ΔF (3, 82) = 1.04, p = .379; the model accounted for 7% of the 
variance in efficiency, which was not significant, F < 1. At Step 4, the three-way 
interaction term was entered, however the change in R
2
,
 
R = .29, ΔR2 = .01, ΔF (1, 
81) = 1.06, p = .305, and the overall model which accounted for 9% of the 
variance in threat shifting efficiency were not significant, F < 1.  
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Table 40  
Unstandardised Coefficients, Beta Weights and 95% Confidence Intervals for all Variables at each step for Shifting Efficiency Index 
  Unstandardised Coefficients  Standardised 
Coefficient 
 95% Confidence 
Intervals for B 
  B Std. Error  Beta  Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Step 1 (Constant) -.39 .42    -1.23 .45 
 Depression -.02 .04  -.06  -.10 .06 
Step 2 (Constant) -.19 .51    -1.21 .84 
 Depression -.05 .06  -.13  -.16 .06 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety  .05 .08  .11  -.10 .21 
 Situational Stress .12 .30  .04  -.48 .71 
 Motivation .12 .09  .14  -.06 .30 
Step 3 (Constant) -.27 .52    -1.30 .76 
 Depression -.04 .06  -.11  -.16 .07 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .03 .08  .07  -.12 .19 
 Situational Stress .10 .30  .04  -.50 .70 
 Motivation .09 .30  .04  -.10 .78 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.10 .06  -.19  .22 .02 
 Situational Stress X Motivation -.03 .09  -.04  -.21 .15 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Motivation -.01 .02  -.04  -.05 .04 
Step 4 (Constant) -.30 .52    -1.33 .74 
 Depression -.04 .06  -.12  -.16 .07 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety .02 .08  .03  -.14 .18 
 Situational Stress .15 .31  .06  -.46 .76 
 Motivation .08 .10  .10  -.11 .27 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress  -.08 .06  -.16  -.21 .04 
 Situational Stress X Motivation -.07 .10  -.08  -.25 .12 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Motivation -.01 .02  -.04  -.05 .04 
 Cognitive Trait Anxiety X Situational Stress X 
Motivation 
-.02 .02  -.13  -.06 .02 
p < .05* 
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Discussion of Anxiety and Shifting Threat Differentiation 
 To test the prediction that anxiety impairs the shifting function in the 
presence of threat-related stimuli, a novel version of the WCST that included 
threat-related and neutral stimuli was employed in Study 2.3. The present study 
examined the associations between cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, and 
motivation on differential threat shifting effectiveness and efficiency. In accord 
with ACT, it was predicted that trait anxiety, situational stress and motivation 
would not interact to predict effectiveness, but that they would combine to predict 
differential threat efficiency. Specifically, higher trait anxiety was expected to 
predict poorer shifting efficiency on threat relative to neutral trials, such that this 
relationship would be restricted to those in the ego threat condition who reported 
lower motivation. 
The data revealed two significant interactions for shifting effectiveness on 
threat-related trials relative to neutral trials. First, the results revealed that 
cognitive trait anxiety and situational stress combined to predict scores on the 
shifting effectiveness index, such that at high situational stress, lower cognitive 
trait anxiety was associated with more effective shifting on threat relative to 
neutral words, whereas higher cognitive trait anxiety predicted poorer shifting 
effectiveness for threat. Second, the data also revealed that cognitive trait anxiety 
and motivation interacted to predict differential threat shifting effectiveness, such 
that at higher motivation, lower cognitive trait anxiety was associated with higher 
shifting effectiveness for threat. Although there was a trend for higher cognitive 
anxiety to be associated with poorer shifting effectiveness for threat relative to 
neutral words at higher motivation, the relationship was not significant. The 
current study indicated that the inter-relationships between cognitive trait anxiety, 
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situational stress and motivation did not predict differential threat shifting 
efficiency. 
The shifting efficiency data reported in Study 1.4 and the present 
experiment confirmed that higher trait anxiety and situational stress combine to 
predict poorer shifting performance. The data from Study 1.4 are consistent with 
those reported by Ansari et al. (2008) who used a mixed anti- and pro- saccade 
paradigm (see also Chapter 2) to demonstrate that anxiety impaired shifting 
efficiency in the absence of threat. In later work from the same laboratory, 
Derakshan, Ansari et al (2009) found similar results using the anti-saccade task, 
which included threat-related stimuli, and reported their findings in terms of 
inhibitory threat processing. Taken together, there is now a growing body of 
evidence to suggest that anxiety impairs the shifting function (e.g., Study 1.4; 
Ansari et al.; Edwards, Moore et al., 2015), and that higher anxiety (Derakshan, 
Ansari et al) and stress further attenuate shifting effectiveness on threat-related 
relative to neutral trials (current study).  
The present study also provided the first empirical test of whether 
motivation further moderates the relationship between trait anxiety and situational 
stress on differential threat inhibitory effectiveness and efficiency. The data 
yielded a significant cognitive trait anxiety x motivation interaction that suggested 
shifting effectiveness for threat words relative to neutral words was improved for 
low trait anxious individuals who reported higher motivation, however the 
opposite pattern was observed for those higher in trait anxiety. As no previous 
studies have investigated the relationship between anxiety, motivation and 
shifting, reconciling the current data with existing work was not possible. 
Nonetheless, the results are conceptually consistent with those reported by Calvo 
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(1985) and Eysenck (1985) also suggested that motivation enhances performance 
of low- but not high-trait anxious individuals. Together, the data confirm that the 
relationship between anxiety and cognitive performance (Calvo, 1985; Eysenck, 
1985), including shifting effectiveness (current study), is buffered by prospective 
motivation. 
Following ACT, it was hypothesised that trait anxiety, situational stress 
and motivation would interact to predict scores on the inhibitory efficiency index. 
Specifically, higher trait anxiety was predicted to be associated with poorer 
shifting efficiency on threat relative to neutral trials, and that this relationship 
would be restricted to those who reported lower motivation in the ego threat 
condition. Contrary to predictions, scores on the inhibitory efficiency index were 
independent of the interactive relationships between anxiety, stress and 
motivation. These data are in contrast to those reported in Study 1.4. In that 
experiment, poorer shifting efficiency was associated with higher anxiety and 
lower effort, and restricted to those in the ego threat condition.  There are two 
important procedural differences between these studies that might explain the 
contrasting results. First, it is plausible that inter-relationships between anxiety, 
stress, and effort (Study 1.4), rather than anxiety, stress and motivation (current 
study), are required to illuminate shifting efficiency deficits. Second, the present 
study compared differential inhibitory responses between threat and neutral 
stimuli, whereas Study 1.4 employed neutral stimuli only. This considerable 
methodological change suggests that lower inhibitory efficiency might be 
associated with higher anxiety and stress and lower effort for neutral stimuli, but 
that this pattern is not augmented on threat relative to neutral trials. It is also 
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possible that some combination of both procedural changes might explain the 
differing results between studies. 
Of note, there is a potential problem with the use of the WCST as a pure 
measure of shifting. In order to switch to a new category or set, the participant is 
required to withhold a response to an old category or set before switching to a 
new one, and as such, the task is not necessarily „process pure‟.  Despite this 
limitation, there are similar problems associated with other measures of shifting 
efficiency. For example, the requirement in the anti-saccade task for participants 
to look towards or away from a given target also requires a mix of inhibition and 
shifting processes. In order to look away from the given target, the subject has to 
inhibit looking towards the target. Although the data reported in Study 1.4 and the 
present study are interpreted with respect to the inhibitory processes, it is 
important to recognise that other cognitive processes are likely to be operating 
concurrently. 
The present study provided the first systematic test of the associations 
between cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress and motivation on shifting 
performance in the presence of threat-related stimuli using a modified WCST. The 
data suggested that cognitive trait anxiety and situational stress combined to 
produce performance deficits for effectively shifting from threat words relative to 
neutral words. These findings support the notion that high trait anxious 
individuals experience difficulties disengaging from threat-related words relative 
to neutral words, which provides support for ACT.  The data also indicated that 
higher motivation was related to better shifting effectiveness for threat compared 
to neutral words but only at lower trait anxiety. The present work adds of the body 
of literature examining attentional biases in anxiety, and confirms the role of 
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motivation in moderating this relationship. Further work however is warranted to 
replicate and extend the findings reported here for the shifting function in the 
presence of threat. 
Chapter Summary 
The studies reported in Chapter 6 investigated the inter-relationships 
between cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress and reported motivation in 
predicting performance on updating, inhibition and shifting tasks, when the 
inhibition and shifting tasks contain both neutral and threat-related stimuli. In 
Study 2.1, a modified version of the reading span task from Study 1.2 was 
employed, such that shorter sentences were included to reduce task complexity 
and potential for floor compression effects (see Study 1.2.2).  The data from Study 
2.1 revealed that the unique factors of mental effort and situational stress 
predicted updating effectiveness, such that higher effort was associated with 
higher effectiveness, and higher stress was related to poorer effectiveness. 
However, there were no inter-relations between cognitive trait anxiety, situational 
stress, effort and efficiency. Study 2.1.2 investigated whether the cognitive trait 
anxiety x situational stress model was moderated by motivation. The results 
suggested that situational stress predicted updating effectiveness, and cognitive 
trait anxiety and motivation combined to predict updating efficiency, such that at 
higher motivation, higher trait anxiety was associated with higher updating 
efficiency, whereas at lower motivation, higher cognitive trait anxiety was related 
to poorer efficiency.  
Study 2.2 and 2.3 included threat-related and neutral words to reveal that 
threat-related and neutral stimuli are differentially processed on tasks of inhibition 
and shifting. For Study 2.2 the data suggested that situational stress and 
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motivation combine to predict inhibitory efficiency, but not effectiveness, for 
threat-related words relative to neutral words. Specifically, higher motivation was 
related to poorer efficiency for threat under high stress compared to low stress.  
The results of Study 2.3 yielded two inter-relationships for shifting 
effectiveness on threat words relative to neutral words. A cognitive trait anxiety x 
situational stress interaction revealed that under high situational stress, higher 
cognitive trait anxiety was associated with poorer shifting effectiveness for threat, 
whereas lower cognitive trait anxiety was related to better shifting effectiveness 
for threat words relative to neutral words. Further, at higher motivation, lower 
cognitive trait anxiety was related to better shifting effectiveness for threat, 
whereas there was a tendency for higher cognitive trait anxiety to be associated 
with poorer threat shifting effectiveness (although this effect was marginally 
significant). A summary of findings, as well as limitations and directions for 
future research, is discussed in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The studies in the current program of research investigated the relationship 
between anxiety and stress on the effectiveness and efficiency of phonological, 
updating, inhibition and shifting processes. In Experimental Series 1, somatic and 
cognitive trait anxiety, situational stress, and the role of mental effort in 
moderating these relationships, were investigated. In Experimental Series 2, threat 
and neutral stimuli were included to determine whether responses to items of 
differential valence were equivalent, and the role of motivation in moderating 
responses was included in the data modelling.  
In Chapter 1, the models of Yerkes and Dodson (1908), Eysenck (1979), 
Sarason (1984), Humphreys and Revelle (1984), Eysenck and Calvo (1992), and 
Eysenck et al. (2007) were outlined and compared, as these earlier theoretical 
positions laid the historical framework for the development of ACT. Particular 
emphasis was placed on describing the assumptions of ACT which formed the 
theoretical basis for the hypotheses in each experiment, and the interpretational 
basis for the data. 
In Chapter 2 the evidence for the associations between anxiety and 
cognitive performance was reviewed and critically evaluated. Results of empirical 
work were evaluated in terms of the assumptions of ACT. The review identified a 
number of methodological shortcomings in the current literature that posed 
interpretation difficulties for the existing data. The procedural challenges were 
summarized as follows: (1) the separate and combined contributions of trait 
anxiety and situational stress on cognitive processes were not well delineated, (2) 
the contributions of cognitive and somatic trait anxiety on cognitive processes 
were not well understood, (3) the inclusion of appropriate situational stress 
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(somatic and cognitive) induction procedures have not consistently been applied, 
(4) appropriate measures of effectiveness and efficiency (that are consistent with 
the definitions of ACT) had not been developed, (5) few studies had controlled for 
the comorbidity between depression and anxiety, (6) systematic investigations 
into the buffering roles of effort and motivation on the anxiety-performance 
relationship had not been undertaken, and (7) there were a limited number of 
investigations into inhibitory and shifting performance on tasks that include both 
neutral and threat-related stimuli.  
To overcome interpretational difficulties associated with these 
methodological problems, the research reported in the present thesis was 
conducted as two two-part series of experiments. Experimental Series 1 (see 
Chapter 3 & 4) contained four studies that examined the relationship between trait 
anxiety (somatic and cognitive), situational stress (somatic and cognitive), and 
mental effort on phonological, updating, inhibitory, and shifting performance 
(effectiveness and efficiency). Experimental Series 2 (see Chapter 5 & 6) 
contained three studies that investigated the associations between cognitive trait 
anxiety, situational stress, and motivation on updating, inhibitory and shifting 
performance (effectiveness and efficiency). The two attentional tasks (inhibition 
and shifting) in this series examined anxiety-related attentional biases for threat, 
such that the tasks contained both neutral and threat-related stimuli.  
For each experiment, the data were analysed using hierarchical moderated 
regression analyses. This procedure allowed examination of the separate and 
combined contributions of the factors in predicting the criterion, after controlling 
for variance in the criterion explained by depression. Detailed interpretations of 
the data with respect to the specific cognitive function and previous empirical and 
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theoretical bases were provided in the corresponding Discussion sections for each 
study, and results were reconciled with appropriate empirical literature and the 
assumptions of ACT. To avoid repetition of detail, the following summary 
describes the general patterns of results with respect to the assumptions of ACT 
(see Chapter 1). The limitations associated with this program of research are 
noted, and recommendations for future work are discussed.  
Empirical Support for Attentional Control Theory 
The present program of research included seven empirical experiments 
designed to test the assumptions of ACT. The findings are summarised below in 
terms of each assumption. 
Anxiety is Determined Interactively by Trait Anxiety and Situational Stress 
The data from four experiments (Study 1.1.2, Study 1.3.2, Study 1.4.2, & 
Study 2.3) revealed empirical support for the assumption that trait anxiety and 
situational stress interact to predict performance on phonological, inhibitory and 
shifting tasks. Under some conditions this relationship is further buffered by 
mental effort and motivation. It is important to note that trait anxiety and 
situational stress did not interact to predict updating performance in either of the 
two studies conducted in the current thesis (see Study 1.2 & Study 2.1). 
Situational stress did however play a significant and unique role in predicting 
updating performance as indexed on the reading span task.  
Anxiety and Effort 
According to ACT, anxious individuals recruit additional cognitive 
resources, typically in the form of extra mental effort, to overcome performance 
shortfalls. Support for the assumption was revealed in the bivariate analyses 
between the measures of somatic and cognitive trait anxiety and effort on the 
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phonological (Study 1.1) and updating tasks (Study 1.2), and between somatic 
trait anxiety and effort on the inhibition (Study 1.3.1) and shifting tasks (Study 
1.4.1). There was also evidence to show that mental effort was positively related 
to phonological (on both the simple and complex task; Study 1.1) and updating 
effectiveness (Study 2.1). Effort, however, negatively predicted inhibitory 
effectiveness and was not associated with shifting effectiveness. The present data 
also confirmed that mental effort moderated the association between trait anxiety 
and situational stress on cognitive performance. Support for this assumption was 
revealed on tasks that indexed the phonological loop and inhibition and shifting 
functions of the central executive (Study 1.1.2; Study 1.3.2; Study 1.4.2). The 
results of these studies showed that different patterns of performance were 
observed at lower versus higher invested effort.  
Effectiveness and Efficiency 
ACT suggests that performance can be measured in terms of effectiveness 
(quality of performance) and efficiency (effectiveness relative to RT). Evidence 
for this assumption was reported above (in five studies) with differing patterns of 
results between phonological (Study 1.1.1, & Study 1.1.2), updating (Study 2.1.2), 
inhibition (in the presence of threat-related and neutral words only; Study 2.2) and 
shifting (Study 1.4) effectiveness and efficiency. However, the results showed a 
similar pattern of performance for inhibitory effectiveness and efficiency in the 
presence of neutral words only (Study 1.3.2). More details are provided below.  
Anxiety Impairs Efficiency more than Effectiveness 
The data from four experiements demonstrated support for the assumption 
that anxiety impairs efficiency to a greater extent than effectiveness (Study 1.1.2, 
Study 1.4, Study 2.1.2, & Study 2.2). Specifically, cognitive trait anxiety impaired 
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efficiency more than effectiveness on simple (forward word span) and complex 
(backward word span) phonological tasks, on an updating task (reading span 
task), on a shifting task (WCST) which included neutral stimuli, and on an 
inhibition task (Go-No-Go) which included threat-related and neutral stimuli. On 
the inhibition task that inlcuded only neutral stimuli, the data indicated that 
anxiety impairs both effectiveness and efficiency (see Study 1.3). When threat-
related stimuli were included on the shifting task (Study 2.3), the pattern was 
reversed, such that anxiety impaired effectiveness but not efficiency. On the basis 
of these data it appears that whether efficiency and effectiveness deficits are 
revealed might depend on which cognitive function is being engaged, and whether 
or not threat-related material is being processed.  
Effects of Anxiety on Performance are Greater as Task Demands Increase 
The assumption that effects of anxiety on performance are greater as task 
demands increase was tested in Study 1.1 by employing both simple (forward 
word span) and complex (backward word span) tasks. The results, however, did 
not support the notion that anxiety-linked deficits are greater as task demands 
increase. For example, Study 1.1.1 demonstrated that somatic trait anxiety and 
somatic situational stress combined to predict phonological efficency on a 
complex relative to a simple task, however their interrelations enhanced efficiency 
on the backward word span task for high trait anxious individuals in a low stress 
condition. Further, Study 1.1.2 demonstrated that cognitive trait anxiety and 
cognitive situational stress (moderated by mental effort) interacted to predict 
phonological efficency in a conceptually similar way for both simple and complex 
tasks, albeit the relationship suggested that higher trait anxiety was associated 
with poorer phonological efficiency at low reported mental effort. Future studies 
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are needed to replicate the present findings with different low- and high- 
complexity phonological tasks, in addition to investigating variations in cognitive 
load on updating, inhibition and shifting functions, given that these empirical 
questions were beyond the scope of the current thesis.  
Anxiety Impairs the Functioning of the Central Executive 
According to Miyake et al. (2000) the central executive has a least three 
separate functions, updating, inhibition and shifting. The data from the present 
program of research support the assumption that trait anxiety and situational stress 
are related to performance deficits on updating (Study 2.1), inhibition (Study 1.3 
& Study 2.2), and shifting tasks (Study 1.4 & Study 2.3). Differences in the 
patterns of performance effectiveness and efficiency varied across the functions 
and are discussed in more detail below. 
Anxiety Impairs the Functioning of the Phonological Loop 
Study 1.1 tested systematically whether trait anxiety (somatic or 
cognitive), situational stress (somatic or cognitive), mental effort and their 
interactions were related to phonological effectiveness and efficiency on simple 
and complex tasks. The data suggested that somatic anxiety was unrelated to 
phonological effectiveness or efficiency on a simple task. On a complex task, 
however, somatic trait anxiety and somatic stress combined to predict 
phonological efficiency, but not effectiveness, and this relationship was not 
buffered by mental effort. The data also suggested that cognitive anxiety was 
unrelated to phonological effectiveness irrespective of task complexity, however 
as predicted, cognitive trait anxiety, cognitive situational stress, mental effort, and 
their interactions combined to predict phonological efficiency. Furthermore, 
despite the lack of support for either a unique or moderated link between anxiety 
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and phonological effectiveness, the data did confirm that individuals who invested 
greater mental effort performed with greater effectiveness, and those higher in 
trait anxiety invested greater mental effort. These data have important 
implications for ACT and shed new light on the relationship between anxiety and 
the functioning of the phonological loop component of the working memory 
system (cf., Baddeley, 1986).  
Anxiety Impairs the Updating Function (Under Stressful Conditions) 
The present thesis tested the assumption that anxiety impairs updating 
performance (indexed here on the reading span task) under high situational stress 
(manipulated using ego threat instructions). Although Study 1.2 did not reveal 
results to support this prediction, the task employed may have been too difficult 
and a floor effect in the data may have occurred. To overcome this possibility, 
task demands were lessened by shortening the sentences and reducing the memory 
load associated with the task. Study 2.1, however, afforded only partial support 
for this assumption. Two separate studies tested whether effort or motivation 
moderated the link between anxiety and updating performance (see Study 2.1). 
The data from Study 2.1.1 demonstrated that situational stress and mental effort 
made unique contributions to updating performance effectiveness, such that high 
stress predicted poorer updating effectiveness, and higher effort predicted better 
effectiveness. These relationships, however, were independent of trait anxiety and 
were not observed for updating efficiency. The data from Study 2.1.2 yielded a 
trend for situational stress to be related to updating effectiveness (in accord with 
Study 2.1.1), such that high stress predicted poorer effectiveness. However, this 
relationship was again unrelated to trait anxiety. An important finding from Study 
2.1.2 was that irrespective of situational stress, cognitive trait anxiety and 
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motivation were jointly associated with updating efficiency, such that at higher 
reported motivation, higher cognitive trait anxiety predicted higher updating 
efficiency, whereas at lower motivation higher cognitive trait anxiety predicted 
poorer efficiency.  
Anxiety Impairs the Inhibition Function 
Study 1.3 examined anxiety-linked inhibitory control deficits using a Go-
No-Go task with neutral stimuli, and provided support for idea that anxiety 
impairs inhibitory control, as predicted by ACT. The data from Study 1.3.1 
revealed that somatic anxiety was not associated with inhibitory control, however 
the results of Study 1.3.2 demonstrated that cognitive trait anxiety, cognitive 
situational stress and mental effort interacted to predict inhibitory effectiveness 
and efficiency. Specially, higher trait anxiety was related to poorer inhibitory 
effectiveness at low stress and higher effort, whereas higher trait anxiety was 
associated with poorer inhibitory efficiency at higher effort, irrespective of stress 
manipulation. Evidence that anxiety impaired the inhibition function in the 
presence of threat-related stimuli was also found, however to avoid repetition, 
these data are discussed below. 
Anxiety Impairs the Shifting Function 
Study 1.4 investigated the assumption that anxiety is associated with 
shifting impairments. Study 1.4.1 indicated that somatic anxiety was unrelated to 
shifting effectiveness or efficiency, whereas the data from Study 1.4.2 provided 
clear empirical support for ACT.  The results of Study 1.4.2 demonstrated that 
cognitive trait anxiety, cognitive situational stress and mental effort predict 
shifting efficiency deficits, but these factors are unrelated to shifting effectiveness 
(uniquely or in combination) on the WCST. The data from Study 1.4.2 indicated 
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that at higher reported mental effort, higher trait anxiety was associated with low 
shifting efficiency irrespective of stress, whereas at lower effort, higher trait 
anxiety predicted lower efficiency at high stress only. The shifting function was 
also examined in the presence of threat-related stimuli and these results are 
discussed below. 
Anxiety Impairs Attentional Control in the Presence of Threat   
Study 2.2 and Study 2.3 investigated the relationship between anxiety and 
attentional control using inhibition and shifting tasks containing threat-related and 
neutral stimuli (see Study 2.2 and Study 2.3, respectively). Mixed support was 
found for the assumptions of ACT. The data from Study 2.2 indicated that 
situational stress and motivation combined to predict inhibitory efficiency (but not 
effectiveness) of threat-related words compared to neutral words. However the 
pattern of this relationship was only partially consistent with ACT. Higher 
situational stress was related to poorer inhibitory efficiency for threat at higher but 
not lower motivation. Further, the data from Study 2.3 yielded two interactive 
relationships that varied on shifting effectiveness for threat-related words relative 
to neutral words, yet there was no relationship between anxiety and efficiency of 
threat differentiation.  In accord with ACT, cognitive trait anxiety and situational 
stress interacted to predict shifting effectiveness, such that higher cognitive trait 
anxiety was associated with poorer shifting effectiveness for threat-related relative 
to neutral words, whereas lower cognitive trait anxiety was related to better 
shifting effectiveness for threat differentiation. Cognitive trait anxiety also 
interacted with motivation to predict poorer shifting effectiveness, and these 
results are discussed below. Taken together, the data from Study 2.2 and Study 
2.3 provide support for the suggestion that anxiety impairs attentional control, and 
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in particular the degree to which the threat-related material is differentially 
processed (cf. Cisler & Koster, 2010). In this regard the data reported here broadly 
support ACT. Subtle differences between the findings reported in the present 
thesis and those described in previous work are likely explained by subtle 
variations in task requirements. 
Anxiety and Motivation 
The experiments reported in Series 2 of this program of research are 
among the first to explore whether motivation further moderates the anxiety-stress 
relationship on updating, inhibition and shifting performance (see ACT; Eysenck 
& Derakshan, 2011). Motivation was defined as the degree to which an individual 
is committed to achieving a goal on a cognitive task. It was operationalised using 
a self-report questionnaire which was administered prior to performing the task 
(i.e., HWK; Klein et al., 2001). ACT suggests that if a task is sufficiently 
demanding and has clear goals, highly anxious individuals will increase their 
motivation and consequently enhance their performance. On the reading span task 
(Study 2.1), higher cognitive trait anxiety and higher motivation predicted better 
reading span efficiency, but not effectiveness. For high trait anxious individuals, 
however, motivation had the opposite effect on the attentional processes of 
inhibition and shifting. Specifically, those high in trait anxiety, who reported 
higher motivation, demonstrated poorer efficency on the inhibition task (Go-No-
Go) in Study 2.2, and poorer effectiveness on the shifting task (WCST) in Study 
2.3. It is important to note, though, that the tasks employed in Study 2.2 and Study 
2.3 contrasted responses between threat-related and neutral trials. If motivation is 
viewed as an intentional strategy, then perhaps recruitment of extra motivation is 
beyond the purview of protecting against shortfalls of differential responses to 
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threat. In light of the well established notion that threat-processing biases operate 
counter to intention (i.e., automatically; see Cisler & Koster, 2010), consciously 
motivated strategies would seem unlikely to be effective. 
Practical Implications 
The present thesis was designed to assess the utility of ACT in explaining 
the relationship between cognitive performance (phonological, updating, 
inhibitory and shifting processes) and state and trait measures of anxiety. 
Furthermore, the program of research examined whether these relationships were 
moderated by motivational effort. ACT provides a set of assumptions specific to 
non-clinical anxiety. Future work should determine whether the patterns of data 
found here for non-clinically anxious individuals hold for clinically anxious 
patients. Importantly, any dissociations in the patterns of results between clinically 
and non-clinically anxious subjects might represent an important marker of 
clinical breakdown and provide therapists with behavioural deficits to target 
during treatment. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Despite the procedural strengths of the present thesis, there are some 
considerations and/or limitations that require mention. The present program of 
research controlled for the relationship between anxiety and depression, and 
depression and the criterion. Specifically, the results reported in Chapters 4 and 6 
explain variance in the criterion above that explained by the variance in 
depression. Nonetheless, it is likely that other personal attribute variables might 
also co-vary with anxiety, effort, and/or motivation, and also with cognitive 
performance. Importantly, the use of random assignment to the situational stress 
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conditions (e.g., ego safe vs. ego threat) ensured that person variables were 
randomised between these groups.  
ACT represents a theory developed for individual differences in anxiety 
within non-clinical populations, and accordingly the studies reported here 
employed undergraduate student samples with varying levels of anxiety as a 
personality dimension. It remains to be seen whether the patterns of data reported 
in the present thesis generalise to clinical populations, such as those with a 
diagnosis of social anxiety, generalised anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress 
disorder or other subcategories of anxiety disorders. Numerous studies have 
presented data demonstrating the relationship between clinically diagnosed 
anxiety and cognitive performance (e.g., Dalgleish et al., 2003; Harvey, Bryant, & 
Rapee, 1996; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). As such, differences between results 
reported here and those of studies employing clinically anxious individuals could 
reflect important markers of clinical breakdown. Understanding the precise 
mechanisms that underpin the cognitive performance of clinically anxious 
individuals can assist with tailoring treatments to the specific cognitive strategies 
being utilised.  
Summary and Conclusions 
A large body of anxiety research has sought to clarify whether anxiety is 
related to impaired or enhanced cognitive performance. The present thesis 
provides a number of critical observations to shed light on this relationship, and 
most importantly critically appraises one of the most recent theoretical approaches 
in this area, namely ACT. The present results indicated that higher cognitive trait 
anxiety was related to impaired performance (1) efficiency (but not effectiveness) 
on simple and complex phonological tasks, at lower effort and under high stress; 
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(2) efficiency on an updating task, at lower motivation; (3) efficiency on an 
inhibition task, at higher effort, irrespective of stress; (4) efficiency (but not 
effectiveness) on a shifting task, at higher effort, irrespective of stress, and at 
lower effort, and high but not low stress ; and (5) effectiveness of threat relative to 
neutral words on a shifting task, at higher motivation. On the other hand, the 
present data demonstrated that higher cognitive trait anxiety was only related to 
enhanced performance efficiency on an updating task at higher motivation, and 
this relationship was irrespective of stress condition. In accord with ACT, these 
results permit two clear conclusions. Specifically, elevated anxiety is more 
strongly associated with impaired than enhanced performance, and performance 
impairments are more likely to manifest as efficiency costs than effectiveness 
deficits. There was some evidence to support the notion that anxious individuals 
devote increased effort and/or motivation to the accomplishment of the specified 
task goals.  
Together, these combined results have significant implications for ACT. 
The finding of differential effects of trait anxiety, situational stress, effort, and 
motivation on the various tasks used in the current work (i.e., word span, reading 
span, Go-No-Go, WCST) raises the question of how the performances of these 
tasks are resourced within the cognitive system. ACT suggests that anxious 
individuals use strategies such as recruitment of extra effort or motivation to 
protect against performance shortfalls. It is possible, nonetheless, that each 
process (phonological, updating, inhibition and shifting) is resourced differently. 
For example, for performance of phonological tasks, trait anxiety and situational 
stress may delete resources but invested mental effort seems to buffer this 
relationship. However, for performance on an updating task, trait anxiety might 
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tax the available resources but motivation appears to moderate this relationship. 
The aforementioned interpretation is, however, beyond the scope of the present 
thesis and requires empirical investigation. It is hoped that the present data 
provides the impetus for such work.  
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Appendix A 
 
BOND UNIVERSITY 
 
Faculty of Society and Design 
 
PhD Research Project  
 
Individual Differences in Processing of Emotional Information 
 
RO-559A 
 
Experimenter: Elizabeth (Liz) Edwards 
 
Supervisor: Dr Mike Lyvers 
 
Information for Participants in the Cognitive Psychology Laboratory 
 
The research carried out in the Cognitive Psychology Laboratory includes a 
number of new and continuing research projects. Our studies are concerned with 
understanding more about the nature of human cognition and a variety of related 
phenomenon. The success of our research is vitally dependent upon the assistance 
of volunteers like yourself, and we are extremely grateful for your participation. 
 
Today I am volunteering to participate in a research study that will involve the 
completion of some questionnaires and a number of tasks that assess cognitive 
abilities. In addition, it may also include a procedure that could temporarily 
elevate my stress levels. I also understand that any data I provide will be held as 
totally confidential and that I am free to withdraw from the experiment without 
prejudice at any time. 
 
This study has been cleared by the Bond University Human Research Ethics 
Committee (BUHREC) in accordance with the National Health and Medical 
Research Council‟s guidelines. You are free to discuss your participation in this 
study with project staff on 5595 2673.  
 
 
 
 
_______________________   ______________________ 
Student‟s Signature    Print Student‟s Name 
 
 
_______________________   ______________________ 
Student Number    Date 
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Appendix B 
 
Word Span Task (Forward and Backward) 
(modified from Wechsler, 1997) 
 
Trial Stimuli 
P 
1 desk,keys 
2 bath,doors,rack 
1 
1 step,wall 
2 rack,hook 
2 
1 hook,keys,chair 
2 desk,rack,wall 
3 
1 rack,step,desk,wall 
2 wall,keys,hook,bath 
4 
1 doors,step,bath,hook,desk 
2 wall,step,keys,chair,bath 
5 
1 step,bath,desk,rack,doors,wall 
2 bath,keys,desk,hook,rack,step 
6 
1 keys,hook,desk,bath,doors,rack,chair 
2 wall,keys,step,rack,bath,doors,desk 
7 
1 bath,desk,wall,hook,rack,doors,keys,chair 
2 desk,bath,doors,chair,rack,hook,keys,step 
8 
1 desk,keys,chair,hook,wall,keys,chair,bath,hook 
2 keys,wall,chair,hook,desk,rack,step,doors,bath 
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Appendix C 
 
Reading Span Task 
(Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Masson & Miller, 1983; see Series 1) 
 
Trial Sentence 
P1 
1 She had been so engrossed in her little lecture that she had almost forgotten her listener.  
2 One man had to bail steadily while another struggled to apply patches to the pontoon.  
Q She had been engrossed in her little lecture.  
A TRUE 
P2 
1 At two hundred fifty miles per hour he felt that he was nearing his level-flight maximum speed.  
2 He gently lifted the various pans and baskets, placing them just so in the sleigh. 
3 The restaurant was a richly appointed, wood-panelled room with thick carpets and glistening silver. 
Q The restaurant was ugly and had tarnished silver. 
A FALSE 
2.1 
1 Due to his many capabilities, his position as director was promoted quickly. 
2 It is possible of course, that life did not arise on earth at all. 
Q He was fired because he was lazy.  
A FALSE 
2.2 
1 After all, he had not gone far, and some of his walking had been circular. 
2 The old lady was thoroughly persuaded that she was not long to continue this novel. 
Q The lady with the novel was old.  
A TRUE 
2.3 
1 Jane's relatives had decided that her gentleman friend was one of high status. 
2 Without any hesitation, he plunged into the difficult mathematics assignment blindly. 
Q Jane did not have relatives or friends.  
A FALSE 
2.4 
1 The entire town arrived to see the appearance of the controversial political candidate. 
2 After passing all the exams, the class celebrated for an entire week without resting. 
Q Everyone had come to see the candidate.  
A TRUE 
2.5 
1 According to the results of the survey, Robert Redford is the most liked Hollywood star. 
2 The weather was unpredictable that summer so no one made plans too far in advance. 
Q The weather that summer was stable and predictable. 
A FALSE 
3.1 
1 The regenerating effects of the floods were not fully realized until months later. 
2 In a moment of complete spontaneity, she developed a thesis for her paper. 
3 At the conclusion of the musician‟s performance, the crowd applauded. 
Q The regenerating effects of the floods were noticed. 
A TRUE 
3.2 
1 They attended the theatre habitually except for circumstances beyond their control. 
2 The lumbermen worked long hours in order to obtain the necessary amount of wood. 
3 The old lady talked to her new neighbour on her weekly walks from church. 
Q The men worked to obtain the wood.  
A TRUE 
3.3 
1 There are days when the city where I live wakes in the morning with a strange look. 
2 We boys wanted to warn them, but we backed down when it came to the pinch. 
3 With shocked amazement and complete fascination Marion looked at the pictures. 
Q Marion did not look at the pictures. 
A FALSE 
3.4 
1 What would come after this day would be inconceivably different, would be real life. 
2 He stood there at the edge of the crowd while they were singing, and he looked bitter. 
3 John became annoyed with Karen's bad habits of biting her nails and chewing gum. 
Q Real life would come after this day.  
A TRUE 
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3.5 
1 Circumstantial evidence indicated that there was a proposal to select him. 
2 To determine the effects of the medication, the doctor hospitalized his patient. 
3 Her mother nagged incessantly about her lack of concern for the fashion of the children. 
Q The patient did not get any medication.  
A FALSE 
4.1 
1 I found the keynote speaker incredibly smart, intelligent and well read. 
2 In order to postpone the business trip, he cancelled his engagements for the week. 
3 The incorrigible child was taught about the importance of respect for his elders. 
4 The brilliant trial attorney dazzled the jury with his astute knowledge of the case. 
Q They thought the key note speaker did well.  
A TRUE 
4.2 
1 I imagine that you have a shrewd suspicion of the object of my earlier visit. 
2 I turned my memories over at random like pictures in a photograph album. 
3 I'm not certain what went wrong but I think it was my short and loud laugh. 
4 Filled with these happy thoughts, I forcefully opened the heavy wooden door. 
Q They turned the memories over at random.  
A TRUE 
4.3 
1 Sometimes I get so tired of trying to convince him that I love him and shall forever. 
2 When in trouble, children naturally hope for a miraculous intervention by a superhuman. 
3 It was your belief in the significance of my studies that kept me going. 
4 The girl hesitated for a moment to taste the onions because her husband hated the smell. 
Q They thought that the studies were insignificant.  
A TRUE 
4.4 
1 The smokers were asked to refrain from their habit until the end of the production. 
2 The young business executive was determined to develop his housing projects within the year. 
3 Despite the unusually cold weather, the campers continued the canoe trip. 
4 All students that passed the test were exempt from any further seminars that semester. 
Q The students were not given the tests.  
A FALSE 
4.5 
1 The entire construction crew decided to lengthen their work day in order to have lunch. 
2 In comparison to his earlier works, the musician had developed a unique enthralling style. 
3 The boisterous laughter of the children was disturbing to the aged in the building. 
4 The sound of an approaching train woke him, and he started to his feet.  
Q The crew decided not to have lunch.  
A FALSE 
5.1 
1 A small oil lamp burned on the floor and two men crouched against the wall, watching them. 
2 The products of digital electronics will play an important role in your future. 
3 One problem with this explanation is that there appears to be no defence against cheating. 
4 Sometimes the scapegoat is an outsider who has been taken into the community. 
5 I should not be able to make anyone understand how exciting it all was. 
Q Digital electronics will be important in the future.  
A TRUE 
5.2 
1 In a flash of fatigue and fantasy, he saw a man sitting beside a campfire. 
2 The lieutenant sat beside the man with the walkie-talkie and stared at the muddy ground. 
3 I will not shock my readers with a description of the cool-blooded acting that followed. 
4 The courses are designed as much for professional engineers as for amateur enthusiasts. 
5 The taxi turned up Michigan Avenue, where they had a clear view of the lake. 
Q The acting that followed was cool-blooded.  
A TRUE 
5.3 
1 The words of human love have been used by the saints to describe their vision of God. 
2 It was shortly after this that an unusual pressure of business called me into town. 
3 He pursued this theme, still pretending to seek for information to quiet his own doubts. 
4 I was so surprised at this unaccountable apparition, that I was speechless for a while. 
5 When at last his eyes opened, there was no gleam of triumph, no shade of anger. 
Q They were not surprised by the apparition.  
A FALSE 
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5.4 
1 He leaned on the wall of the building and the two policemen watched him from a distance. 
2 These splendid glittering eyes were turned upon me from the mirror with a haughty stare. 
3 He sometimes considered applying but the thought was too oppressive to remain in his mind. 
4 And now that a man had decided, some unimaginably different state of affairs must come to be. 
5 When I got to the big tobacco field I saw that it had not suffered much. 
Q The big tobacco field did not suffer much.  
A TRUE 
5.5 
1 Here, as well as elsewhere, the empirical patterns are important and abundantly documented. 
2 The intervals of silence grew progressively longer; the delays became very maddening. 
3 Two or three substantial pieces of wood smouldered on the hearth, for the night was cold. 
4 I imagined that he had been thinking things over while the secretary was with us. 
5 There was still more than an hour before breakfast, and the house was silent and asleep. 
Q The empirical patterns are not important or documented.  
A FALSE 
6.1 
1 The announcement of it would resound throughout the world, penetrate to the remotest land. 
2 To do so in directions that are adaptive for mankind would be a realistic objective. 
3 Slicing it out carefully with his knife, he folded it without creasing the face. 
4 He laughed heartily and looked as though he was quite amused at me for my joke. 
5 He tolerated another intrusion and thought himself a paragon of patience for doing so. 
6 The reader may suppose I had other motives, besides the desire to escape the law. 
Q The directions would be adaptive for mankind. 
A TRUE 
6.2 
1 He listened carefully because he had the weird impression that he knew the voices. 
2 The basic characteristic of the heroes in the preceding stories is their sensitivity. 
3 His imagination had so abstracted him that his name was called twice before he answered. 
4 He had an odd elongated skull which sat on his shoulders like a pear on a dish. 
5 He stuffed his denim jacket into his pants and fastened the stiff, new snaps securely. 
6 On the desk where she wrote her letters was a clutter of objects coated in dust. 
Q He was so abstracted by his imagination.  
A TRUE 
6.3 
1 He had encouraged her when she was at school and supported her when she was a student. 
2 The rain and howling wind kept beating against the rattling window panes. 
3 He covered his heart with both hands to keep anyone from hearing the noise it made. 
4 The stories all deal with a middle-aged protagonist who attempts to withdraw from society. 
5 Without tension there could be no balance either in nature or in mechanical design. 
6 I wish their existed someone to whom I could say that I felt very sorry. 
Q The stories had all contained a middle-aged protagonist.  
A TRUE 
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Appendix D 
 
Go-No-Go Task Stimulus Words (see Series 1) 
Neutral Words 
 
desk (4209) 
suite (1322) 
beds (2038) 
blanket (1063) 
taps (434) 
wall (11180) 
cups (1173) 
chair (6969) 
stair (339) 
iron (4375) 
fence (1502) 
sugar (3365) 
hook (1303) 
bath (3318) 
doors (4383) 
eaves (183) 
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Appendix E 
 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task  
(modified from Heaton et al., 1993; see Series 1) 
 
Target Cards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stimulus Cards 
 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 6 7 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 10 11 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 14 15 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 18 19 20 
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21 22 23 24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25 26 27 28 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 30 31 32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 34 35 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 38 39 40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 42 43 44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 46 47 48 
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49 50 51 52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
53 54 55 56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
57 58 59 60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61 62 63 64 
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Appendix F 
 
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale  
(DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) 
 
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 which indicates how much the statement applied to 
you over the past week.  There are no right or wrong answers.  Do not spend too much time on any 
statement. 
      
  Did not 
apply to 
me at all 
Applied to 
me to 
some 
degree, or 
some of 
the time 
Applied to 
me to a 
considerable 
degree, or a 
good part of 
time 
Applied 
to me 
very 
much, or 
most of 
the time 
  0 1 2 3 
     
1 I found it hard to wind down 0 1 2 3 
2 I was aware of dryness of my mouth 0 1 2 3 
3 I couldn't seem to experience any positive 
feeling at all 
0 1 2 3 
4 I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, 
excessively rapid breathing, breathlessness in 
the absence of physical exertion) 
0 1 2 3 
5 I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do 
things 
0 1 2 3 
6 I tended to over-react to situations 0 1 2 3 
7 I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands) 0 1 2 3 
8 I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy 0 1 2 3 
9 I was worried about situations in which I might 
panic and make a fool of myself 
0 1 2 3 
10 I felt that I had nothing to look forward to 0 1 2 3 
11 I found myself getting agitated 0 1 2 3 
12 I found it difficult to relax 0 1 2 3 
13 I felt down-hearted and blue 0 1 2 3 
14 I was intolerant of anything that kept me from 
getting on with what I was doing 
0 1 2 3 
15 I felt I was close to panic 0 1 2 3 
16 I was unable to become enthusiastic about 
anything 
0 1 2 3 
17 I felt I wasn't worth much as a person 0 1 2 3 
18 I felt that I was rather touchy 0 1 2 3 
19 I was aware of the action of my heart in the 
absence of physical exertion (eg, sense of heart 
rate increase, heart missing a beat) 
0 1 2 3 
20 I felt scared without any good reason 0 1 2 3 
21 I felt that life was meaningless 0 1 2 3 
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Appendix G 
State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety – State Scale 
(STICSA-S; Ree et al., 2000) 
 
 
Below is a list of statements which can be used to describe how people feel. Beside each statement are 
four numbers which indicate the degree with which each statement is self-descriptive of you mood at this 
moment (e.g., 1=Not at All, 4=Very Much So). Please read each statement carefully and circle the 
number which best indicates how you feel right now, at the very moment, even if this is not how you 
usually feel. 
      
  Not at All A Little Moderately Very 
Much 
So 
  1 2 3 4 
At present...     
1 My heart beats fast 1 2 3 4 
2 My muscles are tense 1 2 3 4 
3 I feel agonised over my problems 1 2 3 4 
4 I think that others won‟t approve of me 1 2 3 4 
5 I feel like I‟m missing out on things because I 
can‟t make up my mind soon enough 
1 2 3 4 
6 I feel dizzy 1 2 3 4 
7 My muscles feel weak 1 2 3 4 
8 I feel trembly and shaky 1 2 3 4 
9 I picture some future misfortune 1 2 3 4 
10 I can‟t get some thought out of my mind 1 2 3 4 
11 I have trouble remembering things 1 2 3 4 
12 My face feels hot 1 2 3 4 
13 I think that the worst will happen 1 2 3 4 
14 My arms and legs feel stiff 1 2 3 4 
15 My throat feels dry 1 2 3 4 
16 I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts 1 2 3 4 
17 I cannot concentrate without irrelevant 
thoughts intruding 
1 2 3 4 
18 My breathing if fast and shallow 1 2 3 4 
19 I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as 
well as I would like to 
1 2 3 4 
20 I have butterflies in my stomach 1 2 3 4 
21 My palms feel clammy 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
255 
State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety – Trait Scale 
(STICSA-T; Ree et al., 2000) 
 
Below is a list of statements which can be used to describe how people feel. Beside each statement are 
four numbers which indicate the degree with which each statement is self-descriptive of you mood at 
this moment (e.g., 1=Not at All, 4=Very Much So). Please read each statement carefully and circle the 
number which best indicates how often, in general, the statement is true for you. 
      
  Almost 
Never 
Occasionally Often Almost 
Always 
  1 2 3 4 
In general...     
1 My heart beats fast 1 2 3 4 
2 My muscles are tense 1 2 3 4 
3 I feel agonised over my problems 1 2 3 4 
4 I think that others won‟t approve of me 1 2 3 4 
5 I feel like I‟m missing out on things because I 
can‟t make up my mind soon enough 
1 2 3 4 
6 I feel dizzy 1 2 3 4 
7 My muscles feel weak 1 2 3 4 
8 I feel trembly and shaky 1 2 3 4 
9 I picture some future misfortune 1 2 3 4 
10 I can‟t get some thought out of my mind 1 2 3 4 
11 I have trouble remembering things 1 2 3 4 
12 My face feels hot 1 2 3 4 
13 I think that the worst will happen 1 2 3 4 
14 My arms and legs feel stiff 1 2 3 4 
15 My throat feels dry 1 2 3 4 
16 I keep busy to avoid uncomfortable thoughts 1 2 3 4 
17 I cannot concentrate without irrelevant 
thoughts intruding 
1 2 3 4 
18 My breathing if fast and shallow 1 2 3 4 
19 I worry that I cannot control my thoughts as 
well as I would like to 
1 2 3 4 
20 I have butterflies in my stomach 1 2 3 4 
21 My palms feel clammy 1 2 3 4 
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Appendix H 
Rating Scale for Mental Effort  
(RSME; Zilstra, 1993) 
 
 
Draw a line through the vertical scale to indicate how much mental effort you had 
to invest to execute the previous task (i.e., how effortful was it for you to perform 
the previous task). 
 
 
150 
 
 
140  
 
130  
 
120  
 
110  
 
100  
 
90  
 
80  
 
70  
 
60  
 
50  
 
40  
 
30  
 
20  
 
10  
 
0  
 
 
 
 
 
 
not at all effortful 
not very effortful 
tremendously effortful 
very, very effortful 
very effortful 
pretty effortful 
rather effortful 
fairly effortful 
a bit effortful 
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Appendix I 
 
State Rating Questionnaire 
 
For each of the following dimensions circle the option that best describes how 
you feel, right now, at this moment. 
 
 
1. Calm to Nervous 
Very  
Calm 
Quite 
Calm 
Slightly 
Calm 
Neither 
Calm  
Nor 
 Nervous 
Slightly 
Nervous 
 
Quite 
Nervous 
 
 
Very  
Nervous 
 
 
2. Fearless to Fearful 
 
Very  
Fearless 
Quite 
Fearless 
Slightly 
Fearless 
Neither 
Fearless  
Nor  
Fearful 
Slightly 
Fearful 
 
Quite 
Fearful 
 
 
Very  
Fearful 
 
 
3. Relaxed to Anxious 
 
Very  
Relaxed 
Quite 
Relaxed 
Slightly 
Relaxed 
Neither 
Relaxed  
Nor 
 Anxious 
Slightly 
Anxious 
 
Quite 
Anxious 
 
 
Very  
Anxious 
 
 
4. Unconcerned to Worried 
 
Very 
Unconcerned 
Quite 
Unconcerned 
Slightly 
Unconcerned 
Neither 
Unconcerned  
Nor 
 Worried 
Slightly 
Worried 
 
Quite 
Worried 
 
 
Very 
Worried 
 
 
5. Comfortable to Tense 
 
Very 
Comfortable 
Quite 
Comfortable 
Slightly 
Comfortable 
Neither 
Comfortable 
Nor 
 Tense 
Slightly 
Tense 
 
Quite  
Tense 
 
 
Very  
Tense 
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Appendix J 
 
Reading Span Task (shortened; see Series 2) 
 
Trial Sentence 
P1 
1 She was so engrossed in the lecture, she forgot about the listener.  
2 One man bailed steadily while the other applied patches to the pontoon.  
Q She was engrossed in her lecture.  
A TRUE 
P2 
1 He thought two hundred miles per hour was his maximum speed.  
2 He carefully lifted the gift boxes and placed them on Santa's sleigh. 
3 The five star restaurant had leather chairs, fine china and beautiful silver. 
Q He threw the boxes on Santa's sleigh 
A FALSE 
2.1 
1 Due to his vast experience and many capabilities, he was promoted quickly. 
2 It is possible that no one survived the plane crash at all. 
Q He was fired because he was lazy.  
A FALSE 
2.2 
1 Jane's family had decided that her new work friend had high status. 
2 Without thinking of the consequences, he proceeded to announce his resignation blindly. 
Q Jane did not have any family or friends.  
A FALSE 
2.3 
1 Jane's family had decided that her new work friend had high status. 
2 Without thinking of the consequences, he proceeded to announce his resignation blindly. 
Q Jane did not have any family or friends.  
A FALSE 
2.4 
1 People came from all around to see the newly elected political candidate. 
2 After finishing her studies she celebrated for an entire week without resting. 
Q Many people came to see the candidate.  
A TRUE 
2.5 
1 According to the survey, Zac Efron is the most liked Hollywood star. 
2 The weather was unpredictable, so it was difficult to plan in advance. 
Q The weather was predictable. 
A FALSE 
3.1 
1 The effects of the flood were not fully realised until months later. 
2 With sudden inspiration, she thought of a brilliant idea for her paper. 
3 At the end of the beautiful musical performance, the crowd enthusiastically applauded. 
Q The flood had no effects. 
A FALSE 
3.2 
1 They attended the church habitually except for circumstances outside of their control. 
2 The carpenters worked long hours to saw the necessary amount of wood. 
3 The old lady walked with her new neighbour to and from church. 
Q The men sawed enough wood.  
A TRUE 
3.3 
1 There are days when you wake up and have a strange look. 
2 We fought hard, but backed down when it came to the pinch. 
3 With complete fascination, Marion flicked through the book examining all the pictures. 
Q Marion showed no interest in the book. 
A FALSE 
3.4 
1 Dreaming of winning gold lotto is wonderful, but probably not real life.  
2 He stood and watched her for a while feeling sad and bitter. 
3 John was annoyed when his daughter Karen started swearing and chewing gum. 
Q Winning lotto is not real life. 
A TRUE 
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3.5 
1 After the investigation there was enough evidence to identify and select him. 
2 To determine the effects of the medication, the doctor hospitalised his patient. 
3 His wife nagged incessantly about maintaining a healthy diet for their children. 
Q The doctor hospitalised his patient.  
A TRUE 
4.1 
1 I found the speaker intelligent, very easy to follow and well read. 
2 He postponed his business trip and cancelled his engagements for the week. 
3 The child was taught about the importance of respect for her elders. 
4 The attorney impressed the jury with his thorough knowledge of the case. 
Q The speaker was hard to follow.  
A FALSE 
4.2 
1 I imagine that you are suspicious of the purpose of my visit. 
2 She has pictures of my great-grandmother in an old photograph album. 
3 He was not sure what went wrong but it made him laugh. 
4 Filled with these happy thoughts, she pushed open the heavy wooden door. 
Q She has no old family photographs.  
A FALSE 
4.3 
1  I am trying to convince him that I will love him forever. 
2 The small troubled child wished for a miraculous intervention by a superhuman. 
3 It was your strong belief in my ability that kept me going. 
4 The girl hesitated to taste the onions because she hated the smell. 
Q Your belief in me was very helpful. 
A TRUE 
4.4 
1 All the performers gathered back stage at the end of the production. 
2 The young business executive was determined to improve his sales this year. 
3 Despite the unusually cold weather, the teenagers were planning a camping trip. 
4 Students that passed the exam were exempt from further classes that semester. 
Q The students were not examined.  
A FALSE 
4.5 
1 Staff agreed to longer work days in order to break for lunch. 
2 By comparison to other classical musicians, the violinist had an entertaining style. 
3 Students playing loud music disturb the old people living in the building. 
4 The children were instructed to walk very slowly and lift their feet. 
Q The staff decided to extend their day.  
A TRUE 
5.1 
1 The clowns gathered a small crowd and many children were watching them. 
2 Having a formal education will play an important role in your future. 
3 There was a problem with the examination with some evidence of cheating. 
4 Sometimes it is beneficial to bring an outsider in to the community. 
5 I should have been able to understand how exciting it all was. 
Q Formal education is important to your future.  
A TRUE 
5.2 
1 After searching the bushland they found the man sitting beside the campfire. 
2 The travelling circus crew arrived to set up at the muddy ground. 
3 I was shocked when my son described the hilarious events that followed. 
4 The photography courses are designed as much for professionals as for enthusiasts. 
5 The tour bus parked to give tourists a view of the lake. 
Q The man was eventually found. 
A TRUE 
5.3 
1 Their religious leader wrote a lenthgy description of his vision of God. 
2 Shortly after this, the unexpected pressure of business called me into town. 
3 He continued questioning, pretending to seek information to fulfil his own doubts. 
4 After the shocking announcement today, I was totally speechless for a while. 
5 When we finally spoke, there was no sign of jealousy or anger. 
Q I was shocked by the announcement today. 
A TRUE 
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5.4 
1 He held his child and the woman watched him from a distance. 
2 My eyes turned upon me from the mirror with a haughty stare. 
3 He considered writing about her so she would remain in his mind. 
4 When the jury makes their decision, a conclusion will come to be. 
5 We arrived at the plantation and found it had not suffered much. 
Q The plantation did not suffer much.  
A TRUE 
5.5 
1 The investigation is vitally important and the findings must be well documented. 
2 Hour after hour the difficulties got worse and the delays became maddening. 
3 The hikers complained about the steep climb in the rain and cold. 
4 We were thinking things over while our manager was talking to us. 
5 It was an hour before breakfast and the house was still asleep. 
Q The hikers enjoyed the climbing conditions. 
A FALSE 
6.1 
1 The news had spread across the world even to the remotest land. 
2 We will activate the social policy and this will meet our objective. 
3 Wipe the lens carefully with a soft cloth to protect the face. 
4 He laughed heartily and looked as though he appreciated my clever joke. 
5 He tolerated a third interuption and showed much patience for doing so. 
6 She thought I had other motives, besides trying to escape the law. 
Q My joke was apreciated. 
A TRUE 
6.2 
1 He listened carefully because he thought that he recognised the soft voices. 
2 A common personal attribute among the central characters was their unique sensitivity. 
3 Being so distracted meant his name was called twice before he answered. 
4 She served the chocolate tart with mixed berries to decorate each dish. 
5 He pulled the strap across his waist and fastened the catch securely. 
6 The desk was cluttered with old papers and objects coated in dust. 
Q He answered every time his name was called.  
A FALSE 
6.3 
1 He encouraged her while she was at university and still a student. 
2 The rain and howling wind kept beating against the rattling window panes. 
3 He wondered if people woud hear the loud noise that it made. 
4 The couple moved to the country and attempted to withdraw from society. 
5 Without the correct tension there would be no balance in mechanical design. 
6 When I saw him, I wanted to say that I felt sorry. 
Q The couple moved to the country. 
A TRUE 
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Appendix K 
Go-No-Go Task Stimulus Words (see Series 2) 
 
Neutral Words  Threat-Related Words 
desk (4209)  hurt (4145) 
suite (1322)  grief (1315) 
beds (2038)  evil (2745) 
blanket (1063)  lacking (1479) 
taps (434)  scar (411) 
wall (11180)  dead (11643) 
cups (1173)  burnt (1100) 
chair (6969)  pain (6928) 
stair (339)  satan (375) 
iron (4375)  kill (4375) 
fence (1502)  burn (1559) 
sugar (3365)  abuse (3389) 
hook (1303)  ugly (1252) 
bath (3318)  fail (3238) 
doors (4383)  worry (4516) 
eaves (183)  spasm (184) 
 
NOTE: Frequencies per million x 89 are shown in parentheses 
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Appendix L 
 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task  
(modified from Heaton et al., 1993; see Series 2) 
 
Target Cards 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stimulus Cards 
 
(Matched according to the WCST in Series 1) 
 
 
 
Neutral Cards  Threat-Related Cards 
carpet (2088)  coffin (1317) 
garage (1603)  lonely (1696) 
sheets (2127)  stupid (2439) 
coffee (5724)  danger (5709) 
 
NOTE: Frequencies per million x 89 are shown in parentheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
